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Kitty and Michael Dukakis Center for Urban and Regional Policy  
The Kitty and Michael Dukakis Center for Urban and Regional Policy conducts interdisciplinary research, in collaboration with 
civic leaders and scholars both within and beyond Northeastern University, to identify and implement real solutions to the criti-
cal challenges facing urban areas throughout Greater Boston, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the nation. Founded in 
1999 as a “think and do” tank, the Dukakis Center’s collaborative research and problem-solving model applies powerful data 
analysis, a bevy of multidisciplinary research and evaluation techniques, and a policy-driven perspective to address a wide range 
of issues facing cities and towns. These include affordable housing, local economic development, workforce development, trans-
portation, public finance, and environmental sustainability. The staff of the Dukakis Center works to catalyze broad-based efforts 
to solve urban problems, acting as both a convener and a trusted and committed partner to local, state, and national agencies 
and organizations. The Center is housed within Northeastern University’s innovative School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs.
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) is a statewide organization that represents the interests of all players in 
the housing and community development fields, including non-profit and for-profit developers, municipal officials, homeown-
ers, tenants, bankers, real estate professionals, property managers, and government officials. The organization is a sponsor of 
many research projects concerned with housing and in 1998 commissioned a study from the Donahue Institute at the University 
of Massachusetts entitled “A Profile of Housing in Massachusetts.” This report began the work of measuring progress in key 
housing policy areas such as supply, affordability, and accessibility. Over the past five years, CHAPA has assisted in the funding 
and development of each installment of the Greater Boston Housing Report Cards. 
The Boston Foundation 
The Boston Foundation, Greater Boston’s community foundation, is one of the oldest and largest community foundations in 
the nation, with assets of $737 million. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Foundation and its donors made over $95 million in grants to 
nonprofit organizations and received gifts of over $81 million. The Foundation is made up of some 900 separate charitable 
funds established by donors either for the general benefit of the community or for special purposes. The Boston Foundation 
also serves as a major civic leader, provider of information, convener, and sponsor of special initiatives designed to address 
the community’s and region’s most pressing challenges. For more information about the Boston Foundation, call 617-338-1700 
or visit www.tbf.org.
The Warren Group 
The Warren Group collects public record data on real estate sales and ownership throughout New England and offers a range 
of real estate products, information services and printed publications, including the weekly newspapers Banker & Tradesman 
and The Commercial Record. The company also produces and organizes trade shows and events for a variety of industries, 
including bankers, mortgage brokers, credit unions and lawyers. Based in Boston, the company was established in 1872 and 
is now in its fourth generation of family ownership and management.
We gratefully acknowledge Tim Warren, Alan Pasnik, Seema Layne, Aaron Gornstein, Ann Verrilli,  
Michael Ross, Paul Bishop, and Kyle McLaughlin, who provided our research team with good counsel,  
important data sets, and an acute understanding of the Greater Boston housing market. 
UNDERSTANDING BOSTON is a series of forums, educational events and research sponsored by the Boston Foundation to provide information and 
insight into issues affecting Boston, its neighborhoods, and the region. By working in collaboration with a wide variety of partners, the Boston 
Foundation provides opportunities for people to come together to explore challenges facing our constantly changing community and to develop 
an informed civic agenda.
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In a time of continued economic anxiety, the boston Foundation is proud to publish its eighth 
annual Greater Boston Housing Report Card . The recession may have been officially declared over, 
but the upheavals of the past few years continue to affect the lives of Massachusetts residents, with 
unemployment and an unstable housing market continuing to cause distress .
barry bluestone, Dean of the School of Public Policy and Urban affairs at Northeastern University, 
and his team, backed by the data resources of The Warren Group, once again bring their deep 
expertise to help provide a continuing picture of these issues . Throughout this series of annual 
housing reports, Professor bluestone has articulated the close and dynamic relationship between 
housing and the overall economic wellbeing of the region, identifying the themes and trends that 
matter most, and bringing light to a short list of issues of pressing and common concern .
This year, two elements explored by this report deserve particular attention . First is the likelihood 
of another wave of foreclosures and the second is a new assessment of the impact of the region’s 
student population . We know that scores of colleges and universities in the region continue to be 
critical and defining economic and cultural assets, establishing the region as a center for education 
in the world . How that population has changed in recent years, and the impact it is having on 
housing prices, is an issue that merits thoughtful and sustained attention .
The prospect of another series of foreclosures is a matter of great concern . as this report will 
document, this has the potential to bring further hardship to communities already suffering high 
unemployment . The effects of the economic crisis continue to intensify the growing divide between 
haves and have-nots in the region, documented by the most recent boston Indicators Report as a 
subject of growing concern .
at the same time, this report offers important positive news . Massachusetts stands ahead of the 
national curve in terms of job creation . The recent trend of net outflow of regional residents, driven 
in part by the high cost of housing here, has reversed, and Greater boston is again a destination for 
americans as well as immigrants who come from around the world to find opportunity .
The signs are mixed, but once again we have The Dukakis Center’s clear and probing analysis  
to help us all make sense of the situation .
Paul S . Grogan
President and CEO
The boston Foundation
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In last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card, we 
noted what we believed were the first indications that 
the economic recession that began in 2007 was draw-
ing to an end nationally and regionally . along with 
a strengthening economy were the first signs of an 
uptick in the housing market, with sales beginning to 
pick up and home prices stabilizing . However, we also 
noted that:
While housing has become more affordable rela-
tive to household incomes in Greater boston, the 
region is now less affordable than ever compared 
with virtually every metro area we compete with 
across the country . Moreover, despite the reces-
sion, rents in Greater boston are now substantially 
higher than before the recession began, and we 
have not seen any letup in the number of families 
falling behind in their mortgage payments and 
therefore becoming subject to the initiation of 
foreclosure activity .
For the last half of 2009 and for the first half of 2010, 
home sales and home prices continued to stabilize 
nationally as we predicted, with the average price for 
single-family homes holding steady across 20 of the 
largest housing markets in the country . This pattern 
also held for Greater boston which continued to 
outpace most other metro regions .
Unfortunately, during this spring and summer, 
there were disconcerting developments that reveal a 
continuing weakness in the overall national economy 
and the possibility of a double dip in the national 
and regional housing market that we did not fully 
anticipate . Expansion of the nation’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fell sharply in the second quarter and 
the ranks of the unemployed nationwide continued to 
grow . On the housing front, through July of this year, 
new home sales were running 8 percent below the 
same period last year and 33 percent below 2008 levels . 
With the end of the first-time homebuyer tax credit, 
in July home sales dropped a whopping 27 percent, 
double the consensus forecast of what the termination 
of this program might engender . Foreclosures and 
bank repossessions have been running at record levels 
in 2010 .
These national trends are reflected in Greater boston, 
although this is the first recession of the last three in 
which the Commonwealth’s economy is coming back 
from the depth of an economic crisis faster than the 
nation as a whole . Our unemployment rate remains 
lower than the nation’s and the rate of job creation since 
the beginning of this year is running at four times the 
national rate . On the housing front, Greater boston’s 
home prices remain nearly 14 percent below their 2005 
peak, but in a performance that appears to defy the 
gravity of the recession, rents are near their all-time 
high making rental units less affordable than ever .
as in our previous seven annual reports, the current 
report focuses on recent trends and patterns within 
the Greater boston housing market . However, in this 
one we explore in greater depth a number of issues 
including the sharp rise in foreclosures, the continuing 
problem with rental affordability, the impact of Chap-
ter 40b and 40R on housing production, the differential 
impact of the recession on single-family, multi-family, 
and condominium sales and prices, and for the first 
time we devote an entire chapter to student housing 
and its impact on the region’s rental market .
Overall, we are not quite as sanguine about the pros-
pects for the economy or the housing market this year 
as we were in last year’s overly optimistic projection . 
as of this moment, there are too many disconcert-
ing statistics that point to a continued weakness in 
the overall economy and the housing market . While 
Greater boston and the Commonwealth appear to 
be doing better, indeed considerably better than the 
nation as a whole on a range of economic indicators, 
we are not an island unto ourselves . If the national 
economy continues to suffer, we will suffer its 
tailwinds .
Executive Summary
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in-migration into Massachusetts from other states 
since we began tracking this indicator in 2000 . added 
to foreign immigration which remained at a more or 
less steady level, there was an increase in the state’s 
population due to migration for the first time in nearly 
a decade . What may be more than merely correla-
tion, the trend in Greater boston median home prices 
between 2000 and 2010 nearly mirrors the trend in net 
domestic migration . When home prices were skyrock-
eting in the first half of this decade, out-migration rose; 
when home prices fell after 2005 net out-migration 
decreased and ultimately turned into a net in-migra-
tion trend .
While it is an encouraging sign that families and indi-
viduals are choosing to remain in Massachusetts and 
others are choosing to move here, the impact on home 
prices and rents needs attention . With thousands 
more relocating to Massachusetts, and seeking to buy 
a home or rent an apartment, the increased demand 
for housing can rapidly result in higher home prices 
and rents if new supply does not come on line to meet 
the rising demand . Unfortunately, housing produc-
tion has remained at near historically low levels over 
the past year and unless it picks up significantly, we 
can expect that increased rents and prices could once 
again dissuade potential new residents from moving 
to Massachusetts .
Production of New Housing
Even with what appears to be an improving economy 
in the region, the construction of new housing in 
Greater boston remains anemic . Hardest-hit in Greater 
boston have been multifamily developments . The 
number of building permits for such developments in 
2009 was off by 74 percent from its 2005 high . While it 
is unlikely that 2010 will witness fewer permits than 
2009, there is little evidence from the permitting data 
we have through July of this year to suggest any robust 
recovery in the local housing market .
■■ barring an unimaginable jump in permitting in the 
final months of this year, 2010 is on track to be the 
second-lowest year for permitting in over a decade .
■■ Individual communities within Greater boston 
reflect the regional trend: very few municipalities 
increased the number of issued permits over the 
Specific Findings for  
2009–2010
Economic and Demographic Trends 
in the Greater Boston Region
Employment Trends
The good news is that the impact of the current reces-
sion on Massachusetts has not been as severe as its 
impact on the nation . The recovery from the depth of 
the recession is proceeding faster in Massachusetts 
than in the nation as a whole .
■■ as of august 2010, the U .S . unemployment rate 
was 9 .6 percent; in the Commonwealth, it was 8 .8 
percent .
■■ The U .S . economic activity index fell more than 6 
percent at its lowest point during the recession; in 
contrast, the Massachusetts economic activity index 
fell by just over 4 percent .
■■ Massachusetts jobs are coming back faster than 
those nationwide . by July 2010, employment in the 
Commonwealth was down 2 .8 percent from Decem-
ber 2007, while nationwide employment was down 
by 4 .8 percent .
■■ by July 2010, Massachusetts had replaced nearly 40 
percent of the jobs lost since December 2007 . Nation-
ally, less than 8 percent of the jobs lost during the 
recession had been replaced .
■■ While Massachusetts employs just 2 .4 percent of the 
U .S . workforce, job growth in the Commonwealth 
has accounted for 9 .4 percent of national employ-
ment growth since January of this year .
■■ The recovery of jobs in the Commonwealth has not 
been limited to a few sectors, but every major sector 
from construction and manufacturing to finance and 
tourism has experienced an expansion in employ-
ment since the beginning of this year .
Demographic Trends
There is also good news on the demographic front . 
The period between 2008 and 2009 saw the first net 
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However, starting in June of this year, after the federal 
first-time homebuyer tax credit expired, sales plum-
meted both in Greater boston and the nation . 
Home Prices
While sales increased in the second half of 2009 and 
the first half of 2010, home prices for all types of hous-
ing units continued to decline through 2009, with 
prices dropping the most for two-family and three-
family homes . Only in the first half of 2010 did we see 
the beginning of a moderate recovery in home prices 
of all types of owner-occupied units . Still, there is now 
concern that with the dramatic fall-off in home sales at 
mid-year prices might resume their earlier downward 
trend . While single family home prices increased from 
March through June in Greater boston, they fell in July .
If the softness in prices experienced this summer turns 
out to be only a temporary phenomenon due to the 
short-term impact of the expiring tax credit, then prices 
may end up mirroring the recovery from the 1988-1997 
housing cycle . It took 60 months back then for home 
prices to regain their pre-recession peak . Given what 
we find to be a close parallel between the timing of 
these two cycles, our best guess is that single family 
home prices will not fully recover to their 2005 peak 
until sometime in 2014 .
Rental Market
across the nation, the average rental vacancy rate 
across all large metropolitan areas combined has 
risen quite sharply since 2006 . The rate now exceeds 
10 percent for the first time since at least 1956 (and 
possibly for the first time ever) . However, in Greater 
boston, rental vacancy rates have generally been, and 
still remain, much lower than the national average . 
The big difference is likely related to the concentration 
of college and university students in the region who 
provide a more or less steady demand for rental units . 
as such, the Greater boston rental market is not subject 
to the same supply and demand patterns of the rental 
markets in other metropolitan areas .
■■ Rents in Greater boston continued to rise until the 
second half of 2008 . at the end of 2009, the average 
monthly asking rent had dropped less than $50 from 
its 2008 peak of $1,740 . 
previous year . In four Greater boston municipalities 
there were no permits for new housing at all in 2009 .
■■ For multifamily housing, the situation is even 
bleaker: only five municipalities permitted more 
than 100 new multifamily units in 2009, down from 
12 the year before . Of the 161 communities we track 
in Greater boston, 128 (six more than in 2008) added 
no multifamily housing last year .
■■ actual housing starts in the United States looked 
promising for the first five months of 2010, but both 
June and July showed the lowest number of housing 
starts in over 50 years .
■■ although the situation appears unpromising, 
Massachusetts may still end up leading the nation 
in exiting the housing recession . Homeowner and 
rental vacancy rates in Massachusetts have declined 
to below normal levels which should encourage 
more construction .
Home Sales, Prices and Rents in 
Greater Boston
Home Sales
Single family home sales began to rise in the boston 
region in March 2009, and that increase continued 
through May of this year . This turnaround in sales was 
one of the factors that prompted us last year to talk 
about housing in a “post-crisis” era . Sales of single-
family homes rose in 2009 for the first time in five 
years, providing the first annual data point suggesting 
the beginnings of a recovery in the market for detached 
single-family real estate .
■■ Condo sales took longer to begin recovering, but 
starting in September 2009, each month’s condo 
sales figure has exceeded the monthly figure from 
the year before .
■■ Sales of two- and three-family structures were 
depressed by the housing downturn even more than 
sales of single-family homes and condominiums . 
The sales turnaround for both two- and three-family 
homes took place earlier (but was more modest) 
than in single-family homes and condos, with 
higher sales figures for both types of units in both 
2008 and 2009 .
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Foreclosures in Greater Boston
In last year’s Report Card, we estimated a decline in 
foreclosure deeds for 2009 . Unfortunately, our esti-
mates were overly optimistic, as foreclosure petitions 
increased in the first half of 2010 while the number 
of deeds and auctions in the first half of 2010 suggest 
that the number of households losing their homes to 
foreclosure throughout the year will easily exceed the 
number in 2009 .
■■ Foreclosure petitions were down by almost 10 
percent between February 2009 and June 2010 .
■■ The number of foreclosure deeds in the first six 
months of 2010, however, was 124 percent greater 
than in the first six months of 2009 .
■■ Foreclosure auctions have increased by over 200 
percent from 560 in the first six months of 2009 to 
1,273 in the first six months of 2010 .
Foreclosures activity is not uniform across housing 
types . between the first six months of 2005 and the first 
six months of 2010, the total number of foreclosure 
petitions in Greater boston increased by more than 
four times, from 1,662 to 6,932 . Single-family home 
foreclosure petitions (comprising 60 percent of all peti-
tions) as well as three-family petitions increased by 
3 .7 times . Two-family petitions increased by 4 .5 times . 
Condominium petitions, however, increased by nearly 
7 times during this time .
although not all foreclosure petitions continue to 
the deed or auction phases of foreclosure, the rate of 
increase in deeds has been dramatic . between 2005 
and 2009, the number of annual foreclosure deeds 
increased 21 times across all housing types, with the 
largest increase (over 23 times) in condos and single 
family homes (21 times) . auctions increased 7 times in 
the past year . as expected, a rise in auctions tended to 
lead to home price depreciation for all housing types 
(with the exception of condominiums, which seemed 
to retain their relatively stable prices despite a rise in 
foreclosures and a depressed economy) .
Foreclosure activity is, of course, not evenly distrib-
uted throughout Greater boston . The most affected 
communities have tended to be older industrial cities 
with high unemployment rates . The least affected have 
been suburbs west of the City of boston . The only good 
news here is that the foreclosure crisis has affected 
■■ by the second quarter of 2010, rents began rising 
again . The downward correction in rents that took 
place last year was small and short-lived . This year 
Greater boston is likely to remain the fifth most 
expensive metropolitan region in the U .S . in average 
rent, only exceeded by New York City; Westchester 
County, New York; San Francisco; and Fairfield 
County, Connecticut .
Student Housing in Greater Boston
Much of the increase in rents in Greater boston can be 
explained by an influx of undergraduate and graduate 
students who compete with local residents in the rental 
market .
■■ Nationally, enrollment in post-secondary education 
institutions has been increasing rapidly over the 
last two years . In Greater boston, enrollment has 
increased by 45,000 students since 2001 with 19,000 
of the total occurring in just 2008 and 2009 .
■■ as of fall 2009, there were just under 234,000 under-
graduate students and 102,000 graduate students in 
the region for a grand total of 336,000 post-second-
ary students .
■■ We estimate that in the Greater boston area, there 
are approximately 177,000 students who are living 
off-campus with more than half (54 percent) being 
graduate students . Most of these students are living 
in rental housing .
■■ Within the City of boston, there are at least 61,000 
students (both graduate and undergraduate) living 
off-campus in local neighborhoods with the largest 
concentrations in allston, brighton, the Fenway and 
Mission Hill .
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
predicts a further increase in national enrollment in 
degree-granting institutions (both public and private) . 
between fall 2007 and fall 2018, the NCES predicts that 
undergraduate enrollment will increase by 12 percent 
while graduate enrollment may increase by 20 percent 
or more . If this projection holds for Greater boston, we 
can expect that by 2018 there will be another 26,000 
undergraduates in Greater boston and an additional 
19,000 graduate students . Without production of new 
rental housing, and with 45,000 additional students in 
the region, the already tight rental housing market will 
be strained even further .
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funds . State-funded expenditures declined to just 
$115 million in FY 2010, from $155 million in FY 2008 . 
Despite pressures to cut spending further, the budget is 
level-funded for FY 2011 . There are changes within this 
budget, as the Massachusetts Rental Voucher Program 
will be increased $3 .2 million over FY 2010, mostly to 
the detriment of the Rental assistance for Families in 
Transition (RaFT) program (a cut of $2 .8 million) . The 
federal Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Hous-
ing Program will offset the cuts in RaFT .
Chapter 40R and 40B
Chapter 40R and Chapter 40b continue to be critical 
factors in helping the Commonwealth to meet its hous-
ing needs .
■■ Under Chapter 40R three more communities have 
created Smart Growth Overlay Districts and two 
communities have added a second 40R district . 
altogether there are now 33 40R developments in 
the state with the as-of-right development oppor-
tunity for more than 12,000 units of additional 
housing .
■■ Chapter 40b continues to be the single most impor-
tant state program to encourage the development 
of housing and especially affordable housing . Since 
1970, over 50,000 units of housing have been devel-
oped under 40b with nearly 30,000 geared to house-
holds who earn less than 80 percent of area median 
income .
Conclusion
Overall, the beginning of 2010 held promise, but weak-
ness in the national economy that has appeared in the 
second half of the year makes it very difficult to predict 
what will happen in the Massachusetts economy and 
in the Greater boston housing market through the end 
of 2010 and into 2011 . The good news is that this time 
around the Massachusetts economy is outperforming 
the nation, with a stronger job market and therefore 
—at least, one would hope—a more stable housing 
market .
Still, there are a number of troublesome signs on the 
horizon . Perhaps the most important is the possibility 
that Chapter 40b will be repealed by referendum in 
the November election . If this occurs, the state will lose 
its most important tool for meeting its housing needs . 
fewer homeowners with mortgages in Massachusetts 
than across the nation—3 .4 vs . 4 .6 percent .
Public Policy and Public Spending  
in Support of Housing
New Federal and State Policies
On the federal level, much progress was made in the 
last two years in passing new legislation to encourage 
home purchases by first-time homebuyers, to provide 
state and local governments with funding to renovate 
abandoned and foreclosed properties, to refinance 
mortgages of current homeowners who face foreclo-
sure, to provide incentives to banks and mortgage 
companies to modify existing loans, to encourage 
both borrowers and servicers to increase the number 
of short sales in lieu of foreclosure, to assist tenants 
who are current on their rent to continue to remain in 
foreclosed properties until the property is resold, and 
to assist low and moderate income families who are at 
risk of becoming homeless .
In Massachusetts, major strides in the past year 
included addressing the foreclosure situation, the need 
to protect expiring use affordable housing units (i .e . 
the “preservation” issue), the promotion of more hous-
ing production, and developing ways to maximize the 
continuing habitability of public housing .
Public Spending on Housing
as part of the Special Commission Relative to Ending 
Homelessness in the Commonwealth recommendations, 
state homeless programs were shifted from the Depart-
ment of Transitional assistance to the Department 
of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) 
in FY 2010 . This move more than doubled DHCD’s 
budget . During FY 2010, DHCD received $643 million 
in federal funds and an additional one-time funding 
of $357 million by the federal american Recovery and 
Reinvestment act (aRRa) for a range of programs, 
including the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits and weatheriza-
tion . altogether, DHCD was allocated $1 .4 billion in 
FY 2010 for housing, homelessness and community 
related services .
The current recession and the state’s fiscal crisis have 
taken a toll on the state share of DHCD operating 
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The loss could also undermine the future of Chapter 
40R development, since many communities elect to 
use Chapter 40R as a means to achieve the mandated 
10-percent affordable housing target set by 40b . If 
40b disappears, there will be much less incentive for 
communities to adopt 40R .
The sharp rise in foreclosure deeds and auctions in 
2010 is also worrisome, as this could undermine hous-
ing values and lead to more families finding their 
homes worth less than their mortgages . This not only 
affects consumer confidence and consumer spending 
adversely, but can lead to more foreclosure petitions 
and a spiraling foreclosure deed and auction problem .
Finally, we are concerned about the steady rise of the 
post-secondary student population in Greater boston . 
The 19,000 additional college and university students 
in Greater boston since 2008 and a possible addition of 
45,000 more by 2018 is putting enormous pressure on 
rental markets and therefore reducing rental afford-
ability even further for families and individuals . There 
will be the need for more student housing, especially 
for the burgeoning ranks of graduate students, if 
already very high rents are not to become even more 
unaffordable in Greater boston and especially in the 
City of boston itself .
Overall, the state of housing in Greater boston is 
in flux . Much will depend on whether the national 
economy will avoid a double dip recession . Much 
will depend on whether or not the attempt to repeal 
Chapter 40b is successful . and much will depend on 
whether universities, colleges, private developers, the 
state, and individual municipalities can work together 
so that we can welcome many more students to the 
region without driving up rents and reducing housing 
affordability .
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1.
Introduction
The Economic and Demographic 
Context for Understanding 
the Housing Market
In last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card, we 
noted that 2008 and the first half of 2009 had been 
an extremely difficult period for the Greater boston 
economy and for the region’s housing market . Hous-
ing sales had plummeted, home prices had declined . 
Many families were facing foreclosure . at the same 
time, despite the weakness in the economy and more 
affordable home prices, rents were near their all-time 
peak, reducing housing affordability for many low- 
and moderate-income families .
Yet we thought we had some good news to report .  
We wrote:
although we cannot say for certain what the 
future will hold, it appears as though the current 
economic crisis is nearing an end . Given that 
housing played a significant role in the current 
economic crisis, more than in any other reces-
sion, the apparent bottoming out of the housing 
market provides hope that the worst may be over . 
Home prices have stopped declining in many 
areas of the country, after having sustained stag-
gering losses in some markets since 2005 . Here in 
Greater boston, prices have already begun to firm 
up, and in many communities have increased . 
The “bottom” in single-family home prices seems 
to have occurred around March of this year, while 
condominium prices appear to have stabilized as 
early as January . Sales of single-family properties 
and condominiums exhibit a similar pattern, with 
steady increases for the last five months . These 
indicators are some of the first signs that the worst of 
the crisis may have passed.1
That the worst of the crisis may have indeed passed 
appeared to be confirmed by data for late 2009 and 
the first half of 2010 . The good news was that home 
sales and home prices continued to stabilize through 
the spring of this year . Existing home sales nationwide 
remained above five million in 2009 and data through 
June 2010 suggest that they are on track to reach five 
million again by the end of this year . admittedly, this 
trend was driven for the first six months of the year 
by the now-expired federal first-time homebuyer tax 
credit .2 as for the single-family home market, the 
average price across 20 of the largest housing markets 
was holding firm after plummeting by nearly 32 
percent between May 2006 and May 2009 .3 Through 
May 2010 prices had been essentially flat and even 
had rebounded from their lowest point by about 4 .6 
percent .
a similar pattern was found in Greater boston, 
although the decline in sales and prices was never as 
steep here as in many other metro areas . Year-over-
year single-family home sales perked up from July 
of 2009 through the middle of this year . In line with 
the boost in sales, year-over-year single-family home 
prices also increased in Greater boston .4
This would all be encouraging if not for a rising tide of 
recent disconcerting news that may portend a “double 
dip” in the housing market, at least nationally if not 
in Greater boston . according to the National associa-
tion of Realtors, the bottom seemed to fall out of the 
existing U .S . home market in July of this year, when 
sales plummeted by a whopping 27 .2 percent from the 
previous month and 25 .5 percent from the same month 
in 2009 .5 The one-month drop in sales from June to 
July was the biggest one-month decline in sales going 
back to 1968 . Economists had predicted a sales decline 
of 13 percent due to the expiration of the homebuyer 
tax credit and were clearly surprised by a collapse 
twice as deep . While the median home price held 
steady in July, some analysts, like Michelle Meyer, a 
senior economist at bank of america Merrill Lynch 
Global Research in New York, fear that the new data 
“do not bode well for home prices” in the future and 
that “there is a decent chance we reach a new bottom 
for home prices” … (as part of) a “prolonged, painful 
drop .”6
There is more bad news when it comes to the sale 
of new homes . New home sales in 2009 plummeted 
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to just 375,000, down from over one million in 2006, 
775,000 in 2007, and 485,000 in 2008, plunging the 
construction industry into a virtual depression .7 Recov-
ery in this market looks dubious . New home sales in 
2010 are running 8 percent below the same time last 
year and 33 percent below 2008 levels .
Foreclosures and bank repossessions are also at record 
levels in 2010 . across the country, foreclosure notices 
in the second quarter of the year reached nearly 
900,000, about the same number as in the previous 
year . but bank repossessions increased 38 percent in 
the second quarter of the year from the same period a 
year earlier, for a record total of nearly 270,000 . at this 
rate, the number of homes taken by banks could easily 
top one million by the end of the year .8 The number of 
foreclosure petitions is holding steady, but the number 
of actual foreclosure deeds and foreclosure auctions 
is now rising sharply as mortgage servicers have 
exhausted ways to modify delinquent loans .
What is true nationally regarding foreclosure activity 
is occurring in Greater boston . The number of fore-
closure petitions is holding steady in 2010 at about 
1,200 a month, but the number of households losing 
their homes to foreclosure in Greater boston began to 
spike in mid-2009, rising from under 300 per month 
in august to over 400 in December and more than 600 
a month from March through July 2010 . Foreclosure 
auctions have gone up even faster, rising from 470 in 
august 2009 to nearly 900 in December to between 
1,200 and 1,400 a month from March through June of 
this year before dropping only slightly to 1,050 in July .9 
In part, the rise in foreclosure deeds and auctions is 
occurring as regulators are pressing financial institu-
tions to purge themselves of their troubled loans .10
The National Economy
What appears to be happening to the national hous-
ing market in the second half of 2010 is in part due to 
an economic recovery that is weaker than expected . 
The nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined 
in four of the five quarters between the first quarter 
of 2008 and the spring of 2009 . beginning in the third 
quarter of 2009, though, the nation experienced its first 
quarter of what would appear to be sustained posi-
tive GDP growth . In the fourth quarter, GDP leaped 
at a 5 percent annual growth rate, the best single 
quarter since early 2006 .11 It looked as if the economy 
was beginning to take off . The number of jobs in the 
nation, which had declined in every single month 
from December 2007 through December 2009, began to 
increase in January 2010 .12
Was the economic collapse that began in late 2007 
finally coming to an end? The national economy was 
growing, the financial system had survived its melt-
down and was beginning to make loans again, the 
stock market was surging from a Dow Jones Industrial 
Index of just 7,949 on the day President barack Obama 
was inaugurated to 10,428 on the last day of the year . It 
would seem that 2010 would see the nation move back 
toward greater prosperity and fuller employment .
A Disappointing 2010 and an Uncertain 2011
Unfortunately, the encouraging economic news at the 
end of 2009 would not continue . GDP growth declined 
to 3 .7 percent in the first quarter of 2010 and to 1 .6 
percent in the second quarter (see Figure 1.1) . The 
expectation for the third quarter is no better than 2 
percent, not sufficient growth to make much of a dent 
in national unemployment . Indeed, the unemploy-
ment rate increased to 9 .6 percent in august of this 
year, while new unemployment claims are hovering 
between 450,000 and 500,000 every week, down only 
slightly from a year ago .13
The weakness in the national economy can be 
explained by examining the components of GDP 






























FIGURE 1 .1 
Percentage Change in Real GDP, 2004–2010
Source: Council of Economic advisers, Economic Indicators, august 2010
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housing market . Non-residential investment increased 
by over $76 billion on an annual basis while housing 
added another $10 billion (see Figure 1.2b) . but weak 
consumer spending and a sharp decline in public 
stimulus kept the growth spurt from turning into a 
full-blown recovery .
National employment fell more sharply than GDP . 
The decline in output itself contributed to the loss in 
jobs . but even as the economy began to grow again, 
firms across the country boosted productivity—output 
per worker—rather than hire additional workers . 
Indeed, productivity gains were prodigious in 2009 as 
companies found ways to use their existing employees 
more efficiently rather than hire new ones . Figure 1.3 
provides graphic evidence of the explosion in produc-
tivity at the beginning of the economic recovery . Three 
percent productivity growth is normally considered to 
be exceptional . Productivity increased between 3 .4 and 
8 .4 percent on an annual basis between the first quarter 
of 2009 and the first quarter in 2010 .
The strong growth in GDP in the first half of 2010 
would normally have led to a substantial amount of 
increased hiring, but the accompanying extraordinary 
improvement in productivity created a “jobless recov-
ery .” as Figure 1.4 demonstrates, the number of unem-
ployed doubled between 2007 and 2009, and even with 
GDP growth of better than 3 percent in the first half 
of 2010, the number of unemployed has continued 
to climb .
extraordinarily low growth beginning at the end of 
2007 . Nothing undermined the economy more than 
the collapse of residential investment . between the last 
quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2010, invest-
ment in the construction and renovation of homes 
and apartment buildings declined from a rate of $523 
billion a year to just $352 billion—a decline of nearly 
one-third (32 .8 percent) . business investment (i .e ., non-
residential investment) also fell sharply, but by less 
than half the rate of the housing production collapse . 
altogether, personal consumption, business invest-
ment, and residential investment declined by a total of 
$493 billion .
The federal government tried to offset this reduction in 
GDP, expanding spending by over 16 percent . but the 
federal spending was partially offset by a contraction 
in state and local spending as the recession took its toll 
on tax revenues . Hence, overall government spending 
increased by only a little more than 5 percent . Wash-
ington added $149 billion to GDP per year between 
2007:IV and 2010:II, but state and local governments 
reduced their contribution by nearly $32 billion a year . 
Not surprisingly, an additional $117 billion in annual 
stimulus provides only a small nudge to a $13 .2 trillion 
GDP . With too little overall public stimulus relative to 
the depth of the private sector contraction, GDP has 
not been able to sustain a reasonable growth rate .
The growth spurt that did begin in 2009 was largely 
the result of a sharp increase in business investment, 
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FIGURE 1 .2a 
Components of Real GDP Growth: 2007:IV – 2010:II
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FIGURE 1 .2b
Components of Real GDP Growth: 2009:IV – 2010:II
Source: Council of Economic advisers, Economic Indicators, august 2010
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when consumers begin to spend more aggressively . 
but there is a chicken-and-egg problem here . busi-
nesses will not invest heavily until they have assur-
ance that there will be stronger markets for their goods 
and services, and this will not occur until consumers 
are confident that they will have jobs and income to 
buy them .
One would have hoped that by now, after such a 
prolonged recession, there would be the beginning 
of a recovery in the home construction industry . but 
new privately-owned housing-unit starts continue to 
lag well behind historical levels . as Figure 1.5 reveals, 
from 2000 to 2005, new housing starts climbed from 
about 1 .6 million per year to nearly 2 .1 million units . 
beginning in 2006, new starts began a steady decline, 
reaching a low in 2009 of just over 550,000 . With data 
for January through July of 2010, we forecast a modest 
increase in starts to a little over 600,000 for the entire 
year . but this total is still less than a third of the record 
number constructed in the middle of the decade, and 
the end of the first-time homebuyer tax credit could 
put a big dent in production .
Given all of these new data, it is difficult to forecast 
what might happen to the economy and the housing 
market over the next year . Without a stronger recov-
ery, it is likely that home prices will begin to fall again, 
that more homeowners will find themselves underwa-
ter — owing more on their mortgages than their homes 
are now worth — that foreclosures will remain at very 
high levels, and that new construction that might have 
been forthcoming will be put on hold .
a corollary to high productivity growth combined 
with little increase in employment is found in statis-
tics on corporate profits . before-tax profits peaked in 
2006, before the recession took hold, at an annual rate 
of $1 .823 trillion . They would fall to as little as $862 
billion in the fourth quarter of 2008 at the depth of the 
recession . Since then, corporate profits are nearly back 
to their all-time record, with first quarter 2010 prof-
its coming in at $1 .773 trillion . This means there are 
financial resources available in the business sector that 





























FIGURE 1 .3 
Productivity Growth in the Nonfarm Business Sector, 
2004–2010:II (annualized)














































New Privately-Owned Housing Unit Starts in the U.S., 
2000–2010 (est.) (in thousands)
Source: U .S . Department of Housing and Urban Development, Residential Construction Statistics, July 2010
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using both the Economic activity Index prepared by 
the Philadelphia Federal Reserve bank for each state 
and the nation and an Employment Index based on 
total nonfarm employment . To compute the Economic 
activity Index the Fed draws on data on total nonfarm 
employment, hours worked in manufacturing, unem-
ployment rates, and real wages and salaries . In the 
long run, this index tends to reflect changes in each 
state’s and the nation’s total output or Gross State 
Product (GSP) . In each case we have traced out the 
index for 31 months, the duration of the current reces-
sion through June of this year .
 The recession that began nationwide in July 1990 
lasted until March 1991 . Compared to the nation, as 
Figure 1.6a indicates, Massachusetts was hard hit by 
this recession . Whereas the nation’s economic activity 
had returned to its July 1990 level by March 1992 (20 
months later), in Massachusetts the index remained 
more than 2 percent lower 31 months after the reces-
sion began and more than 5 percent lower than the 
nation as a whole . The employment rebound trailed 
economic activity in both the nation and Massachu-
setts . but by January 1993, national employment had 
returned to its pre-recession peak, while employment 
in Massachusetts was still 8 percent below its pre-
recession high .
Figure 1.6b provides this comparison for the recession 
that began in March 2001 and ended in December 2001 . 
The Massachusetts Economy
If there is any good news, it relates to how Massachu-
setts and Greater boston are faring in this recession . 
In past recessions, the Commonwealth has suffered 
more than the nation as a whole . This time, however, 
the state and the region seem poised to outperform the 
nation in terms of economic activity, employment, and 
the housing market . The region’s education and health 
care industries hold it in good stead, but recently 
all industrial sectors of the Massachusetts economy 
appear to be in recovery mode, from construction and 
manufacturing to the leisure and hospitality industry . 
Whether the region can withstand another national 
economic dip is the big question .
Given the severity of the Great Recession, few regions 
of the country have been able to escape its grip . but 
there are some states that have come through the reces-
sion relatively unscathed . While the national unem-
ployment rate in July of this year was 9 .5 percent, it 
was just 3 .6 percent in North Dakota, 4 .4 percent in 
South Dakota, and 4 .7 percent in Nebraska . These farm 
states have continued to prosper while states with a 
large traditional manufacturing sector have been hard 
hit . Michigan’s unemployment rate was 13 .1 percent, 
while Ohio and Illinois both were experiencing jobless 
rates of 10 .3 percent .
However, the states that experienced the highest 
unemployment rates were among those that suffered 
an implosion in their housing markets after the specu-
lative housing boom earlier in the decade left them 
with a large oversupply of homes . In those states, 
prices plummeted, foreclosures skyrocketed, and resi-
dential construction came to a screeching halt . While 
the national unemployment rate was 9 .5 percent in 
July, Nevada’s unemployment rate was 14 .3 percent, 
California was stuck at 12 .3 percent, and Florida was 
at 11 .5 percent . The utter collapse of construction in 
these three states has been responsible for a loss of 59 
percent of all construction jobs in Nevada, 47 percent 
in Florida, and 42 percent in California since 2006 .
During the two national recessions preceding the 
current one, the Massachusetts economy did not 
perform as well as the rest of the nation . These reces-
sions were both deeper in the Commonwealth and 
lasted longer . Figures 1.6a, 1.6b, and 1.6c compare the 
recessions that began in January 1990 and in March 


















































































































U.S. Economic Activity Index
FIGURE 1 .6a
Economic Activity Index and Employment Index  
during the 1990 Recession, Massachusetts vs. U.S.
Source: Federal Reserve bank of Philadelphia, State Coincident Indexes (July 1992 =100) and 
U .S . bureau of Labor Statistics, Total Non-Farm Employment (Seasonally adjusted)
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In nearly every recession, economic activity picks up 
before employment . Nonetheless, between January 
and July of this year, Massachusetts gained over 60,000 
jobs, replacing nearly 40 percent of the jobs lost since 
December 2007 . Nationally, less than 8 percent of the 
jobs lost during the recession had been replaced . Put 
another way, since January of this year the Common-
wealth has been responsible for 9 .4 percent of the 
national job gain despite the fact that it only employs 
2 .4 percent of the nation’s workforce .
Not only has the Commonwealth outperformed the 
nation on the overall job front since the beginning of 
2010, it has done so in every single major industry 
sector, from construction and manufacturing to trade, 
transportation, and utilities; financial activities; profes-
sional and business services; education and health 
services; and leisure and hospitality (see Figure 1.7) .
If this encouraging economic trend continues in the 
Commonwealth and added employment leads to 
greater economic confidence, it is possible that home 
sales volume will once again begin to pick up later this 
year, helping to stabilize the regional housing market . 
However, given the current weakness of the national 
economy, it is possible that the Massachusetts recovery 
could stall which could have adverse consequences for 
Greater boston’s housing market .
This time, it took 19 months for the nation’s economic 
activity index to return to its pre-recession level in 
November 2002 . again, 31 months later the Common-
wealth’s index remained more than 2 percent below its 
pre-recession level . as for employment, the U .S . had 
returned to within 2 percent of its peak, while Massa-
chusetts still was missing over 5 percent of its former 
job base .
In the current recession, however, Massachusetts is 
doing considerably better than the nation (see Figure 
1.6c) . as noted above, the current recession has proven 
much more severe and has lasted longer than the two 
that preceded it, and neither the state nor the nation 
has returned to its pre-recession levels of economic 
activity and employment from the NbER-designated 
start of the recession in December 2007 . Still, in 
contrast to the prior recessions, Massachusetts has 
suffered relatively less than the nation as a whole . The 
U .S . economic activity index fell more than 6 percent 
at its lowest point; by contrast, at its lowest level, 
Massachusetts was just over 4 percent lower than its 
pre-recession level . Since then, the bay State has more 
rapidly approached its pre-recession economic activ-
ity level than the nation . Likewise, Massachusetts jobs 
are coming back faster than those nationwide . by June 
of this year, the Commonwealth still had 3 .2 percent 
fewer jobs than in December 2007, but employment 





















































































































U.S. Economic Activity Index
FIGURE 1 .6b
Economic Activity Index and Employment Index  
during the 2001 Recession, Massachusetts vs. U.S.
Source: Federal Reserve bank of Philadelphia, State Coincident Indexes (July 1992=100) and 
























































































































Economic Activity Index and Employment Index 
during the 2007 Recession, Massachusetts vs. U.S.
Source: Federal Reserve bank of Philadelphia, State Coincident Indexes (July 1992=100) and 
U .S . bureau of Labor Statistics, Total Non-Farm Employment (Seasonally adjusted)
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in order to stimulate the economy, banks and mort-
gage companies have been able to borrow at record 
low rates and pass these savings onto their customers 
in the form of low 15- and 30-year mortgage rates .
Figure 1.8 displays the national average 30-year mort-
gage rate from January of 2000 through July of this 
year . Mortgage rates came down from a high of over 
8 percent in 2000 to about 5 .5 percent in the middle 
of 2003 as the Federal Reserve board lowered inter-
est rates to help guide the economy out of the 2001 
recession . From then on mortgage rates generally rose, 
settling in the range of 6 .0 to 6 .5 percent from 2006 
through 2008 . Since then, mortgage rates have been cut 
so that by July of this year, the average rate was just 
4 .52 percent, the lowest in more than 40 years .
Normally, such low rates would not only spur an 
enormous amount of home refinancing, but encourage 
more families to purchase homes . However, after the 
subprime mortgage debacle and the financial struggles 
of so many financial institutions, lending requirements 
have been tightened and fewer families who would like 
to take advantage of lower mortgage rates have credit 
scores that allow them to do so . Despite historically low 
mortgage rates, the mortgage market is actually much 
tougher than in the past, making it less likely that we 
will experience a sharp rise in new home purchases .
Mortgage Interest Rates
What could contribute to a more stable housing market 
in Massachusetts and perhaps the nation is the contin-
uation of extremely low mortgage rates . With the 
































































































Percent Change in Employment, 
 January 2010 – July 2010, Massachusetts vs. U.S.














































































































































Monthly National Average Commitment Rate on 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages, January 2000 – July 2010
Source: Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey .
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Various studies have found that interstate migration 
depends on a variety of factors . In general, higher per-
capita income attracts in-migrants but a higher aver-
age cost of living repels them . Warmer temperatures, 
better state and local amenities, and greater sunshine 
attract population . Violent crime and hazardous 
waste sites incite out-migration .14 Several studies have 
shown that net migration and employment growth are 
jointly dependent, with jobs attracting in-migrants but 
in-migrants also encouraging firms to locate where 
they move .15
Research reported in last year’s Greater Boston Hous-
ing Report Card found that housing costs do not have 
a substantial impact on inter-metropolitan migration, 
except among the most expensive metro regions—and 
there the impact is quite substantial .16 Greater boston 
has been one of those very high-cost-of-housing 
regions, along with Honolulu; San Francisco, Santa 
Cruz, Oxnard, Santa barbara, Los angeles and San 
Diego in California; Washington, D .C .; and New York .
While correlation does not prove causation, it is 
remarkable that the trend in Greater boston median 
home prices between 2000 and 2010 and the trend in 
net domestic migration are almost mirror images of 
each other . as home prices increased steadily from 
2000 to 2005, net out-migration from Massachusetts 
increased from 22,900 to almost 62,000 . as home prices 
began to fall, out-migration declined in lock-step . by 
2009, with the median single-family home price down 
by nearly 20 percent from its 2005 peak, net out-migra-
tion turned into net in-migration . While not defini-
tive, this empirical evidence suggests once again how 
important housing affordability may be to retaining 
and attracting households .
Combined with the figures on employment, these 
migration figures provide some indication that Massa-
chusetts is steadily making its way out of recession and 
toward a return to growth . People from other states 
and from other countries seem to be deciding that the 
Commonwealth is an attractive place to move to and 
to work in .
However, it must be noted that these trends have 
profound implications for the housing market . With 
thousands more people locating in Massachusetts, 
and seeking to buy a home or to rent an apartment, 
increased demand for housing will result in higher 
home prices and rents if new supply does not come on line 
Demographic Patterns and Migration
Each year in the Housing Report Card we have noted 
the fascinating trend that while Massachusetts attracts 
many immigrants from other countries, it tends to lose 
residents to other states in the country . In 2004 and 
2005, the domestic migration loss was so immense 
(over 60,000 each year) that despite substantial foreign 
immigration, the state still posted net migration-
related population losses of over 30,000 residents . In 
last year’s Report Card we reported that, for the first 
time since 2001, foreign in-migration offset domestic 
out-migration, resulting in a modest net population 
gain for the Commonwealth .
The period between 2008 and 2009 witnessed a sea 
change in migration patterns in Massachusetts (see 
Figure 1.9) . For the first time since we began tracking 
this indicator, domestic migration turned positive . 
More people moved into Massachusetts during that 
period than moved out . Meanwhile, the state main-
tained a robust level of foreign in-migration . Together, 
these migration patterns resulted in a net population 































































Net Migration to and from Massachusetts, 
2000–2009
Source: U .S . Census bureau, State Population Estimates, Components of Population Change .
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increased demand for student housing must become a 
top priority for local policymakers .
In Chapter 5, we pay close attention to the persistent 
foreclosure crisis in Greater boston . While the number 
of foreclosure petitions seems to have stabilized, the 
number of foreclosure deeds and auctions has soared 
since the beginning of the year as banks and mortgage 
companies attempt to get non-performing loans off of 
their books . This may lead to further downward pres-
sure on home prices in a weakened housing market .
Chapter 6 turns its attention to national and state hous-
ing policies . both the federal government and the state 
have added new weapons in the battle against foreclo-
sure and the state has received additional federal funds 
for a range of housing policies including programs to 
combat homelessness . Several additional communi-
ties have availed themselves of the Chapter 40R Smart 
Growth Overlay District provision so that in total there 
are now 33 Chapter 40R districts within which more 
than 12,000 units of housing could be built . Mean-
while, the state faces the looming possibility of the 
repeal of Chapter 40b which has been the single most 
important mechanism for providing affordable hous-
ing in the Commonwealth . The loss of 40b could not 
only undermine the ability to produce housing under 
this law, but compromise the future of 40R .
Finally, Chapter 7 sums up the key points of the entire 
report, concluding that the Greater boston housing 
market may be in flux for some time to come as a result 
of recent new weakness in the national economy that 
could infect the region’s progress . The near future of 
the region’s economy and housing market are uncer-
tain . Constant vigilance is needed to ensure economic 
recovery, as are sound policies that can help sustain 
the future stability and affordability of housing in the 
region and throughout the Commonwealth .
to meet it. but, as we will show in Chapter 2, housing 
production has remained at anemic levels over the past 
year . Unless production picks up speed significantly, 
the increased rents and prices that ensue could well 
dissuade potential new residents, particularly young 
families, from moving to Massachusetts, ultimately 
turning that net migration figure back to negative .
What Does All This Mean for Greater Boston?
In the remaining chapters of this report, we investigate 
what has happened to the Greater boston housing 
market from the onset of recession in December 2007 
through this past summer .
In Chapter 2, we review developments in housing 
production over the past several years nationally and 
in Greater boston . Data on new housing permits and 
housing starts, which had been improving through 
the end of 2009 and early 2010 have now fallen to their 
lowest level on record . With the economy continuing 
to languish nationally, there may be fallout in Massa-
chusetts that would discourage new construction here 
as well as in other regions .
In Chapter 3, we investigate data on sales volume, 
home prices, and rents . While sales improved through 
much of 2009 and early 2010, they began to flag once 
again in mid-summer . Home prices followed this 
trend so that it is now hard to determine what path 
home prices may take for the rest of this year and into 
2011 . Rents once again bucked other housing trends 
by continuing to remain at near historic levels . This is 
at least partially related to the fact that rental vacancy 
rates are at traditionally normal levels but well below 
those in other parts of the country . Hence rental afford-
ability continues to be a significant problem in Greater 
boston posing a sustained challenge to the region’s 
future ability to retain and attract young families .
Chapter 4 is a brand new chapter providing an 
in-depth investigation of the impact of a growing post-
secondary student population on the Greater boston 
housing market . More than any other metropolitan 
region, the student population in boston provides 
both economic, social, and cultural vitality but also 
an obstacle to the achievement of greater affordabil-
ity particularly in the rental market . With continued 
growth especially among graduate students who have 
limited housing opportunities on campus, meeting the 
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2.
Housing Production in the Region
Overall Production Levels
Given data on permitting for the first six months of 
2009, we projected in the last installment of The Greater 
Boston Housing Report Card that the five-county region 
would add a mere 3,491 new housing units in the 
entire year .1 as it turns out, this projection underesti-
mated the total number of new permits . by year’s end, 
as indicated in Table 2.1, the region saw 4,714 housing 
permits .2 Even so, this figure represented a 28-percent 
decline from the prior year, and a drop of more than 
two-thirds from the permitting level achieved in 
2005 . This decline was most acute among multifamily 
among the most readily apparent ramifications of 
the prolonged economic downturn that has beset the 
nation has been a reluctance among developers to add 
new units to a persistently sluggish housing market . 
as consumer confidence has continued to wane, as 
economic recovery—particularly in terms of employ-
ment—has been halting at best, and as home prices 
have slid, development of new housing in Greater 
boston, as in other regions of the country, has proven 
anemic .
TabLE 2 .1
Single-Family and Multifamily Building Permits in Greater Boston, 2000 to 2010 (Projected)
Year Total Units
% Change 













from Prior Year 
(Units in 2–4 
Unit Structures)





Year (Units in 
Buildings with 
5+ Units)
2000 9,563 6,376 660 2,527
2001 8,929 -6 .6% 5,604 -12 .1% 642 -2 .7% 2,683 6 .2%
2002 8,558 -4 .2% 5,531 -1 .3% 709 10 .4% 2,318 -13 .6%
2003 11,120 29 .9% 5,290 -4 .4% 1,067 50 .5% 4,763 105 .5%
2004 12,713 14 .3% 6,222 17 .6% 985 -7 .7% 5,506 15 .6%
2005 15,107 18 .8% 6,552 5 .3% 991 0 .6% 7,564 37 .4%
2006 12,332 -18 .4% 4,910 -25 .1% 1,180 19 .1% 6,242 -17 .5%
2007 9,772 -20 .8% 4,139 -15 .7% 636 -46 .1% 4,997 -19 .9%
2008 6,529 -33 .2% 2,682 -35 .2% 376 -40 .9% 3,471 -30 .5%
2009 4,714 -27 .8% 2,507 -6 .5% 278 -26 .1% 1,929 -44 .4%
2010 
(projected) 5,500 16 .7% 3,000 19 .7% 300 7 .9% 2,200 14 .0%
% Change, 
2000–2005 58 .0% 2 .8% 50 .2% 199 .3%
% Change, 
2005–2009




16 .7% 19 .7% 7 .9% 14 .0%
Source: U .S . Census building Permit Survey for Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties, Ma
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developments . In 2005, more than 7,500 permits were 
issued for construction of new units in these large 
developments . In 2009, this number was 74 percent 
lower, falling below 2,000 for the first time in over a 
decade .
The gap between our projection and the true year-end 
figure demonstrates the difficulty in drawing current 
annual estimates from data that run only through 
June . This is particularly true for building permit 
data, which are susceptible to huge monthly fluctua-
tions because of the nature of the permitting process . 
building permits are not issued in a steady stream, 
but instead come out in groups, especially in the case 
of large multiunit developments or large planned 
subdivisions of single-family homes . In an otherwise 
weak month for housing production, the approval of 
one massive housing development can radically alter 
the total number of permits . as such, any seasonal 
trend that might facilitate the estimation of year-
end totals is masked by the eccentricities of local 
permitting agencies .
between January and June of 2010, the five-county 
Greater boston region approved 1,474 single-family 
permits, 165 permits in structures with two to four 
units, and 1,075 permits in multifamily developments . 
Given these figures, and the uncertainty of new hous-
ing development in the region, a reasonable projection 
would put the total number of new housing permits 
through the end of 2010 at around 5,500 . To the extent 
that developers’ decisions reflect the general strength 
of the housing market and the economy as a whole, 
the modest recovery evident through the first half of 
the year may encourage them to develop new hous-
ing more rapidly, which would have the effect of 
boosting that estimate . Conversely, the rather weak 
performance of the economy in July and the likelihood 
of several more months of sluggish economic growth 
could have the opposite effect, mitigating the incentive 
to develop new housing, which would result in a lower 
year-end figure . It is too early, especially given month-
to-month permitting volatility, to determine what the 
total number of housing permits will be at year’s end .
What is clear, however, is that this figure will continue 
to trail by a large margin the number of housing 
permits issued during the middle of the last decade . 
Even a more robust projection of 7,500 new permits 
through December 2010 would represent less than half 
the total number of permits achieved in 2005 . While 
it is unlikely that 2010 will witness fewer permits 
than 2009, there is little evidence from the permitting 
data we have through July of this year to suggest any 
robust recovery in the local housing market . In other 
words, barring an unimaginable jump in permitting in 
the final months of this year, 2010 is on track to be the 
second-lowest year for permitting in over a decade .
Figure 2.1 examines these data in more depth, compar-
ing trends in permits of single-family units, two- to 
four-family units, and units in structures with five or 
more units . by 2005, after a decade of rapidly escalat-
ing home prices, developers pulled nearly 60 percent 
more permits than in 2000 . Single-family construction 
hardly budged, rising between 2000 and 2005 by less 
than 3 percent . but the number of two-to-four- unit 
building permits increased by more than 50 percent, 
while the number of large multiunit building permits 
increased by almost 200 percent . Of the nearly 66,000 
building permits pulled between 2000 and 2005, nearly 
36,000 were for single-family homes while over 25,000 
were for units in large multiunit apartment buildings .
Since 2005, permitting of all types of housing has been 
hard hit, but just as permitting of units in large struc-
tures grew disproportionately through the first half of 
the decade, it also fell disproportionately in the second 
half . based on our estimates for the total number of 
permits through the end of 2010, we project that the 
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FIGURE 2 .1
Building Permits in Greater Boston  
by Housing Type, 2000–2010
Source: U .S . Census bureau, annual New Privately-Owned Residential building Permits: 
Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties, Ma
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Table 2.2













1 Raynham 457 20 78
2 boston 332 513 1
3 Framingham 178 15 94
4 lakeville 176 19 81
5 Stow 171 45 32
6 Plympton 125 5 138
7 Tewksbury 124 417 2
8 Marshfield 116 21 74
9 Tyngsborough 115 16 93
10 billerica 106 39 35
11 Randolph 63 284 4
12 Pembroke 61 23 70
13 Scituate 60 14 97
13 Taunton 60 51 27
15 Gloucester 56 26 61













143 Cohasset 3 19 81
143 Marlborough 3 17 89
143 boxford 3 9 125
143 Manchester 3 9 125
143 Nahant 3 2 152
148 Maynard 2 38 37
148 belmont 2 15 94
148 Southborough 2 10 117
148 Stoughton 2 6 132
148 avon 2 4 146
148 Millis 2 6 132
148 Hopedale 2 0 160
148 Millville 2 0 160
156 Rockland 1 35 42
156 Swampscott 1 3 149
158 Winthrop 0 6 132
158 Shirley 0 7 131
158 Wenham 0 1 159













1 Plympton 125 5 128
2 Tyngsborough 115 16 68
3 Westford 55 50 10
4 Needham 51 64 3
5 Taunton 50 43 16
6 Dracut 49 33 23
7 Tewksbury 48 51 8
8 Sudbury 47 55 5
9 Walpole 46 34 21
10 Methuen 44 47 12
11 billerica 42 39 18
12 Franklin 41 53 6
12 bolton 41 6 120
14 lexington 39 52 7













144 Watertown 2 0 157
144 arlington 2 3 141
144 Maynard 2 5 128
144 belmont 2 15 71
144 Southborough 2 10 99
144 Stoughton 2 6 120
144 avon 2 4 138
144 Millis 2 2 147
144 Hopedale 2 0 157
144 Millville 2 0 157
154 Milton 1 4 138
154 Rockland 1 35 20
154 Swampscott 1 3 141
157 Chelsea 0 0 157
157 Winthrop 0 1 154
157 Shirley 0 7 117
157 Wenham 0 1 154
157 Medford 0 0 157
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2009 Housing Production by  
Type and Location
In order to track emerging trends within individual 
cities and towns in the Greater boston region, we have 
supplemented our discussion of general permitting 
trends with a more in-depth analysis of municipal 
permitting practices in each installment of The Greater 
Boston Housing Report Card . We continue that project 
this year in Table 2.2, which reports which towns had 
the highest and lowest numbers of permits in 2009 . For 
a complete town-by-town breakdown, see the Munici-
pal Scorecard in Appendix A .
as discussed above, 2009 was the slowest year on 
record in terms of the permitting of new housing units . 
The trend witnessed regionally showed up promi-
nently within each of the individual communities, as 
well . For only the second time since we began tracking 
these data, the city of boston did not lead the region 
in home permitting in 2009 . That distinction went to 
Raynham, which issued only 10 single-family housing 
permits but permitted 447 units in a rare multifam-
ily development (Raynham added no multifamily 
units between 2005 and 2008) . boston had the second 
highest number of permits in 2009, with 332, yet this 
represented just 29 percent as many as were issued in 
the Hub in 2005 . In fact, just three municipalities that 
were among the top 15 in permitting in 2008 were on 
the same list in 2009 . and of the 15 highest permitting 
communities in 2009, only the top two would have 
made the list of the top 15 in 2005 . Four municipalities 
in Greater boston, including the city of Medford with a 
population above 50,000, issued absolutely no permits 
for new housing in 2009 .
In every year between 2005 and 2008, the town of 
Plymouth has led the way in the permitting of single-
family detached housing units . In the wake of the 
devastation of the housing market, this trend ceased in 
2009, as Plymouth, which consistently added hundreds 
of new homes each year (permitting 453 single-family 
homes in 2005, for instance) issued just 27 new permits 
in 2009 . Instead, the leaders in single-family permitting 
in 2009 were Plympton, Tyngsborough, and Westford . 
In all, only five municipalities were among the top 15 
in single-family permitting in both 2008 and 2009 . and 
again, only two would have made the top 15 in 2005 .
lower than in 2005 . by comparison, the decline in 
permitting for units in two- to four-family buildings is 
likely to be around 67 percent, and the drop in permit-
ting in large multiunit complexes is likely to exceed 
71 percent . as we will show in Chapter 3, the market 
for homes in two- and three-unit buildings in Greater 
boston has borne the brunt of the housing downturn in 
terms of sales volume and price declines . This is true 
when it comes to permitting, as well: from a recent 
high of 1,180 in 2006, the number of permits in two- 
to four-unit structures fell to just 278 in 2009, and is 
projected to grow to just 300 through 2010 .
TabLE 2 .2
Municipalities . . . continued
2009 
Rank Municipality












1 Raynham 447 0 40
2 boston 235 410 1
3 Lakeville 160 0 40
4 Stow 154 0 40
5 Framingham 150 0 40
6 Marshfield 97 0 40
7 billerica 64 0 40
8 Tewksbury 62 364 3
9 Randolph 52 276 4
10 Scituate 50 0 40
11 Chelsea 37 228 6
12 Pembroke 36 0 40
12 Townsend 36 0 40
14 Everett 35 106 12
15 Watertown 32 0 40
15 Milton 32 0 40
Source: U .S . Census bureau, annual New Privately-Owned 
Residential building Permits for Places in Ma
128 municipalities did not permit any multifamily housing in 2009.
122 municipalities did not permit any multifamily housing in 2008. 
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in permitting than the first six months of 2009, from 
which last year’s projections were drawn .
In fact, among these nine, the rank order of the six 
left-most bars has not changed at all . The Miami area 
saw just 3,156 new building permits issued in the first 
six months of 2010, compared to 27,386 in the first 
six months of 2005; this represented a decline of 88 .5 
percent . Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Minneapolis simi-
larly experienced declines so severe that in the first 
six months of 2010 they permitted less than a quarter 
as many new housing units as they had in the first six 
months of 2005 .
The other five metro regions profiled in this figure 
have not fared well—each has declined by more than 
50 percent—but they have not suffered the calamitous 
declines in housing production experienced in the 
first four . and indeed, of these nine regions, Greater 
boston’s drop in permitting, while still steep, has been 
the least severe .
The steep drop in the permitting of new housing in 
many metro areas across the country has worked its 
way through the pipeline and come out on the other 
apart from Raynham, boston and a few other munici-
palities, however, production in the multifamily sector 
of the housing market has been next to nonexistent . 
Only five municipalities permitted more than 100 
new multifamily units in 2009, down from 12 the year 
before . The example of boston is itself quite reveal-
ing . The state’s capital permitted about 1,500 units of 
multifamily housing in 2003, over 800 in 2005, and 
again over 800 in 2007 . Yet only 410 units in structures 
with more than five units were issued in 2008, and, 
as demonstrated in Table 2 .2, this number fell again 
in 2009 . boston’s multifamily permitting collapse has 
been representative of trends across the region . In fact, 
perhaps the most revealing story in this category is 
just how few municipalities have added any multiunit 
housing at all . The number of communities adding no 
multiunit housing continues to increase; in 2009, there 
were 128 communities that fit this profile, six more 
than in 2008 . Once again, only the top two communi-
ties on this list in 2009 would have made the list of the 
top 15 in 2005 .
Comparing Boston to Other Metro Areas  
and to the Nation
as weak as boston’s permitting performance has 
seemed over the past several years, the region’s decline 
has not proven anywhere near as severe as that seen in 
many metropolitan regions nationwide . In comparing 
boston to other metro regions last year, we used our 
projections of how many permits we expected to see in 
Greater boston at the end of 2009, and estimated that 
by the end of the year, boston’s permitting rate would 
be nearly 75 percent lower than it had been in 2005 . 
as it turned out, these estimates were too pessimistic . 
We avoid many of the eccentricities of permitting esti-
mates in Figure 2.2 this year by comparing just the first 
six months of 2010 to the same time period in 2005 in 
boston and in nine metropolitan regions in geographi-
cally diverse locations across the United States .
The rank order of these metropolitan regions is nearly 
identical to that presented in last year’s Greater Boston 
Housing Report Card, but the values have shifted a little 
as a result of two factors . First, we underestimated 
year-end permitting totals not just for boston but 
for all of the other metro areas, as well . Second, the 

























































































































Percent Change in Building Permits for Selected 
Metropolitan Areas, January through June, 2005–2010
Source: U .S . Census bureau, annual New Privately-Owned Residential building Permits
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april, when construction began on more than 60,000 
new homes for the first time since October 2008 . This 
was more than 45 percent higher than the number of 
housing starts in april 2009 . Whatever optimism the 
first five months brought, however, was quickly extin-
guished in June, when the number of housing starts 
again fell below the previous year’s monthly figure . 
across the U .S . in June of this year, construction was 
begun on just 53,400 new housing units . That number 
was by far the worst June performance in more than 
50 years, and it was nearly 10 percent lower than 
the number of housing starts in 2009 . and July was 
even worse .
What Does the Near Future Hold?
It is hard to tell what might happen to residential 
construction during the rest of 2010 and into 2011 . 
The latest figures from President Obama’s Council of 
Economic advisers reveal that residential fixed invest-
ment in the second quarter of 2010 was slightly higher 
than the first quarter, but still languishing at less than 
half the inflation-adjusted level of 2004, 2005, and 
2006 .3 With the sharp drop in reported home sales in 
July following the end of the first-time homebuyer tax 
end in the form of a dramatic nationwide decline 
in new housing production . Figure 2.3 presents the 
monthly year-over-year percent change in the number 
of new housing starts across the United States . In this 
figure, points above the 0 axis represent improvement 
in the production numbers compared to the same 
month a year before, while numbers below that axis 
represent year-over-year declines . The figure shows 
sustained growth in the number of new housing starts 
across the country nearly every month between 2001 
and 2005, a period in which the construction boom 
led to the oversupply of housing that has been partly 
responsible for the recent housing crisis . by contrast, 
between april 2006 and December 2009 there were 45 
uninterrupted months of year-over-year decreases in 
the number of housing starts nationwide . The largest 
year-over-year drop occurred in January 2009 . In that 
month, there were only 31,900 new housing starts in 
the entire country, 38,900 fewer (-54 .9 percent) than the 
70,800 that took place in January 2008 .
Over the first several months of 2010, it looked as 
though housing production was rapidly picking up 
steam nationwide . Each of the first five months of the 
year showed a marked improvement over the previous 






























































































































Year-Over-Year Percent Change in Monthly New Privately Owned Housing Units Started in the United States, 
2001–2010
Source: U .S . Census bureau, New Privately-Owned Housing Units Started, Not Seasonally adjusted .
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credit, it is likely that developers are going to pause 
before pulling many more permits and putting shovels 
in the ground . That likely means we will not see much 
of a recovery in home construction before the begin-
ning of next year or perhaps even next summer . The 
sluggish economy means there will be little demand 
for new homes and ironically the weakness in the 
home construction industry plays a large role in the 
continuing weakness in the overall economy . With 
little construction leading to slower economic recovery 
and slower economic recovery leading to less construc-
tion, only a strong stimulus to the economy can possi-
bly lead to a faster recovery in residential investment .
Here in Greater boston, one suspects the same logic 
will hold . However, as we will see in the next chapter, 
homeowner vacancy rates have recently declined to 
levels that should signal the need for more construc-
tion and the vacancy rates for rental units have fallen 
below normal levels . Like the rest of the economy, 
Massachusetts may therefore lead the nation in coming 
out of the housing recession with a resumption in 
new home construction later this year or early next 
year . Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 6, there 
continues to be an increase in municipal adoption of 
Chapter 40R Smart Growth districts where as-of-right 
housing construction can begin . Unlike in past cycles 
when zoning regulations strictly limited the number 
of sites where new housing could be construction, the 
existence of 40R may make it possible for develop-
ers to react more quickly once the economy picks up 
more speed .
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3.
Home Prices and Rents in Greater Boston
there a hint that the recovery might at least temporar-
ily stall .
Last year we also expressed deep concern that despite 
more than two years of a weakening economy and 
falling home prices, rents remained stubbornly high . 
We now have additional data for all of 2009 and the 
first half of 2010 on rents in Greater boston, and they 
suggest that our original concern was not misplaced . 
While the Massachusetts unemployment rate is 
still hovering around 9 percent, rents have actually 
increased since last year, not softened .
This chapter reviews Greater boston’s recent home 
price and rent history, beginning with a brief look at 
housing vacancy rates, which help to explain trends  
in housing costs .
In last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card, we 
suggested that after four years of sinking home prices, 
2009 might be a turning point in the region’s housing 
market . We had data for only the first six months of 
2009 at the time of publication, but one could discern 
a possible market “bottom” in March of that year, 
with prices for single-family homes and condos rising 
steadily through June .1 Part of this apparent trend, 
and perhaps all of it, could simply have been the 
normal seasonality of home prices . Prices are gener-
ally higher in the spring and summer months when 
more households are shopping for homes . a real test 
of whether the housing market was recovering would 
require data past June of last year . We now have some 
of those data, and as Figure 3.1 reveals, the recovery in 
single family home prices continued apace from March 
2009 through May of this year . Only in June, after the 

















































































































Case-Shiller Single-Family Home Price Index for Greater Boston, November 2005 – June 2010
Source: Standard and Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Index Series
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Homeowner Market
Homeowner Vacancy Rates
Homeowner vacancy rates much below 2 percent have 
historically been an indicator of tight housing markets, 
while rates above 2 percent have tended to coincide 
with a surplus of supply, often leading to flat prices 
or an absolute decline .2 at under 0 .5 percent, it is not 
surprising to see home prices increase at double-digit 
annual rates .
Throughout the second half of the 1990s and well into 
the 2000s, vacancy rates for owner-occupied units 
in Greater boston remained at extremely low levels, 
reaching as low as an extraordinary 0 .3 percent in 2002 
(see Figure 3.2) . These low vacancy rates contributed 
to the rapid home price appreciation the region expe-
rienced between 1995 and 2005, as home sellers had 
an advantage relative to buyers . The median price 
of existing single family homes in the boston metro-
politan area soared during that 10-year period from 
$170,000 to over $400,000 .3 Since Greater boston had a 
particularly low vacancy rate relative to other metro 
regions of the country during this period—at least 
half a percentage point lower than the average for the 
nation’s top 75 metro areas—it is not surprising that 
home prices appreciated faster here than in most other 
locations .
as the housing market weakened in Greater boston 
after 2005, homeowner vacancy rates increased, but 
they never exceeded 2 percent . as a result, prices 
stopped rising and began to fall, but they did not drop 
anywhere near as sharply as in metro regions such 
as Orlando where the vacancy rate exploded to 7 .4 
percent in 2007 or in atlanta or Phoenix where the rate 
increased to 4 .7 and 3 .7 percent, respectively .4 While 
the national vacancy rate has stood at 2 .6 percent 
in each of the first two quarters of the current year, 
boston’s rate has been dropping back toward the 
extremely low levels seen 10 years ago . by the second 
quarter of 2010, the rate was barely higher than 1 
percent, thus sustaining at least one of the conditions 
for a continued recovery in home prices despite a rela-
tively weak economy .
Home Sales Volume
Sales of single-family homes in the five-county Greater 
boston region rose in 2009 for the first time in five 
years, contributing to the downward trend in Greater 
boston vacancy rates . as Figure 3.3 indicates, from the 
most recent sales peak of 35,444 in 2004, sales volume 
declined steadily for four straight years, bottoming out 
at 22,787 (a reduction of 36 percent) in 2008 . Drawing 
on early data from The Warren Group, we predicted 
last year that sales would continue to drop . Instead, 
sales picked up in late 2009, bringing the yearly total 
number of sales to 23,508 . although this figure repre-
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FIGURE 3 .2
Homeowner Vacancy Rates, Greater Boston vs. U.S. Metro Areas, 1990–2010
Source: U .S . Census bureau, Quarterly Vacancy Survey .
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as Figure 3.4 illustrates, sales of two- and three-family 
structures were depressed by the housing downturn 
even more than sales of single-family homes and 
condominiums . From a high of 5,539 sales in 2004, 
two-family sales dropped by more than half, to just 
2,575, in 2007 . For three-family units, the decline was 
even more dramatic . There were just 933 sales of these 
structures in 2007, nearly 62 percent lower than the 
2,441 sales posted in 2004 . The sales turnaround for 
both two- and three-family homes took place earlier 
than in single-family homes and condos, though, with 
higher sales figures for both types of units in both 2008 
and 2009 .
The housing market features a great deal of seasonal 
variation, and accounting for that seasonality makes 
annual forecasting a difficult endeavor . Our sales 
predictions in last year’s report—which were based 
on the January through June data available to us at 
the time of publication — underestimated the total 
number of transactions that would take place for the 
entire year because of the dynamics of this seasonal-
ity . In place of full-year forecasts for 2010, this year 
we have compared year-to-date sales figures through 
June to parallel half-year figures for the past five years . 
In doing so, we believe we have a better indicator of 
how strongly the housing market maybe recovering 
in Greater boston, presumably free of normal seasonal 
fluctuation .
previous year, it provided the first annual data point 
suggesting the beginnings of a recovery in the market 
for detached single-family real estate .
For condominiums, 2009 marked the end of the sales 
volume hemorrhaging that had been occurring since 
2005, but it did not mark the beginning of the same 
turnaround as in the single-family market . as we fore-
cast in last year’s report, condominium sales continued 
to decline last year, though not as severely as we had 
predicted . From a high of 26,127 for all of 2005, condo 
sales in the Greater boston region dropped to 15,060 
in 2009, a decline of 42 percent . Not until September 
2009 did monthly year-over-year condo sales actually 
increase . Since that time, each month’s condo sales 
figure has exceeded the monthly figure from the year 
before .
In previous installments of The Greater Boston Housing 
Report Card we have dedicated less attention to sales 
in two- and three-unit structures than to single-family 
homes and condominiums because the latter two 
categories make up the bulk of home sales . Still, these 
two- and three-unit sales are a significant component 
of the housing market and represent a far higher share 
in boston than in most other metropolitan areas of the 
United States . as such, they merit a discussion here, 
particularly in the wake of the foreclosure crisis that 
has disproportionately affected multifamily structures 
like the ubiquitous triple-deckers in boston and other 
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Sales of Two- and Three-Family Homes  
in Greater Boston, 2000–2009
Source: The Warren Group
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homes in three-unit structures, sales have increased in 
the first six months every year since 2007, but the gains 
have been rather small . although 2010’s six-month 
sales figure was 37 percent higher than 2007’s, this 
represented an increase of just 200 sales . Sales in three-
unit structures were 17 percent higher in the first six 
months of 2010, compared to 2009 .
The extra damage done to the market for two- and 
three-family homes in Greater boston might be writ-
ten off as simply a quirk of the housing market, were 
it not connected with broader social and economic 
trends at both the individual and the municipal levels . 
Particularly in this region, these two- and three-family 
homes have historically served as vehicles for social 
mobility, especially for immigrant families who could 
live in one unit while renting the others to friends and 
family members, thus generating a steady stream of 
income for themselves while preserving an appreciat-
ing asset . To the extent that this segment of the local 
housing market has suffered outsize declines, the pain 
associated with the decline of the housing market is 
likely to have been disproportionately concentrated 
among families with lower incomes, and it may well 
have interrupted the process of social mobility that 
ownership of these types of homes had promised in 
previous years .
at the municipal level, these types of structures 
are heavily concentrated in boston, the dense inner 
suburbs that surround the city and the larger older 
For single-family homes and condos, these half-year 
data are presented in Figure 3.5 . because the recovery 
did not begin until midway through 2009, the steady 
decline in six-month sales figures that began in 2006 
continued through 2009 . This year (2010) marks the 
first January to June sales period since 2005 in which 
single-family and condo sales are higher than the 
previous year’s . between January and June, nearly 
3,000 more single-family homes were sold in Greater 
boston than during that same period last year, an 
increase of nearly 30 percent . For condos, the six-
month year-over-year increase was nearly 2,000 units, 
or 31 percent . If sales volume had not plummeted in 
July following expiration of the federal homebuyer tax 
credit, these data would represent the clearest sign yet 
of a housing-market recovery in Greater boston . but in 
July 2010, single-family home sales in Greater boston 
were down 25 percent from July 2009 and 33 percent 
lower than the previous month .5 Whether sales will 
recover in coming months is hard to predict .
The recovery in sales of two- and three-unit homes, as 
stated above, began earlier, yet it has actually proven 
more modest than the recovery for single-family 
homes and condos . Figure 3.6 provides the six-month 
sales figures for two- and three-unit homes in the five-
county Greater boston region . among homes in two-
unit structures, the 1,615 sales in the first six months 
of 2010 represented a 30 percent increase from the 
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towns, more than 90 percent of all homes sold in 2009 
were detached single-family structures .
Communities with high proportions of condo sales 
tend to cluster right around the center of the city . In 
Central boston (comprising the North End, beacon 
Hill, the back bay, the South End, Downtown boston, 
and Chinatown), condos made up more than 97 
percent of all home sales last year . all of the top 10, 
and 15 of the top 20, condo markets are either neigh-
borhoods in boston or communities that directly abut 
the city . This is a rather diverse group of communities 
economically, though, as condo prices ranged from 
the high end (in places like brookline, a rich inner 
suburb next to boston, and Middleton, a middle-class 
industrial cities that dot the region . These places, by 
and large, are home to a substantially higher propor-
tion of low-income families as well as racial and ethnic 
minorities unlike many smaller and more prosperous 
suburbs, whose housing stock consists overwhelm-
ingly of single-family detached dwellings . In Table 3.1 
we compare annual home sales data for 2009 for differ-
ent types of housing units to determine which indi-
vidual cities and towns had the highest percentages 
of single-family homes, condos, two-family homes, 
and three-family homes among all homes sold . Not 
surprisingly, the towns with the highest proportion of 
detached single-family home sales were all relatively 
small and relatively wealthy suburbs . In these 20 
TabLE 3 .1
Greater Boston Municipalities with the Highest Proportion of  
Single-Family, Condominium, Two-Family, and Three-Family Home Sales, 2009

















1 boxford 100 .0% 1 Central boston 97 .1% 1 Everett 35 .6% 1 East boston 31 .4%
2 Dunstable 100 .0% 2 Cambridge 83 .0% 2 Revere 32 .9% 2 Lawrence 26 .7%
3 Carlisle 98 .2% 3 South boston 81 .7% 3 Lawrence 31 .4% 3 Dorchester 20 .2%
4 Westwood 98 .2% 4 brookline 80 .5% 4 Malden 28 .9% 4 Chelsea 15 .3%
5 Wilmington 97 .8% 5 brighton 79 .6% 5 Mattapan 26 .2% 5 Lynn 15 .0%
6 Topsfield 96 .1% 6 allston 78 .3% 6 Chelsea 25 .2% 6 Mattapan 14 .3%
7 Georgetown 94 .0% 7 Jamaica Plain 76 .9% 7 Hyde Park 20 .8% 7 Everett 11 .9%
8 Holbrook 93 .7% 8 Charlestown 76 .2% 8 Lynn 20 .2% 8 Roxbury 11 .9%
9 Hamilton 93 .2% 9 Roxbury 70 .3% 9 Somerville 19 .3% 9 brockton 11 .8%
10 berkley 92 .7% 10 Somerville 61 .5% 10 Medford 16 .5% 10 Somerville 8 .0%
11 Kingston 92 .5% 11 Watertown 58 .8% 11 Dorchester 16 .1% 11 allston 6 .5%
12 Lynnfield 92 .4% 12 berlin 57 .0% 12 Lowell 15 .5% 12 Revere 5 .2%
13 Dover 92 .2% 13 Salem 53 .5% 13 Haverhill 14 .4% 13 South boston 5 .2%
14 Plympton 92 .0% 14 Waltham 51 .2% 14 Watertown 14 .3% 14 Lowell 5 .0%
15 Hanson 91 .9% 15 Middleton 49 .5% 15 Roslindale 13 .9% 15 Malden 4 .9%
16 Lakeville 91 .5% 16 Dorchester 49 .4% 16 East boston 13 .5% 16 Jamaica Plain 4 .5%
17 Harvard 91 .0% 17 Salisbury 48 .5% 17 Whitman 13 .4% 17 Hyde Park 4 .5%
18 Newbury 90 .6% 18 Chelsea 48 .5% 18 brockton 13 .3% 18 Taunton 3 .8%
19 Milton 90 .4% 19 Winthrop 47 .4% 19 Taunton 13 .2% 19 Winthrop 3 .4%
20 Upton 90 .3% 20 Roslindale 47 .1% 20 Winthrop 12 .6% 20 Gloucester 3 .2%
Source: The Warren Group
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of $327,358 . In actuality, the 2009 annual figure was 
$337,591 . This figure represented a decline of 19 .5 
percent from 2005, when the average price topped 
$400,000 in the five county Greater boston region .7
For condos, our full-year annual forecast of a median 
price of $275,264 was about $4,000 lower than the final 
actual figure, $279,768 . In contrast with single-family 
homes, condo prices had remained relatively stable 
through 2008, yet they fell substantially for the first 
time in 2009 . Still, the decline in the median condo 
price was much more modest . From its peak level in 
2007, the median price fell by just 8 .7 percent through 
2009—less than half the rate of the decline in single-
family home prices .
as Figure 3.8 demonstrates, the largest housing price 
contractions in Greater boston have taken place among 
two-family and three-family homes, which tend to be 
more concentrated in the dense urban core and house 
a disproportionate number of low-income families . 
Housing of both types reached their peak annual 
values in 2005 . They experienced modest declines in 
prices in both 2006 and 2007, then plummeted in value 
in 2008 and 2009 . From a median value of $444,021 in 
2005, the median for two-family homes fell nearly 40 
percent, to $267,188 in 2009 . For three-family homes, 
the comparable figures were $492,182 in 2005 and 
$243,009 in 2009, a stunning 51 percent drop in median 
selling price in just four years . In fact, these three-unit 
North Shore community) to the low end of the housing 
market (in places like Roxbury and Chelsea) .
a different picture emerges when we examine the 
communities with a high proportion of two- and 
three-unit buildings . Nearly all of these are commu-
nities that have been hardest hit by the foreclosure 
crisis and have had to provide, year in and year out, 
higher levels of social services associated with deal-
ing with low-income populations, while working with 
highly constrained municipal budgets .6 Given the 
high percentage of such sales in communities like East 
boston, Everett, Chelsea, Dorchester, Mattapan, and 
Lynn, the steep decline in this segment of the housing 
market has taken a high toll on the communities most 
in need of a robust housing market .
Home Prices
although home sales volume began to pick up for 
single-family homes and condominiums in 2009, and 
for two- and three-family units even before then, this 
was not the case for home prices (see Figure 3.7) . On 
an annual basis, home prices continued to fall for all 
types of housing from 2007 through 2009 . The fore-
casts that we made last year about home prices turned 
out to be more accurate than our forecasts for sales 
volume . In last year’s installment of The Greater Boston 
Housing Report Card we reported that we expected to 
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a summary of the price depreciation between the peak 
and trough for each of these types of housing units and 
the subsequent recovery through June 2010 is found 
in Table 3.2 . The table suggests the “more price falls, 
the faster it comes back .” as demonstrated above (see 
Table 3 .1), these types of homes are disproportion-
ately concentrated in poorer communities throughout 
Greater boston, where the housing market has proven 
exceedingly fragile . as such, this excessive volatil-
ity of rapidly declining and rising prices introduces 
a measure of uncertainty in the communities least 
equipped to handle it .
structures have been hit so acutely by the housing 
crisis that, on average, they are selling now for less 
than typical two-unit structures, a phenomenon not 
seen since 2000 .
Comparing the first six months of 2010 with the 
first six months of the five previous years, as we did 
with the sales volume data, we see the beginnings 
of a moderate recovery in home prices in all types 
of owner-occupied units . Figure 3.9 portrays these 
half-year comparisons for detached single-family 
homes and condos . Last year marked a low point for 
home prices for both types of units, but the first six 
months of 2010 revealed the first six-month home price 
increases in five years . These six-month year-over-year 
increases were not huge—just 7 percent for single-
family homes and just 4 percent for condos—but they 
did seem to point toward a mild recovery .
The six-month year-over-year percentage gains for 
two- and three-family homes have been more impres-
sive, but perhaps only because last year’s prices were 
so low . The median price for two-family homes was 
15 percent higher in the first six months of 2010, 
compared to a year ago; for three-family homes, the 
median price was 19 percent higher than a year ago . 
On average, two-family homes have continued to sell 
for slightly more than three-family homes in Greater 
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TabLE 3 .2
Changes in Home Prices by Type of Housing Unit, 
Greater Boston, 2005 – June 2010
Peak Year Trough Year
Peak Year to 
Trough Year
Mid 2009 –  
Mid 2010
Condo 2007 2009 -8 .7% 4 .0%
1-Family 2005 2009 -19 .5% 7 .0%
2-Family 2005 2009 -39 .8% 14 .9%
3-Family 2005 2009 -50 .6% 19 .3%
Source: The Warren Group
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substantially, the housing recovery may take longer . If 
the overall economy were to grow faster, it is conceiv-
able that full price recovery could come a little earlier . 
In either case, one would be justified in believing that 
full price recovery will not occur for at least another 
three years .
Characteristics of Massachusetts 
Homebuyers
Each year the National association of Realtors (NaR) 
releases a hefty amount of data chronicling the char-
acteristics of home buyers and sellers including what 
types of housing they buy, how much money they 
spend, how first-time buyers differ from repeat buyers, 
which methods sellers use to market their homes, and 
what proportion of buyers finance their purchases . 
NaR provides data pertaining to buyers and sell-
ers nationwide, as well as data on buyers and sellers 
in each individual state . as in previous years, these 
data illuminate the unique ways in which the Massa-
chusetts housing market differs from those found in 
other states . We present a selection of key comparisons 
between the state and the nation in Table 3.3 .
Following a trend that we have noted each year, home-
buyers in Massachusetts have significantly higher 
incomes than their counterparts across the nation . The 
median income of Massachusetts homebuyers, nearly 
$95,000, was a full 30 percent higher than the national 
median, just over $74,000 .8 The state’s income distri-
bution accounts for this disparity in median incomes: 
just 12 percent of Massachusetts homebuyers earned 
less than $45,000 in 2008, compared with 21 percent 
of buyers across the country, while two-thirds of the 
bay State’s buyers made over $75,000, compared with 
fewer than half of all buyers in the U .S .
These higher incomes proved quite necessary, 
however, as the price of a typical house in Massachu-
setts ($275,000) costs nearly 50 percent more than that 
of a typical house throughout the country ($185,000) . 
Indeed, despite a higher median income in Massachu-
setts, the ratio of median home price to median income 
in the Commonwealth is 2 .90, while the same ratio 
across america is just 2 .53 . In all states, new homes 
tend to cost more than previously owned homes, and 
in both categories typical home prices in the Common-
wealth significantly exceeded those in other states . In 
Are We Still on Track for a Full Home Price Recovery?
In our 2009 Housing Report, we compared the pres-
ent housing price cycle with the last one in order to 
provide a forecast of when single family home prices 
might return to their late 2005 peak . In the earlier 
cycle, prices began to fall in July 1988 and continued 
to decline through February 1992 . During this peak-
to-trough period, which lasted 42 months according to 
the Case-Shiller index, home prices fell by 15 .3 percent . 
It took the next 62 months—just over 5 years—for 
single-family home prices in Greater boston to return 
to their July 1988 peak .
The peak of the current cycle occurred in Novem-
ber 2005, based again on the Case-Shiller Index, and 
according to the latest data hit bottom in april 2009 . 
This peak-to-trough period also lasted 42 months, 
and during that time prices fell by 17 .8 percent, only 
slightly more than in the previous cycle .
In Figure 3.11, we have superimposed the current 
cycle onto the previous one . a cursory examination of 
the figure suggests that the peak-to-trough portions of 
the two cycles are quite similar, as are the initial recov-
eries from the troughs through the first 15 months 
of the up-cycle . If this pattern were to continue, then 
the full recovery would take roughly 60 months or 
five years . That would mean that single-family home 
prices in Greater boston would not recover until some-
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Greater Boston Housing Cycles: 1988–1997 vs. 2005–
2010, Case-Shiller Single-Family Home Price Index
Source: Standard and Poor’s Case-Shiller Single-Family Home Price Index
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that a far lower proportion of the Commonwealth’s 
housing stock consists of detached single-family homes, 
and a far higher proportion consists of two-family, 
three-family, and multiunit dwellings . Controlling for 
size heightens the disparity in housing cost: the average 
price per square foot of homes purchased in Massachu-
setts was $176 in 2009 . This figure is 74 percent higher 
than the average price per square foot of all american 
homes purchased last year ($101) .
fact, the proportion of homebuyers in Massachusetts 
whose houses cost less than $150,000 was only about a 
third as high as the proportion able to find such afford-
able units nationwide .
as striking as this affordability gap is on its face, it 
becomes even more extreme when we take into consid-
eration the fact that homes purchased in Massachusetts, 
while significantly more expensive, are also signifi-
cantly smaller . This has to do primarily with the fact 
TabLE 3 .3 
2009 Homebuyer Profile, Massachusetts vs. U.S.
MA U.S. MA/U.S. Ratio
All Homebuyers
Median Income (2008$) $94,800 $73,103 1 .30
% with Incomes <$45,000 12% 21% 0 .57
% with Incomes <$55,000 19% 32% 0 .59
% with Incomes >$75,000 67% 48% 1 .40
Median age 38 39 0 .97
Median Price of Home Purchased $275,000 $185,000 1 .49
Median Price – New Home $310,000 $222,000 1 .40
Median Price – Previously Owned Home $271,000 $176,000 1 .54
% Who Financed Their Purchase 90% 92% 0 .98
% Purchasing Homes Price <$150,000 12% 34% 0 .35
% Purchasing Homes Price <$200,000 24% 53% 0 .45
% Purchasing Newly Constructed Home 9% 18% 0 .50
Of Newly Constructed Home buyers, % Paying <$200,000 24% 40% 0 .60
Of Newly Constructed Home buyers, % Paying <$300,000 43% 68% 0 .63
Of Newly Constructed Home buyers, % Paying >$500,000 31% 8% 3 .88
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 65% 78% 0 .83
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 7% 8% 0 .88
% Purchasing Unit in building with 2–4 Units 10% 2% 5 .00
% Purchasing Unit in building with 5 or More Units 12% 7% 1 .71
Median Size (sq . ft .) 1,620 1,800 0 .90
Price per Square Foot for all Homes $176 $101 1 .74
 Detached Single Family $169 $97 1 .74
 Townhouse $168 $124 1 .35
 Unit in 2–4 Unit Structure $242 $120 2 .02
 Unit in Structure with 5 or More Units $250 $175 1 .43
Source: National association of Realtors, 2010 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers
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Rental Market
Rental Vacancy Rates
across the nation, rental vacancy rates for all large 
metropolitan areas combined have crept up since 1990 
and have risen quite sharply since 2006 (see Figure 
3.12) . While they hovered between 7 and 8 percent 
through the turn of the millennium, they now exceed 
10 percent for the first time since at least 1956 (and 
possibly for the first time ever) .
In the relatively dense Greater boston region, rental 
vacancy rates have traditionally been far lower than 
the national average . Even as the vacancy rate nation-
wide approached 8 percent in the 1990s, boston’s 
vacancy rate dropped steadily . From a level above  
7 percent in 1991, the rental vacancy rate for the region 
fell nearly every year that decade, so that by 2000 it 
stood at 2 .7 percent, the lowest value ever . Just as the 
low homeowner vacancy rate contributed to mount-
ing housing prices in the region, this extremely low 
rental unit vacancy rate contributed to rapidly escalat-
ing rents in boston-area apartments at the beginning 
of the 1990s . although the area’s rental vacancy rate 
returned to the more normal 5–6 percent level for most 
of the 2000s, it was still more than three percentage 
affordability problems affected all home purchases in 
Massachusetts, but they were perhaps most acute for 
those making their first purchase . In 2009, this group 
made up a larger share of all homebuyers in Massa-
chusetts than across the nation . The ratio of home-
buyer income in Massachusetts to that across the U .S . 
is higher for first-time buyers than it is for all buyers 
(1 .37 vs . 1 .30), but so is the ratio of the median home 
price in Massachusetts to the national median (1 .57 
among first-time buyers vs . 1 .49 for all buyers) . The 
ratio of median price to median income for first-time 
buyers in the Commonwealth stood at 2 .89, compared 
to a ratio for first-time buyers nationwide of 2 .53 . 
Similar results are found among repeat homebuyers, 
but for this group median income and median price 
in Massachusetts were slightly less out of line with 
national trends . altogether, these data indicate that 
in spite of the recent price declines witnessed in the 
regional housing market, owning a home in Greater 
boston, and indeed anywhere within Massachusetts, 
remains a far costlier endeavor than in most other 
parts of the country . This was true back in 2005 and it 
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FIGURE 3 .12
Rental Vacancy Rates, Greater Boston vs. U.S., 1990–2010
Source: U .S . Census bureau, Quarterly Vacancy Survey
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(12 percent) . a likely partial explanation for this trend 
is that those who lost their homes or who decided not 
to enter the homebuyer market propped up demand 
for apartments, even as demand for owner-occupied 
housing fell . Effective rents, which take into account 
discounts offered by landlords to tenants, such as a 
month of free rent or some similar concession, tracked 
closely with asking rents in their persistent upswing 
through mid-2008, peaking at $1,740 .
Only in the second half of 2008 did the rental market 
begin to somewhat soften . at the end of 2009, the aver-
age asking rent in Greater boston had dropped about 
$50 from its 2008 peak, while the average effective 
rent had fallen about $60 . This was the same period in 
which home sales began to pick up again in the region, 
and this shift likely played a role in mitigating the 
climb in rents . by the second quarter of 2010, though, 
rents began rising again . It is not clear whether this 
simply entails a stabilization of rents or instead marks 
another round of rapid rent increases . What does 
seem to be clear, though, is that whatever downward 
correction in rents took place was rather short-lived . 
Compared to other metropolitan regions in the U .S ., 
renting an apartment in Greater boston continues to be 
an expensive undertaking .
as in past years, the boston metropolitan area is 
among the very most expensive rental markets . 
points lower than the national average every year of 
the decade . and in the first quarter of 2010, the gap 
between Greater boston’s rental vacancy rate and the 
national average metropolitan vacancy rate reached an 
all-time high of 7 percentage points, though that gap 
closed to the still-high value of 4 .8 percentage points 
in the second quarter . Clearly, the rental market in 
Greater boston is quite different from the rental market 
most everywhere else . as we will see in Chapter 4, 
the big difference is likely related to the concentration 
of college and university students in the region who 
provide a more or less steady demand for rental units .
Rents
In last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card we 
noted the fascinating way that trends in apartment 
rents in Greater boston stood in contrast to trends in 
home prices . With a wave of foreclosures pushing 
homeowners out of their houses and dissuading poten-
tial homebuyers from investing in new owner-occu-
pied housing, home prices declined between 2005 and 
2009 . at the same time, rents remained quite high . In 
fact, rather than falling along with home prices, rents 
actually increased despite the growing weakness in 
the owner-occupied housing market and the economy 
more generally . as Figure 3.13 indicates, between the 
second quarter of 2005 and the third quarter of 2008, 































































































































Asking and Effective Apartment Rents in Greater Boston, 2001–2010
Source: Reis .com
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Conclusion
It is difficult to forecast where home prices will trend 
in the coming months or the beginning of 2011 . If we 
are fortunate, the end of the first time homebuyer tax 
credit will only have a temporary impact on home 
sales and prices followed by a resumption of sales 
activity and stability in home prices . There are simply 
too many unknowns to predict this outcome .
as for the rental market, there is little reason to believe 
that the historically high rents of the past several 
years will come down anytime soon, particularly 
given the number of households losing their homes to 
foreclosure, the number of families who are remain-
ing in rental housing due to the weak economy, and 
the continued growth in the number of university 
and college undergraduate and graduate students in 
Greater boston, a subject to which we turn in the next 
chapter .
according to Reis .com, in the second quarter of 2010, 
only four metropolitan regions—New York City; West-
chester County, New York; San Francisco; and Fairfield 
County, Connecticut—had higher average rents than 
boston . Of the top 10 metro regions, all but two (San 
Francisco and San Jose, Ca) were in the northeast . by 
comparison, metropolitan regions that have in recent 
years attracted many young families and many high-
tech companies that might otherwise have located in 
the boston region have essentially outcompeted boston 
by being more affordable . The average effective rent in 
austin, Texas was $789 during the second quarter of 
2010; in Portland, Oregon it was $763; and in Raleigh-
Durham, North Carolina $724 .
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4.
Student Housing
Housing in the City of boston identified the need to 
address the impact of students on the local housing 
market . In its 1996 report, the advisory Panel stated 
that
The presence of 32 colleges, universities and 
graduate schools is one of boston’s major assets, 
contributing to the economic base and quality 
of life, but the impact of 67,000 students esti-
mated to live in rental housing places a strain on 
the City’s private housing market .  . . . Groups of 
students sharing apartments can pay much higher 
rents than either individuals, families with chil-
dren or people living on fixed incomes and thus 
the student presence tends to artificially inflate 
prices in certain segments of boston’s private 
rental housing market . Construction of additional 
student dormitories would free up rental units and 
help establish a truer private housing market .3
because the increase in enrollment since 1996 has 
been so rapid, most of the universities and colleges 
in the region have been unable to expand on-campus 
housing options fast enough to house the new influx 
of students . The result is that incoming students are 
putting more and more pressure on the rental hous-
ing market in the city and surrounding suburbs . This 
is one of the major reasons why we find that rents in 
Greater boston have remained high throughout the 
current economic crisis and have been rising almost 
steadily at least since 2005 .
Of course, some students are more likely to be rent-
ing than others . For instance, most community college 
students commute from home and therefore do not 
place additional pressure on the rental market . addi-
tionally, many undergraduate students are housed on 
campus . However, graduate students are frequently 
on their own for housing, as there is little on-campus 
housing available to them, and they are unlikely 
to commute from home .4 as such, total enrollment 
increases alone do not provide sufficient information 
to indicate the level of stress that students add to the 
rental market . The following sections break down the 
enrollment increases by level of education (graduate 
Greater boston’s status as the world’s higher education 
capital is one of the main attractions of the region, and 
its 76 accredited universities and colleges are responsi-
ble for much of the Commonwealth’s prosperity . These 
institutions of higher education provide a trained 
labor force for businesses not only here but across the 
nation and the globe . Their research labs have spun 
off hundreds of companies that employ tens of thou-
sands of local residents while leading the world in new 
discoveries that improve living standards everywhere . 
a number of these institutions have been responsible 
for spawning boston’s great teaching hospitals which 
are the envy of the world . Without its “Eds and Meds,” 
Greater boston would be a shadow of itself .
Each year, tens of thousands of undergraduate and 
graduate students come to the Greater boston area 
to take advantage of these great institutions and over 
the past few years, the number of students has grown 
rapidly . This increase is not surprising, following the 
national trend . The Current Population Survey reports 
that a record-high 70 .1 percent of 2009, high-school 
graduates were enrolled in college in October 2009, up 
from 68 .6 percent in 2008, and 67 .2 percent in 2007 .1 
Similarly, The Pew Research Center reports an increase 
in freshman enrollment of 144,000 students between 
2007 and 2008, the largest in 40 years .2
University and college students in Greater boston 
add a vitality to the region not only socially, but 
economically, as they are major customers for its retail 
and service establishments . but they also add to the 
demand for private housing and in doing so play a 
major role in making rental housing in Greater boston 
among the most expensive in the nation . Unlike the 
typical household with one or two breadwinners, three 
or four students can live together in a two-bedroom 
apartment each paying $500—$600 a month so that 
landlords can charge $2,000 to $2,400 for a unit which 
otherwise might rent for $1,700 or less . This can price 
families and individuals out of the rental markets 
where large numbers of students live .
Well before the recent expansion in university and 
college enrollment, the Mayor’s advisory Panel on 
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and undergraduate) and by type of school (private, 
state, community) in order to more accurately assess 
the added burden on the housing market and to 
provide a forecast for the future .
Enrollment by Level of Education
In Greater boston total post-secondary enrollment 
remained more or less constant from 1984 through 
2000 hovering between 280,000 and 290,000 students 
(see Figure 4.1) .5 Then, between 2001 and 2009, student 
enrollment increased rapidly from 290,000 to 336,000, 
an increase of more than 45,000 students in a single 
decade . The last two years alone (2008 and 2009) 
accounted for over 19,000 of the increase .
The total enrollment figures mask underlying differ-
ences in undergraduate and graduate enrollment 
patterns in the region . as Figure 4.2 reveals, under-
graduate enrollment actually declined between 1989 
and 1998, sinking from nearly 225,000 in 1989 to just 
over 207,000 in 1998 . (There are no comparable data 
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FIGURE 4 .1
Total Post-Secondary Enrollment in Greater Boston, 1984-2009
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FIGURE 4 .2
Undergraduate Enrollment in Greater Boston, 1984-2009
 Source: College Navigator, College-Insight, IPEDS data center; august 2010
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period . Other institutions, including the University of 
Massachusetts (both boston and Lowell campuses), 
Salem State, bentley University, Dean College, and 
Merrimack College experienced enrollment reductions 
of over 1,000 students each during that period .
The increase in undergraduate enrollment has been 
very abrupt: only about 3,400 additional undergradu-
ate students from 2000 to 2005, but then an additional 
20,550 from 2005 to 2009—with nearly 14,000 of those 
additional students showing up in just the past two 
years . This has been especially problematic for the 
between 2000 and 2004, the number of undergradu-
ate students in Greater boston has increased every 
year so that by Fall 2009, there were just under 234,000 
students in the region, an increase of nearly 24,000 in 
five years .
The decrease from 1989 to 1998 is partially due to 
the restructuring at Northeastern University, which 
changed from a large mostly-commuter school to 
a smaller mostly non-commuter university . North-
eastern University alone accounts for over 8,000 of 
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FIGURE 4 .3
Graduate Enrollment in Greater Boston, 1984-2009
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FIGURE 4 .4 
Graduate Enrollment as a Proportion of Total Post-Secondary Enrollment in Greater Boston, 1984-2009
Source: College Navigator, College-Insight, IPEDS data center, august 2010
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Enrollment by Type of Institution
although the growing enrollment figures suggest a 
powerful addition to rental housing demand, students 
from different types of institutions are not equally 
likely to rent off-campus apartments . Total enrollment 
figures mask the underlying trends in enrollment at 
private institutions, state schools, and community 
colleges . Table 4.1 indicates the change in enrollment 
from 2001 to 2009 for all three types of institutions .
During the decade total enrollment increased by nearly 
46,000 students in Greater boston . among under-
graduates, the greatest increase occurred in the student 
ranks of community colleges . Nearly 45 percent of the 
entire 2001–2009 increase in the region’s post-second-
ary student body occurred in these two-year institu-
tions—10,462 out of 23,470 additional undergrads . 
These students tend to have come from the region 
and tend to live at home while they attend school . as 
such, their impact on the local rental housing market is 
limited .
Of the remaining 13,000 additional undergraduates, 
about one-third (4,400) attended public four-year 
universities such as UMass boston and UMass Lowell . 
While we do not have data on how many public 
university undergrads rent apartments with other 
students or friends, it is likely that many of them still 
live at home and put less pressure on the local rental 
market .
The remaining two-thirds (8,600) of the additional 
undergraduates attended private four-year schools like 
boston University, boston College, and Northeastern . 
housing market during the past three years because 
those students entering in 2006 and 2007 were juniors 
and seniors in 2009 and 2010 when undergradu-
ate students tend to leave dormitories for their own 
off-campus apartments . This added pressure almost 
certainly contributed to the sustained high rents in 
Greater boston when we would have expected rent 
levels to soften and effective rents to deviate more 
sharply from advertised rents .
In contrast to undergraduate enrollment, graduate 
enrollment has been rising at a fairly steady rate for at 
least a quarter of a century (see Figure 4.3) . Since 1984, 
the number of graduate students in boston has nearly 
doubled; since 2001, graduate enrollment has increased 
by more than 22,000 students .
The increase in graduate enrollment offset the dip in 
undergraduate enrollment between 1989 and 1998 so 
that total university and college enrollment remained 
more or less flat during that period . but the combina-
tion of the steady rise in graduate students and the 
sharp rise in undergraduates after 2005 has led to the 
point where in the fall of 2009, there were 336,000 
post-secondary students in Greater boston includ-
ing 234,000 undergraduates and 102,000 in gradu-
ate school . Today, the graduate student population 
is nearly half as large as the undergraduate student 
population, and comprises nearly one-third of the total 
university and college student population (see Figure 
4.4) . back in the 1980s, the graduate student popula-
tion accounted for no more than 20 to 23 percent of all 
post-secondary students .
The implications for the housing market become even 
more evident when considering the undergraduate 
and graduate populations separately . a large share of 
undergraduates spend at least their first two years in 
college residence halls or dormitories before setting 
out to live in surrounding neighborhood housing . 
Graduate students who make up an increasing share 
of the student population in Greater boston are almost 
all living in off-campus housing since there are few 
on-campus options for them at most schools . Unlike 
most undergraduates, graduate students have fewer 
reasons to be as close to campus and therefore have 
a tendency to find housing throughout the Greater 
boston region, putting added pressure on neighbor-
hoods not necessarily adjacent to their campuses .
TabLE 4 .1














Community Colleges 10,462 0 10,462
Total Enrollment 23,470 22,420 45,890
Source: College Navigator, College-Insight, IPEDS data center; august 2010
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education which operate facilities within the city limits 
to report each year on the number of students enrolled, 
the number residing in campus housing, the number 
residing off campus, and a breakdown of the location 
of off-campus students by boston zip code . In addition, 
each of these institutions must provide a complete list 
of addresses of properties currently owned, leased, 
rented or operated by the institution in which students 
are housed .
Greater Boston
Universities and four-year colleges house students at 
various rates ranging from 92 percent at MIT on the 
high end to no housing at all at commuting schools 
such as the University of Massachusetts boston . 
Taking into account the on-campus housing rates of 
these schools in Greater boston, approximately 95,000 
undergraduates are housed on-campus (Figure 4.5) . 
The remaining 82,500 undergraduates at private and 
public institutions are living in off-campus housing . 
Thus, the overall undergraduate off-campus hous-
ing rate is 46 .5 percent (Figure 4.6) . Of course, some 
of these students are living at home and commuting 
to school, but that rate may itself be dictated by high 
rental prices . More students might rent apartments if 
they could afford them .
as noted above, a large proportion of upper classmen 
at these schools seek off-campus housing and this 
particular group of undergraduates is responsible for 
much of the pressure on surrounding neighborhood 
rental markets .
What may be even more important is the role of the 
growing graduate student population on Greater 
boston’s rental market . Returning to Figure 4 .4 and 
Table 4 .1, it is clear that the student demographic that 
has increased the fastest is graduate enrollment in 
private universities and colleges . These private schools 
account for over 20,000 additional graduate students 
since 2000 and over 90 percent of all additional gradu-
ate students in Greater boston . a huge proportion 
of these students are competing for housing in the 
region’s rental market .
Off-campus Housing
Obtaining accurate data on the number of university 
and college students living off campus throughout 
Greater boston proved difficult since many institutions 
outside the City of boston were not able to provide 
these numbers to us . However, using a combination 
of sources including Peterson’s Guide to Colleges and 
Universities and the City of boston’s University Account-
ability Reports, we were able to piece together estimates 
of the total number of students throughout Greater 
boston who were living on- and off-campus in fall 
2009 and disaggregate the number by undergraduates 
and graduate students .6 The data on student housing 
in the City of boston are the most accurate since the 
city requires each of the private institutions of higher 
TabLE 4 .2
 Increase in Undergraduate Enrollment by Type of 
Institution, Greater Boston, 2000–2009
2001–2007 2007–2009
Private Four-Year Colleges 
and Universities
5,820 2,727
Public Four-Year Colleges 
and Universities
735 3,726
Community Colleges 3,052 7,410
Total Enrollment 9,607 13,863
















Estimated Number of Students in Four-Year  
Colleges, Universities, Professional Schools, On and 
Off Campus, Greater Boston, Fall 2009
Source: Peterson’s .com; City of boston University accountability Reports
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City of Boston
We have more precise data on the institutions of 
higher education operating within the City of boston 
because of the city’s mandated University Account-
ability Reports . Using these data on private four-year 
university and college enrollments and housing status, 
we have been able to calculate reasonably good esti-
mates of the number of students living on campus 
in dormitories and residence halls and the number 
living off campus . It is important to remember that 
these estimates include only private institutions oper-
ating in boston, exclude both community college 
and public four-year universities and colleges (i .e . 
Roxbury Community College, bunker Hill Community 
College, and UMass boston), and only refer to full-
time students since many part-time students would 
normally be living in the region even if not in school . 
Moreover, these numbers do not include those who 
are living in boston but who are registered students at 
universities or colleges elsewhere in Greater boston . 
Hence, they underrepresent the total student popula-
tion in the city itself .
Nevertheless, the numbers are substantial, as Figure 
4.7 reveals . While there are now nearly 37,000 full-time 
undergraduates living in campus dormitories and resi-
dence halls in boston, over 34,000 full-time undergrad-
uate students in private boston-based post-secondary 
In addition to undergraduate students, there were 
nearly 102,500 graduate students in Greater boston in 
fall 2009 . Graduate students are housed on campus at 
an average rate of just 7 .7 percent . Only about 8,000 
graduate students have on-campus housing at their 
institutions and most schools with graduate programs 
have little or no housing at all for these students .7 
Therefore, a large proportion of the 94,500 graduate 
students not housed on campus are competing in the 
private rental market .
adding together both undergraduate and graduate 
students in Greater boston’s 4-Year universities and 
colleges yields an estimate of 177,000 students living 
off-campus with the majority (54 percent) being gradu-
ate students . Not surprisingly, such a large number of 
students, most of them living in rental housing, has 
generated a growing demand for rental housing which 
keeps rents from falling even during times of economic 
crisis . and as the number of students grows in the face 
of little new housing supply, rents will almost certainly 
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Source: City of boston University accountability Reports
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of the number of full-time students living off campus 
and each school’s share of the total off-campus student 
population . Appendices B, C, and D provide data on 
the proportion of each school’s full-time student popu-
lation living off campus .
The Future
The National Center for Education Statistics predicts 
a further increase in national enrollment in degree-
granting institutions (both public and private) from 
fall 2007 through fall 2018 .8 Total enrollment increased 
28 percent nationwide between 1993 and 2007 and is 
projected to increase by an additional 13 percent by 
2018 . The report also predicts that while the increase 
in undergraduate enrollment will be 12 percent, the 
increase in graduate enrollment will approach 20 
percent .
If the national projection applies to Greater boston, we 
can expect that by 2018 there will be another 26,000 
undergraduates in Greater boston and an additional 
19,000 graduate students . One can imagine that with 
another 45,000 students in the region, the already tight 
rental housing market will be strained even further .
For this reason, it is important to begin to address 
more aggressively the impact of the student popula-
tion on the housing market in the region and particu-
larly in the City of boston itself . We either have to 
concede that rents will continue to spiral upward or 
consider alternative housing options for undergradu-
ates and especially graduate students . Reducing the 
number of students in the region or capping growth 
is not the ideal way to deal with the pressure on the 
housing market . Students play a vital role in the 
region’s economy and can continue to provide a source 
of consumer demand that helps all kinds of businesses 
remain prosperous, generating tens of thousands 
of jobs .
The alternative is to find new ways of meeting the 
demand for student housing . One would hope that 
individual schools will continue to construct residence 
halls for their own students . as for graduate students, 
the fastest growing student segment, we have been 
suggesting the possibility of building one or more 
multi-university graduate student villages . Here are 
the basic elements for such an initiative:9
schools live off campus either in boston or somewhere 
else in Greater boston and most of them in rental units . 
In percentage terms, the boston-based private four-
year institutions of higher education are now housing 
52 percent of their full-time undergraduates on campus 
with 48 percent living off campus . (Figure 4.8)
Many of these students, particularly in the undergrad-
uate ranks, live near campus . Hence, neighborhoods 
such as allston-brighton, Mission Hill, the Fenway, 
and back bay are home to off-campus students and 
in these neighborhoods rents are almost surely being 
kept high as result of student pressure on the housing 
market .
as for graduate students, boston-based universities 
and professional schools provide very little housing . 
Only a little more than 10 percent of these students live 
in campus residence halls so that close to 90 percent 
are living off campus .
altogether, combining full-time undergraduates and 
graduate students, there are about 40,000 students 
living in boston-based campus residence halls and 
dormitories while nearly 60,000 of these institutions’ 
students live off campus . In percentage terms, 60 
percent of full-time students in boston-based private 
post-secondary institutions are living in housing off 
campus, most of it rental . Table 4.3 provides a list of 














Total Residing Off-Campus (Boston)
FIGURE 4 .8
Proportion of Full-Time Students in Boston-based 
Four-Year Colleges, Universities, Professional 
Schools, On and Off Campus, Fall 2009
Source: City of boston University accountability Reports
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Undergraduates Graduates All Students




boston University 5,841 7,916 13,757 23 .1%
Northeastern University 7,811 5,410 13,221 22 .2%
Suffolk University 3,931 1,686 5,617 9 .4%
boston College 1,901 2,591 4,492 7 .5%
berklee College of Music 3,038 0 3,038 5 .1%
Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences 1,815 544 2,359 4 .0%
Emerson College 1,544 696 2,240 3 .8%
Harvard University - boston-based Schools 0 1,804 1,804 3 .0%
Wentworth Institute of Technology 1,703 65 1,768 3 .0%
Simmons College 772 747 1,519 2 .5%
boston architectural College 619 505 1,124 1 .9%
Tufts University School of Dental Medicine 0 804 804 1 .3%
New England Law 0 741 741 1 .2%
Tufts University, School of Medicine 0 707 707 1 .2%
School of the Museum of Fine arts 528 110 638 1 .1%
Fisher College 617 0 617 1 .0%
New England Conservatory of Music 245 331 576 1 .0%
MGH Institute of Health Professions 86 480 566 1 .0%
art Institute of boston at Lesley University 492 70 562 0 .9%
bay State College 540 0 540 0 .9%
Emmanuel College 508 0 508 0 .9%
The boston Conservatory 314 164 478 0 .8%
The New England College of Optometry 0 458 458 0 .8%
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (boston-only) 23 387 410 0 .7%
Wheelock College 247 120 367 0 .6%
Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts University 0 201 201 0 .3%
New England College of business and Finance 36 34 70 0 .1%
Laboure College 25 0 25 0 .0%
Saint John's Seminary 8 15 23 0 .0%
Urban College of boston 22 0 22 0 .0%
boston baptist College 17 0 17 0 .0%
Massachusetts School Of Professional Psychology 0 308 308 0 .0%
32,683 26,894 59,577 100 .0%
TabLE 4 .3
Full-Time Boston-based Private University and College Students Living Off Campus, Fall 2009
Source: City of boston University accountability Reports
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Finding the right location for each village would 
be critical . Sites near public transportation would 
make it possible to serve several institutions without 
inconveniencing students or adding to transportation 
congestion . Since graduate students usually do not 
disrupt local neighborhoods, one would expect that 
community antipathy to such developments near other 
housing would not be a major problem . and since 
graduate students do not have the same need or desire 
to live on or adjacent to their own campuses, the sites 
for such graduate villages need not be constrained by 
the limited amount of developable land near existing 
campuses .
Student housing demand has been a major factor in 
Greater boston’s residential markets for decades . We 
now know that this demand has played a significant 
role in keeping rent levels high almost regardless of 
the state of the economy . In moving forward to assure 
more reasonable rents for households throughout 
Greater boston and especially in the City of boston’s 
neighborhoods, the next frontier in housing should 
include new approaches to meeting the housing needs 
of students and in doing so remedy one of the most 
durable challenges facing residents of the region .
Several universities and colleges would collaborate on 
marketing a high-density graduate student residential 
facility that would be centrally located near public 
transit, would include commercial and retail space, 
and have common areas that could house seminar 
rooms, a small lecture hall, a large screen video room, 
and recreational space . The village could be developed 
by a private sector developer with universities and 
colleges having responsibility for marketing the facility 
to its own graduate students . The collaborating higher 
education institutions would not have a financial stake 
in the development and the facility would remain on 
the city’s tax rolls .
The village would include efficiencies, singles, doubles, 
and perhaps some triples and possibly even some units 
for married couples with young children . The village 
would have first and perhaps second floor commercial 
retail space that might include a small supermarket 
(e .g ., Trader Joes, Whole Foods), a drycleaner, drug 
store, and a sports bar . It would have an underground 
garage with perhaps one space per three to five units, 
but a large Zip Car facility with vehicles ranging from 
Smart Cars to vans . The village would have regular 
programming of seminars, lectures, and film festivals 
for residents and others sponsored by the collaborating 
universities and colleges .
The combination of a convenient location, attractive 
apartments, a large array of amenities, the ability 
to live with students from other schools, and other 
village-like attributes might make this a top residen-
tial choice among graduate students when they come 
to boston . If the village were also open to graduate 
students after graduation, it might serve to retain 
young professionals in the city .
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5.
Foreclosures in Greater Boston
In last year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card, we 
suggested that the foreclosure crisis would not be 
over in the latter half of 2009, but that the number of 
foreclosures would decline in the near future . With 
updated 2009 data and foreclosure action data for 
the first six months of 2010, we can see that we were 
overly optimistic . In reality, the number of foreclosure 
petitions increased in the first half of 2010 and the 
number of deeds and auctions are already nearing the 
full year totals we saw in 2009 . It is with this news that 
we delve further into the foreclosure history of Greater 
boston to obtain a better understanding of just how 
severe this foreclosure crisis has been .
Foreclosure Petitions in Greater Boston
Figure 5.1 reveals the monthly number of foreclosure 
petitions beginning back in January 2000, through June 
of this year . a petition is normally triggered when a 
homeowner is behind 90 days or more in making a 
mortgage payment . Prior to 2004, foreclosure petitions 
rarely exceeded 100 per month . From 2005 through 
the middle of 2008, there was a steady increase in peti-
tions, with monthly petitions more than quadrupling 
from less than 400 to over 1,800 . In all of 2007, nearly 
16,000 petitions were filed compared with less than 700 
just three years earlier .
as a result of the Massachusetts right-to-cure legisla-
tion that put a 90-day moratorium on new petitions 
in order to give borrowers time to catch up on missed 
mortgage payments, petitions dropped sharply to 185 
in May 2008 and 183 in June . The direct result of the 
right-to-cure was short lived, however, as the number 
of foreclosures from September 2008 through June 2009 
averaged over 1,140 a month, with a peak of 1,551 at 
the end of that period . This was close to the all-time 
monthly peak of just over 1,800 in april of the year 
before .
after June of last year, the number of petitions 
dropped steadily as we had hoped they would . In last 
year’s Report Card, we had projected that “with an 
upturn in the economy and ultimately a decrease in 
unemployment, the number of foreclosures (would) 
further decline in the near future .”1 but the reprieve 
we hoped for came to an end in January 2010 before 
stabilizing at an average of more than 1,150 a month 
for the first half of this year . The only good news was 
that during the first six months of this year, only two 
months (March and april) had a larger number of 
foreclosure petitions in a month-to-month comparison 
with the first six months of 2009 . Furthermore, the total 
number of foreclosure petitions in the first six months 
of 2010 is 8 percent less than the number of foreclosure 
petitions in the first six months of 2009 and the number 
of foreclosure petitions in June 2010 is 28 percent lower 
than in June 2009 . This indicates that the number of 
foreclosure petitions may still be on a downward 
course .
Not all foreclosure petitions end in families losing 
their homes . If a homeowner is able to resume paying 
his or her mortgage, a foreclosure deed may never 
be issued . To alleviate the number of Massachusetts 
families losing their homes to foreclosure, Governor 
Deval Patrick signed the Act to Stabilize Neighborhoods 
bill in July 2010 . This bill will encourage banks to work 
with homeowners to find a way to modify their home 
loans before petitions turn into deeds and the owners 
lose their homes . This bill includes a 150 day right-to-
cure, two months longer than the 90 days available 
beginning in 2008 . This should allow homeowners 
an extended period to organize a modified mortgage 
and may lead therefore to fewer petitions turning into 
deeds . This bill may contribute to a long term reduc-
tion in the number of foreclosures, but based on the 
spike in foreclosure petitions after the previous Massa-
chusetts right-to-cure bill was signed, we are hesitant 
to suggest that this will be a long term solution to the 
foreclosure crisis in Greater boston .
Foreclosure Deeds in Greater Boston
The monthly trend in foreclosure deeds from January 
2000 to June 2010 is displayed in Figure 5.2 . Prior to 
2005, it was rare to have more than 20 homeowners 
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lose their homes in any one month . Moving into 2006, 
the number of deeds dramatically increased, averag-
ing nearly 125 a month . In 2007, the number of deeds 
averaged 340 per month and continued to rise in 2008 
to more than 550 per month . as we predicted in last 
year’s Greater Boston Housing Report Card, there was a 
decline in the number of deeds in 2009 . This was likely 
due to the inability of the Massachusetts Land Court 
to keep up with the volume of foreclosure activity in 
addition to the impact of the right-to-cure legislation . 












































































































































Monthly Foreclosure Petitions in Greater Boston, 2000–2010










































































































































Monthly Foreclosure Deeds in Greater Boston, 2000–2010
Source: The Warren Group
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Foreclosure Auctions
Figure 5.3 displays the pattern of foreclosure auctions 
between January 2000 and July 2010 . Data on fore-
closure auctions provided by The Warren Group are 
collected from newspaper announcements . although 
not all announced auctions take place, foreclosed 
homes that do sell often sell for a price much below 
the normal neighborhood market value, which in turn 
can affect the price point of other homes in the same 
neighborhood . This is a particular concern if a large 
number of foreclosures are concentrated in the same 
neighborhood .
auctions in Greater boston were fairly constant and 
rarely greater than 75 a month prior to the end of 2004 . 
In 2005 the number of auctions began to rise and this 
trend continued into 2006 . but it was not until april 
2007 that auctions in Greater boston spiked to 875 per 
month . after the peak in april, auctions decreased to 
a low of 434 in November . a similar trend, but more 
exaggerated, was seen in 2008 . In the early part of 
the year, auctions increased to a high of over 1,000 in 
March, but then decreased for the remainder of the 
year . We see this pattern because home auctions are 
often grouped together . In the case of 2007 and 2008, 
it is likely that auctions were held in the beginning 
months of the year and the homes that were ready for 
auction in the latter part of 2007 and 2008 were held 
2009, equivalent to the average number of deeds in 
2007 .
Unfortunately, the decline in deeds in 2008 and early 
2009 did not carry over into the second half of 2009 or 
into 2010 . In fact, the number of deeds has been grow-
ing since July 2009 and has increased sharply over 
the first six months of 2010 . The year-to-year change 
between 2009 and 2010 is staggering . The number of 
foreclosure deeds in the first six months of 2010 is 124 
percent greater than in the first six months of 2009 and 
77 percent of the total number for all of last year . The 
only good sign is that from april 2010 to June 2010 the 
number of deeds has been continually decreasing, so 
although these months are twice as high as the number 
of deeds in the same months of 2009, the number is at 
least finally on the decline—for the time being .
Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned about 
the remainder of 2010 . although it is unlikely that 
monthly deeds will reach the level of the early 2008 
peak when up to 800 families lost their homes in a 
single month, it is likely they will increase through 
the rest of 2010 based on the high number of foreclo-
sure petitions reported during 2009 . This trend is also 
occurring nationwide as banks try to clean up their 
books by reclaiming the homes of delinquent home-
owners and selling to other families or putting them 










































































































































Monthly Foreclosure Auctions in Greater Boston, 2000–2010
Source: The Warren Group
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Foreclosure Activity by Housing Type
Foreclosures activity is not uniform across housing 
types . Figure 5.4 displays the rate of increase in fore-
closure petitions for single-family homes, two-family 
homes, three-family homes, and condos . between 
the first six months of 2005 and the first six months 
of 2010, the total number of foreclosure petitions in 
Greater boston increased by more than 4 times, from 
1,662 to 6,932 . Single-family home foreclosure petitions 
(comprising 60 percent of all petitions) increased by 3 .7 
times, as did three-family petitions . There were more 
than 4 .5 times as many foreclosure petitions in the first 
half of 2010 involving two-family homes, compared to 
the same six-month period in 2005 . but it was condo-
minium foreclosure petitions that exploded over this 
time period, increasing nearly 7 times .
as we noted above, not all foreclosure petitions 
continue to the deed or auction phases of foreclosure . 
Nonetheless, the rate of increase in petitions pales in 
comparison with the increase in deeds, as Figure 5.5 
demonstrates . between 2005 and 2009, the number 
of annual foreclosure deeds increased 21 times across 
all housing types, with the greatest increase (over 23 
times) in condos and single-family homes (21 times) . 
Two-family homes followed, increasing by over 19 
times, while the number of deeds on three-family units 
increased by more than 18 times . altogether, single-
family foreclosures in the first half of 2010 accounted 
to the beginning months of the next year . In 2009, 
the average number of auctions per month was 720 
compared to 804 in 2008 .
Unfortunately, a spurt of foreclosure auctions in late 
2009 continued into 2010 with a vengeance . Indeed, the 
number of auctions in the first six months of 2010 is 2 .3 
times greater than in the same period of 2009 (1,273 vs . 
560) . This further indicates that regulators are press-
ing financial institutions to rid themselves of troubled 
loans .
a major concern related to auctions is the adverse 
effect on other homeowners . as banks auction off 
homes at lower prices, surrounding home values often 
decrease as well . This places more homeowners at risk 
of going “underwater”—having a mortgage that is 
greater than the home’s value . With the large surge in 
auctions in 2010—combined with the continuing weak-
ness in the national economy — the recovery in home 
prices that we witnessed during the first six months of 
the year may weaken or even reverse .
Table 5.1 provides a summary of foreclosure activity 
in Greater boston from January 2005 at the beginning 
of the foreclosure crisis to June of this year . between 
the beginning of this period and april 2008, petitions 
increased by nearly 700 percent, deeds by almost 2,800 
percent, and auctions by over 400 percent . During 
what we would call the original right-to-cure period 
from april 2008 through February 2009, petitions were 
down nearly a third, deeds more than a third, and 
auctions down by more than half . but while petitions 
were down by almost 10 percent between February 
2009 and June of this year, deeds were up a third and 
auctions increased by 200 percent . It is fair to say that 
we are not out of the foreclosure woods yet .
TabLE 5 .1
Summary of Foreclosure Activity in Greater Boston, 
January 2005 – June 2010
Petitions Deeds Auctions
January 2005 – april 2008 683 .2% 2768 .0% 421 .9%
april 2008 – February 2009 -32 .2% -36 .7% -56 .2%
February 2009 – June 2010 -9 .1% 34 .6% 199 .5%













Ratio of Foreclosure Petitions, January – June 2010, 
to Foreclosure Petitions, January – June 2005, by 
Housing Type
Source: The Warren Group
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condos . Single-family homes experienced the smallest 
increase in auction activity between 2005 and 2010 and 
sustained the smallest loss in home value . Two-family 
homes were subject to a larger increase in auctions and 
lost, on average, over 35 percent of their value . Three-
family homes had a still larger increase in auctions, 
losing over 45 percent of their value on average . Condo 
prices, on the other hand, should have plummeted 
given the fact that condos were subject to a larger 
increase in auctions than any other housing type . We 
do not have a good explanation for this, but it might be 
related to the fact that condo prices appear to be more 
stable than any other type of housing regardless of the 
state of the economy or the state of the housing market . 
accelerated auction activity does not appear to affect 
condo prices any more than a depressed economy .
In conclusion, the number of single-family homes and 
condominiums falling into foreclosure has been greater 
than two- and three-family homes, but the foreclosure 
crisis in Greater boston is hitting two- and three-family 
homes at a more devastating rate . The Warren Group 
reports that there is no precise explanation for this, 
but suspects that absentee investors owning two- and 
three-family homes may be willing to walk away 
sooner when things get tough . They also attribute 
this to owners of “small multi-family dwellings (who) 
are dependent on rents and are more likely to default 
if they can’t fill their apartments every month .”3 
Regardless, two and three family homes are usually 
for just over half (51 percent) of the nearly 3,600 fore-
closure deeds that forced families out of their homes 
in Greater boston—compared with just 173 in the first 
half of 2005 .
Foreclosure auctions also skyrocketed, increasing by 
over 7 times between the first half of 2005 and the first 
half of 2010 . In this case, the increase was smallest 
among single-family homes (5 .6 times) and highest 
among condos (14 .1 times) with two- and three-family 
units increasing by 7 .3 and 9 .3 times, respectively . 
Figure 5.6 provides this information .
We would expect that the larger the increase in 
auctions, the greater the decline in home values, since 
auctions usually result in homes selling for a fraction 
of their original market value . as Table 5.2 reveals, 
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January – June 2010, to Foreclosure Auctions,  
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Source: The Warren Group
TabLE 5 .2
Auction Activity vs. Home Prices in  
Greater Boston, 2005–2010, by Housing Type
1-Family 2-Family 3-Family Condo
Ratio of Foreclosure 
auctions, 2010/2005
5 .6 7 .3 9 .3 14 .1
Percent Change in 
Median Home Price, 
2005–2010
-12 .9% -35 .4% -45 .4% -4 .7%
Source: The Warren Group
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affected, with over 2 .5 percent, or 1,049 housing units 
with a petition . Put in human terms, one in every 34 
homeowners in brockton received a foreclosure peti-
tion in 2009 . The west suburban communities around 
boston appear to have suffered least from the foreclo-
sure crisis, with foreclosure rates generally below 0 .5 
percent .
Of the seven towns with greater than 2 percent of 
total housing units with a foreclosure petition, four 
are located in the southern region of Greater boston 
and each had an unemployment rate greater than 9 .6 
percent in 2009 . The 28 towns and cities in which less 
than 0 .5 percent of total housing units were subject to 
a foreclosure petition had unemployment rates among 
the lowest in the state, with rates between 5 .6 and 8 .6 
percent in 2009 . Most of these 28 towns are located in 
the western suburbs of Greater boston .
concentrated in higher density towns and cities and 
this makes for a particularly harsh housing market in 
these areas .
Geographic Distribution of Petitions, Deeds 
and Auctions in Greater Boston
Foreclosures are not evenly spread throughout the 
region . Map 5.1 displays foreclosure petitions (2009) 
as a percentage of the total number of housing units 
(2000) in each of the communities in Greater boston . 
according to this map, cities and towns that have a 
high percentage of foreclosure petitions tend to be 
located in the southern part of the boston region and 
along the New Hampshire border, with pockets of 
high concentration north of the City of boston (Lynn, 
Revere and Everett) . In 2009, brockton was the most 
< 0.5%
> 0.5%, < =  1.0%
> 1.0%
MaP 5 .1
Foreclosure Petitions (2009) as a  
Percentage of Total Housing Units (2000)
Source: The Warren Group
< 0.25%
> 0.25%, < = 0.50%
> 0.50%
MaP 5 .2
Foreclosure Deeds (2009) as a  
Percentage of Total Housing Units (2000)
Source: The Warren Group
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2010, the 10th and 13th highest incidence of unemploy-
ment in the Greater boston region .
although foreclosure petitions do not always lead 
to foreclosure deeds and auctions, once a home has 
been foreclosed, it can face auction . Map 5.3 reveals 
the cities and towns with the highest auction rates . 
Not surprisingly, given the number of petitions and 
deeds, brockton and Millville are more prone to hous-
ing auctions than anywhere else in the region with 
more than 2 percent of their housing units facing a 
foreclosure auction . again, the chance of facing an 
auction is lowest in the western suburbs . although the 
geographic distribution may change slightly between 
towns and cities hit by foreclosure petitions, deeds, 
and auctions, it appears that those towns and cities 
that are most affected by the foreclosure crisis are 
affected in each phase of the process .
The number of foreclosure deeds (2009) as a percent-
age of total housing units (2000) is displayed in Map 
5.2 . It is important to note that the scale of this map is 
different from the scale of the previous map . although 
the percentage of total housing units with foreclosure 
deeds is less than that with petitions, it is not surpris-
ing that the geographic distribution of deeds is similar 
to the distribution of petitions . Cities and towns along 
the New Hampshire border, just north of the City of 
boston, and in the southern area of Greater boston face 
the highest foreclosure deed rates, while the western 
suburbs had the lowest . In 2009, Millville and brock-
ton were the only towns in the Greater boston region 
where more than 2 percent of their homeowners lost 
their homes to foreclosure . both of these towns had an 
unemployment rate of greater than 12 percent in July 
< 0.25%
> 0.25%, < = 0.50%
> 0.50%
MaP 5 .3
Foreclosure Auctions (2009) as a Percentage of 
Total Housing Units (2000)
Source: The Warren Group
Foreclosure Petitions (2009)













1 brockton 2 .53 1 brookline 0 .13
2 Plympton 2 .43 2 Sherborn 0 .14
3 Millville 2 .41 3 Cambridge 0 .18
4 Wareham 2 .36 4 belmont 0 .19
5 Randolph 2 .30 5 bedford 0 .21
6 Halifax 2 .18 6 arlington 0 .22
7 Lynn 2 .04 7 Newton 0 .23
8 Lawrence 1 .94 8 Lincoln 0 .24
9 Lakeville 1 .92 9 Concord 0 .26
10 Carver 1 .92 10 Needham 0 .28
11 Plymouth 1 .91 11 Lexington 0 .28
12 Revere 1 .89 11 Wellesley 0 .28
13 Dighton 1 .72 13 acton 0 .31




1 .70 15 Winchester 0 .33
Source: The Warren Group
TabLE 5 .3
 Municipalities with the Highest and Lowest  
Foreclosure Rates in Greater Boston, 2009
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in the City of boston that have very high foreclosure 
activity, the foreclosure rates for the city as a whole 
are not nearly as high as in other municipalities in the 
Commonwealth .
Eight communities fall into two of the three lists of 
communities with the lowest foreclosure rates . These 
municipalities are overwhelmingly found in the west-
ern suburbs of the Greater boston region and generally 
are among the most well-to-do communities in the 
Commonwealth .
Table 5.3 lists the 15 municipalities in the Greater 
boston region with the highest and lowest foreclosure 
petitions, deed and auction rates . These tables further 
indicate that foreclosure activity is concentrated in 
particular communities in the Greater boston region . 
Six communities (brockton, Lawrence, Lynn, Millville, 
Plymouth and Wareham) fall within each of the three 
lists because they have the greatest rate of foreclosure 
petitions, deeds and auctions in the Greater boston 
region . Note that many of these communities are 
older industrial cities . While there are neighborhoods 
TabLE 5 .3
 Municipalities with the Highest and Lowest Foreclosure Rates in Greater Boston, 2009 (continued)
Foreclosure Deeds (2009)













1 Millville 1 .46 1 Dover 0 .00
2 brockton 0 .98 1 Carlisle 0 .00
3 Lynn 0 .86 1 Lincoln 0 .00
4 Lawrence 0 .78 1 Sherborn 0 .00
5 Marlborough 0 .78 5 arlington 0 .02
6 Randolph 0 .74 5 bedford 0 .02
7 Wareham 0 .68 5 Cambridge 0 .02
8 Salisbury 0 .64 8 Needham 0 .03
9 Framingham 0 .59 9 Lexington 0 .04
10 Milford 0 .59 9 belmont 0 .04
11 Plymouth 0 .59 11 brookline 0 .05
12 Revere 0 .59 11 Medfield 0 .05
13 Everett 0 .58 11 Watertown 0 .05
14 Lowell 0 .58 11 Sudbury 0 .05
15 ayer 0 .57 11 Rockport 0 .05
Source: The Warren Group
Foreclosure Auctions (2009)













1 Millville 2 .30 1 Manchester 0 .00
2 brockton 2 .02 1 berlin 0 .00
3 Lawrence 1 .62 1 bolton 0 .00
4 Lynn 1 .61 1 Wakefield 0 .00
5 Marlborough 1 .45 1 Foxborough 0 .00
6 Wareham 1 .42 1 Winthrop 0 .00
7 Halifax 1 .39 1 Lancaster 0 .00
8 Plymouth 1 .31 1 Hull 0 .00
9 Plympton 1 .27 1 Lakeville 0 .00
10 Framingham 1 .14 10 arlington 0 .01
11 Lowell 1 .13 10 Malden 0 .01
12 Carver 1 .11 10 Milton 0 .01
13 bellingham 1 .08 10 Middleborough 0 .01
13 Haverhill 1 .08 14 Rockland 0 .02
15 Taunton 1 .07 14 Chelsea 0 .02
14 Duxbury 0 .02
14 Whitman 0 .02
14 North Reading 0 .02
14 Lynnfield 0 .02
14 Walpole 0 .02
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Foreclosures in Massachusetts vs. the U.S.
Compared to many other states and the nation as a 
whole, the foreclosure crisis in Massachusetts affects 
fewer homeowners . Table 5.4 provides data from the 
Joint Center for Housing Studies on the percentage of 
homes with mortgages in each state facing foreclosure . 
Nationally, in the first quarter of 2010, 4 .6 percent of 
all homes with mortgages had an outstanding fore-
closure petition . In Massachusetts the proportion was 
3 .4 percent . This was one-fourth the rate in Florida; 
one-third the rate in Nevada; one-half the rate in New 
Jersey; and two-thirds the rate in California . In all there 
are 20 states with higher mortgage foreclosure rates 
than in the Commonwealth . The states with the lowest 
mortgage foreclosure rates (under 2 percent), with the 
exception of alaska, are all in the farm belt .5
Nevertheless, with foreclosure petitions still well 
above past levels and the devastation in two- and 
three-family homes, we fear that the foreclosure crisis 
is far from over . We should see positive results from 
the latest foreclosure bill signed by Governor Patrick in 
July of this year, but as was true in 2008, the benefits of 
such measures may be short lived if there is not a more 
robust economic recovery and a strengthening housing 
market . This will be particularly true for those areas of 
Greater boston where high unemployment appears to 
continue to undermine the housing market leading to 
foreclosure petitions, deeds, and ultimately auctions .
TabLE 5 .4
Rates of Foreclosure Petitions among Households 
with Mortgages, by State
Rank State Rate Rank State Rate
1 North Dakota 1 .2 26 Kentucky 3 .3
2 alaska 1 .3 27 Minnesota 3 .3
3 Wyoming 1 .7 28 South Carolina 3 .4
4 South Dakota 1 .8 29 Louisiana 3 .4
5 Montana 1 .9 30 Massachusetts 3.4
6 Nebraska 1 .9 31 Utah 3 .4
7 Texas 2 .1 32 Wisconsin 3 .5
8 arkansas 2 .1 33 Rhode Island 3 .6
9 Missouri 2 .1 34 Delaware 3 .7
10 Virginia 2 .1 35 Idaho 3 .7
11 alabama 2 .2 36 Georgia 3 .9
12 West Virginia 2 .2 37 Connecticut 3 .9
13 Washington 2 .3 38 Maryland 4 .0
14 North Carolina 2 .3 39 New York 4 .3
15 Kansas 2 .3 40 Michigan 4 .4
16 Tennessee 2 .4 41 Indiana 4 .5
17 New Hampshire 2 .6 42 Maine 4 .6
18 Vermont 2 .7 43 Hawaii 4 .8
19 Colorado 2 .8 44 Ohio 4 .9
20 Iowa 2 .8 45 California 5 .2
21 Pennsylvania 2 .9 46 Illinois 5 .8
22 Oklahoma 3 .0 47 arizona 5 .9
23 New Mexico 3 .1 48 New Jersey 6 .2
24 Mississippi 3 .1 49 Nevada 10 .4
25 Oregon 3 .3 50 Florida 14 .0
Source: Mortgage bankers association, National Delinquency Survey; U .S . Census bureau, 
2008 american Community Survey, as cited in the Joint Center for Housing Studies 
of Harvard University, The State of the Nation’s Housing, 2010 . Used by permission .
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6.
Public Policy and Public Spending in Support of Housing
after a number of years with little priority given to 
housing at the Federal level, 2009/2010 witnessed 
a new focus on this issue . Driven by the foreclosure 
crisis and the collapse of the national housing market, 
especially in states not part of the usual East Coast/
West Coast interest in affordable housing, Congress 
and HUD have devoted substantial energy to bills 
affecting the housing world . Thus, in 2009 and 2010, 
members of Congress went home to their districts 
in Texas, in Nevada, in Florida and throughout the 
country to hear about housing issues, often for the first 
time in many years . No longer was the term “housing” 
something only used by constituents in Massachu-
setts, New York and California . With leadership from 
Congressmen and Senators from New England and 
new leadership at HUD, much progress was made in 
passing new legislation to encourage home purchases 
by first-time homebuyers, to provide state and local 
governments with funding to renovate abandoned 
and foreclosed properties, to refinance mortgages of 
current homeowners who face foreclosure, to provide 
incentives to banks and mortgage companies to 
modify existing loans, to encourage both borrowers 
and servicers to increase the number of short sales in 
lieu of foreclosure, to assist tenants who are current on 
their rent to continue to remain in foreclosed proper-
ties until the property is resold, and to assist low and 
moderate income families who are at risk of becoming 
homeless .1
In Massachusetts, the Legislature and the Patrick 
administration have also made major strides in the 
past year in addressing issues related to housing, 
including the foreclosure situation, the need to protect 
expiring use affordable housing units (i .e . the “preser-
vation” issue), the promotion of more housing produc-
tion, and developing ways to maximize the continuing 
habitability of public housing .
Moreover, in part because the current leadership of 
Federal housing policy in Congress is being spear-
headed by Massachusetts Congressman barney Frank 
as Chair of the Financial Services Committee, much 
of the Federal and State housing legislation has been 
developed in concert to assure that both levels of 
government can work together most effectively to 
achieve housing policy goals relating to production, 
preservation, foreclosure, and public housing .
before we examine Federal policy and the implica-
tions for the nation as a whole and specifically for 
Massachusetts, we need to address the special case of 
Chapter 40b, a key piece of housing legislation that 
will be the subject of a voter referendum in November, 
and which could lead to the law’s repeal . because of 
the timely nature of this, we will discuss the legislation 
and its impact on housing in the Commonwealth, then 
shift to the federal government and explore the impact 
of public policy more broadly .
Chapter 40B
The goal of Chapter 40b, or The Massachusetts Compre-
hensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act, first enacted 
in 1969, is to encourage the production of affordable 
housing in all cities and towns in Massachusetts . It 
achieves this goal by providing an alternative zoning 
approval process for developers who are attempting to 
construct housing in municipalities where fewer than 
10 percent of all housing units are affordable by the 
U .S . Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) standard that a household with 80 percent 
of area median income can afford a home in the 
community without spending more than 30 percent 
of its gross income . In such communities, a developer 
may circumvent local zoning regulations and seek a 
comprehensive building permit directly from the state 
if the developer agrees to include 20 to 25 percent of 
the housing units as long-term affordable units .2 The 
remaining 75 to 80 percent of housing units can be 
offered to the public at market rate, which often serve 
middle-income singles, seniors and families who make 
between 100 percent and 150 percent of area median 
income .3
The typical occupation of residents who fall below 
the 80 percent of area median income include those in 
the health care industry (nurses, medical assistants, 
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therapists, dental assistants); educators (teachers, 
counsellors); retail employees; construction trades 
(carpenters, plumbers, electricians); and other occupa-
tions related to human services .4 In addition, a large 
number of residents who fall into this category are 
retired seniors .
by 2007, 51 cities and towns of the 351 located in 
Massachusetts had exceeded the 10 percent threshold 
and therefore were exempt from the 40b law . This 
was up from 24 municipalities in 1997 . Moreover, 
because of new construction of affordable units, 40 
communities were within 2 percentage points of the 10 
percent threshold in 2007, up from 17 in 2001 .5 Smaller 
communities were closing in on meeting the affordable 
minimum as well: 117 municipalities only needed to 
produce or preserve less than 100 units to reach the 10 
percent threshold in 2007 .6
Chapter 40B Accomplishments
as shown in Table 6.1, between 1970 and april 2010 
Chapter 40b has supported the development of more 
than 1,000 projects with over 50,000 units of hous-
ing . another 132 projects have been approved, but 
construction is either under way or has not yet begun . 
Of the constructed units, almost 30,000 have been 
geared to those earning less than the HUD income 
standard with the majority (94 percent) of affordable 
units offered as rentals . Overall, approximately 80 
percent of all 40b housing is comprised of rental units 
with the remaining units for homeowners . CHaPa 
reports that the overall level of production under 40b 
is higher than any other single housing program avail-
able in the Commonwealth .7
When current development construction is complete 
the number of total 40b projects will be over 1,100 and 
the number of units will be in excess of 59,000 . The 
total number of affordable units will increase from 
29,285 to 31,683 .
Housing built under 40b is typically in relatively small 
developments . The average number of units per 40b 
project is about 50 . In such a typical development, 
about 30 units have been HUD affordable .
In addition to promoting the construction of afford-
able units, which helps to retain moderate-income 
households in Massachusetts and thereby contributes 
to maintaining a workforce for companies operating 
in the state, Chapter 40b has made significant direct 
economic contributions in terms of economic activity 
and employment . according to a study released in 
September 2010 by the UMass Donahue Institute, the 
construction of Chapter 40b housing units from 2000 
to april 2010 has resulted in $9 .25 billion in economic 
activity and 47,683 jobs in the Commonwealth .8 
Furthermore, if all proposed Chapter 40b projects are 
completed as planned, the result will be another $750 
TabLE 6 .1































1970s 50 4,773 4,522 4,773 4,522 0 0 0 0
1980s 287 15,228 12,050 14,484 11,855 744 195 0 0
1990s 262 8,425 4,573 5,182 3,583 3,243 990 0 0
2000s 431 21,861 8,140 15,443 6,163 6,025 1,775 393 202
Total Constructed 1,030 50,287 29,285 39,882 26,123 10,012 2,960 393 202
Under construction 132 9,002 2,578 1,241 539 7,507 1,927 254 112
Grand Total 1,162 59,289 31,863 41,123 26,662 17,519 4,887 647 314
Source: 1970s - 1990s permit estimates provided by CHaPa; UMass Donahue Institute, September 2010
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40b developments are the primary cause of shortfalls 
in municipal school budgets .11
as shown in Table 6.2, there will be 185 projects, 
including 12,076 units lost if Chapter 40b is repealed in 
November . Massachusetts will lose over 1,700 afford-
able rental units and close to 1,400 affordable home 
ownership units .
Given the data presented in preceding chapters, there 
is a real threat that repeal of 40b will make it even 
more difficult to produce the affordable housing we 
need to keep rents and home prices from further escal-
ating . Limiting the supply of housing, particularly 
affordable units in Greater boston, can only lead to 
aggravating the problem Massachusetts has faced in 
the past of retaining young families in the state .
Chapter 40R
Now in force for over four years, Chapter 40R is the 
“carrot” to Chapter 40b’s “stick .” The new law comple-
ments 40b by encouraging municipalities to create 
specific “smart growth” zoning districts that allow 
for higher density housing development near transit 
in return for additional state-provided local aid . The 
definition of smart growth includes mixed use devel-
opments, open space, and low-income housing avail-
ability, all in proximity to transit .
as we wrote in last year’s Housing Report Card, as of 
September 2009, 28 cities and towns in Massachusetts 
had approved Smart Growth Districts under Chapter 
40R, 20 of which were in the Greater boston area . as 
of august 2010, three additional municipalities have 
approved Smart Growth Districts under Chapter 
40R, raising the total to 31 . In addition, bridgewater 
million in construction which could employ nearly 
7,000 construction workers .
The UMass Donahue Institute estimates the residents 
of Chapter 40b units (built between 2000 and april 
2010) are responsible for $61 .8 million in annual prop-
erty taxes, $93 .7 million in state income taxes, and 
$22 .8 million in sales taxes . If all proposed Chapter 
40b housing projects are completed as planned, there 
will be an additional $4 million in property taxes, $4 
million in state income taxes, and $2 .4 million in sales 
taxes .
The Future of Chapter 40B
For the first time in 41 years, Chapter 40b will be on 
the state ballot in November . The boston Globe reports 
that some opponents of the law complain that these 
housing developments are often too big or do not fit 
their locations .9 Other opponents are motivated to 
support repeal of 40b because they believe 40b afford-
able housing units put pressure on school budgets, 
have adverse effects on home values, or possibly add 
to local crime rates .
However, a 2004 report completed at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology concluded that concern 
that multifamily developments built under Chap-
ter 40b in single-family, suburban neighborhoods 
negatively affect surrounding property values is 
misplaced .10 Furthermore, the Chapter 40b Task Force 
Findings and Recommendations to Governor Mitt 
Romney (May 30, 2003) report concludes that there 
is no evidence that Chapter 40b developments have 
placed an unreasonable amount of strain on a munici-
pality’s ability to provide fire and police service and 
that there is no evidence that Chapter  
TabLE 6 .2
Units at Risk if Chapter 40B is Repealed,  













































or to be 
determined
Total  185 12,076  3,541  5,086  1,721  5,365  1,376  1,241  380  384  64 
 Source: UMass Donahue Institute, September 2010
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increased the number of units in its Smart Growth 
District, and Reading and Marblehead each approved a 
second 40R District in their towns so the total number 
of 40R districts now stands at 33 . as Table 6.3 reveals, 
the approved districts now account for over 12,000 
units that could be built as-of-right when developers 
begin constructing housing again . Over 7,500 of these 
potential units are in Greater boston .
as economic uncertainty continues it remains difficult 
to judge the true long-term impact of the program 
because we have no indication of when and if these 
40R units will actually be constructed . However, the 
fact that the number of communities adopting 40R still 
is increasing indicates that municipalities continue to 
find benefits from participating in the program .
Recent Advances in Federal Housing Policy
Turning to Federal policy, there was a flurry of legisla-
tive action in 2009 and new legislation has been intro-
duced this year to combat the continuing crisis in the 
national housing market .
National Housing Trust Fund
The National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) was 
created as part of the Housing and Economic Recov-
ery act of 2008, but has not yet been capitalized .12 
Once funded, the NHTF will support the production, 
preservation, and operation of rental homes for those 
with the lowest incomes in the country . The NHTF is 
the first federal rental housing production program 
that is specifically targeted to extremely low income 
households since the Section 8 voucher program was 
established in 1974 . Given the high cost of rental units 
in Greater boston, the NHTF could be a boon for the 
region and the Commonwealth .
The Housing and Economic Recovery act outlines 
the ways that states must use funds to achieve those 
purposes:
■■ Production of housing should be targeted for house-
holds who have incomes from 30 to 50 percent 
of area median income, including those facing 
homelessness .
■■ at least 90 percent of the funds must be used for 
the production, preservation, rehabilitation, or the 
operation of rental housing .
TabLE 6 .3
Number of Potential Permitted Units  
under Chapter 40R, as of August 2010
Municipality Number of Units
amesbury 249
belmont  18 
boston  578 
bridgewater  594 
brockton  1,096 
Chelsea  125 
Chicopee  778 
Dartmouth  319 
Easthampton  450 
Easton  280 
Fitchburg  705 
Grafton  240 
Haverhill  526 
Holyoke  296 
Kingston  730 
Lakeville  207 
Lawrence  1,031 
Lowell  250 
Lunenburg  204 
Lynnfield  180 
Marblehead  17 
Marblehead (second district)  46 
Natick  138 
North andover  530 
North Reading  434 
Northampton  156 
Norwood  15 
Pittsfield  296 
Plymouth  675 
Reading  202 
Reading  (second district)  256 
Sharon  167 
Westfield   244 
Total  12,032 
Source: Commonwealth Housing Task Force
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Since the 1950s, HUD has subsidized about 1 .7 million 
rental units in more than 23,000 privately-owned, 
multi-family properties that are typically affordable 
to low-income tenants .  Many of these units are over 
40 years old and in need of recapitalization .  a 2004 
Government accountability Office (GaO) report found 
that more than 193,000 subsidized units were projected 
to become market rate housing in the next 10 years 
when the HUD-subsidized mortgage matures and 
the mortgage subsidy and low-income affordability 
restrictions attached to the property terminate .  GaO 
estimated that approximately 200,000 individuals in 
over 101,000 units would be at risk of paying higher 
rents because there were no existing tenant protections 
such as enhanced vouchers to protect the tenants from 
paying higher rents or being evicted when the mort-
gage matures .  The bill addresses the issues outlined 
in the GaO report and a host of other issues related 
to protecting the significant investment made by the 
federal government in helping to construct and main-
tain housing for low and moderate income tenants, 
many of whom are elderly or disabled, by:
■■ Providing resources and incentives to prevent the 
further loss of affordable housing units;
■■ Providing grants and loans to for-profit and non-
profit housing sponsors to help ensure the property 
is recapitalized and kept affordable;
■■ Establishing a voluntary Preservation Exchange 
Program to encourage owners to sell properties to 
purchasers who will keep the housing affordable;
■■ Establishing a first right of refusal that provides 
state housing agencies with an opportunity to 
purchase a property from an owner who wishes to 
sell their property while not requiring owners to sell 
their properties or prevent them from obtaining fair 
market value;
■■ allowing owners to request project-based assistance 
in lieu of enhanced vouchers, which serves to help 
preserve the long-term affordability of the project, 
assist with capital for rehabilitation, and ensure that 
tenants are not displaced;
■■ allowing owners to receive budget based rent 
increases, thus ensuring that the properties are 
adequately maintained and encouraging owners to 
renew Section 8 contracts;
■■ Up to 10 percent can be used for homeownership 
activities for extremely low or very low income first-
time homebuyers including down payment and 
closing cost assistance and assistance for interest 
rate buy-downs .
■■ at least 75 percent of the funds for rental housing 
must benefit extremely low income households 
(those with incomes at or below 30 percent of area 
median income) or households with incomes below 
the federal poverty line .
■■ all funds must benefit very low income households 
(50 percent of area median income or less) .
The State or State designated administering entity may 
use no more than 10 percent of its annual NHTF alloca-
tion for administrative costs of carrying out program 
requirements, including home ownership counseling .
The act also establishes requirements relating to enti-
ties that states fund to produce and preserve affordable 
housing using Housing Trust Fund resources . Eligible 
recipients of funds from the states, territories and the 
District of Columbia are organizations and agencies 
(nonprofit or for-profit) that demonstrate:
■■ The experience and capacity to produce the housing 
proposed;
■■ The financial capacity to undertake, comply, and 
manage the housing; and
■■ Familiarity with federal, state and local housing 
programs that will be used in conjunction with the 
federal funds .
More than 2,250 organizations representing every 
Congressional district have signed a letter in support 
of capitalizing this critical priority program, but no 
conclusive action has been taken yet by Congress .
Housing Preservation and Tenant  
Protection Act of 2010
On July 28, 2010, the House Financial Services 
Committee approved H .R . 4868, the Housing Preserva-
tion and Tenant Protection act of 2010 . This compre-
hensive affordable housing legislation, introduced 
by Chairman barney Frank of Massachusetts, would 
help stem the loss of affordable rental housing units 
across the country and prevent the displacement of 
low-income tenants, many of whom are elderly or 
disabled .13
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House . Once enacted, this piece of legislation should 
be a natural complement to Massachusetts’ Chapter 
40R Smart Growth Zoning and Housing Production 
act . among its provisions are:
■■ a Comprehensive Planning Grant Program will 
foster livable communities by helping communi-
ties develop comprehensive regional plans that 
incorporate transportation, long-term affordable 
and accessible housing, community and economic 
development, and environmental needs . Selection 
criteria and eligible activities are flexible to allow all 
sizes and types of communities—rural, suburban, 
and urban—to plan for a more sustainable future . 
The act authorizes $475 million in competitive grant 
funds over four years . 
■■ The Challenge Grant Program will enable communi-
ties to implement cross-cutting projects accord-
ing to their comprehensive regional plans . With 
$2 .2 billion authorized for competitive grants over 
three years, these projects will help communities 
create and preserve affordable housing; support 
transit-oriented development; improve public trans-
portation; create pedestrian and bicycle thorough-
fares; redevelop brownfields; and foster economic 
development . 
■■ an Interagency Council on Sustainable Development 
will be established to bring together the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
Department of Transportation, the Environmental 
Protection agency, and other federal agencies to 
identify federal barriers to sustainable development 
at the local level . 
■■ an Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities 
within HUD will be established to oversee all parts 
of this legislation .
Neighborhood Stabilization Program
a third round of the Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP) was passed this year with several 
important amendments to the program .15 First passed 
in 2008, NSP has been an important tool for commu-
nities and nonprofits attempting to deal with the 
problems of foreclosed properties in the wake of the 
financial market collapse in 2008 . The basic program 
provides that NSP funds may be used for activities 
which include, but are not limited to:
■■ Closing gaps in existing law to ensure that all 
low and moderate-income tenants are eligible for 
enhanced vouchers in the event that the assisted 
housing is converted to market rate housing;
■■ Giving HUD and affordable housing providers the 
tools needed to recapitalize the aging Section 202 
elderly housing portfolio;
■■ Enabling tenants to be partners with HUD, the 
Rural Housing Service (RHS) in the Department of 
agriculture, and owners to ensure that federally-
assisted housing is properly maintained;
■■ Including notification requirements to ensure 
that tenants are given sufficient notice prior to the 
conversion of the property to market rate housing;
■■ Making permanent a rural housing revitalization 
demonstration program launched in Fiscal Year 
2006 that is designed to preserve and recapitalize 
Section 515 properties;
■■ authorizing vouchers for tenants in properties that 
are converted to market rate housing or foreclosed; 
and;
■■ Directing HUD to establish a nationwide public 
database of HUD- and RHS-assisted properties to 
enable policymakers and the public to more effec-
tively monitor and preserve the existing portfolio of 
affordable housing . Requires the database to contain 
adequate safeguards to ensure the protection of 
owners’ privacy rights and proprietary information .
Clearly, this legislation could yield a number of key 
benefits to current low and moderate income renters, 
benefiting many in Greater boston .
Livable Communities Legislation
On august 3, 2010, the Senate banking Commit-
tee passed Chairman Christopher Dodd’s Livable 
Communities act (S . 1619) to improve the coordina-
tion between housing, community development, 
transportation, energy, and environmental policies 
to help create better places to live, work and raise 
families .14 The bill is designed to promote sustain-
able development and enable communities to reduce 
traffic congestion; cut greenhouse gas emissions and 
oil consumption; protect farmland and green spaces; 
revitalize existing Main Streets and urban centers; 
spur economic development; and create more afford-
able housing . Companion legislation is pending in the 
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unit for two years, if sufficient funds are available (2) 
Uniform tenant organizing rights, application proce-
dures, and tenant rights across all HUD programs 
(3) an established physical condition standard, and 
(4) Use restrictions and rental assistance contracts 
that would remain in effect after any foreclosure or 
bankruptcy .
although there is much debate among housing profes-
sionals and elected officials about the specifics of the 
legislation, its basic idea carries promise for reclaim-
ing low-income public housing units — an almost 
irreplaceable asset for people in need . HUD Secretary 
Shaun Donovan has stated that the absence of a viable 
preservation strategy for public housing has led to 
the loss of 150,000 units through demolition or sale 
over the last 15 years . Current appropriations of $290 
million could leverage $7 billion to preserve 300,000 
units . Debate about this approach is likely to continue 
for some time .
Low Income Housing Tax Credits
Provisions in the 2009 Stimulus bill (the american 
Recovery and Reinvestment act, or aRRa) had a 
significant and powerful effect on the ability of devel-
opers to monetize low income housing tax credits 
(LIHTC) and start construction on hundreds of afford-
able housing projects in Massachusetts and across the 
country .17 In aRRa, Congress created the Exchange 
Program operated by the Treasury Department . Under 
the Exchange Program, if a developer cannot find an 
investor to buy the tax credits — which usually repre-
sent the bulk of the equity in the project required by 
lenders — the state LIHTC allocating agencies may 
exchange those credits with Treasury and receive 
funds directly from the Treasury Department to invest 
in the proposed housing . Until funding is approved 
for the National Housing Trust Fund, LIHTC remains 
the primary method for supporting new construction 
and rehabilitation of housing for low- and moderate-
income households . advocates are working hard to 
have those aRRa provisions extended for another 
year .
Section 8 Vouchers
The Section 8 Voucher Reform act (SEVRa) was 
approved by the House Financial Services Commit-
tee in July 2009 .18 It contains several important provi-
sions to strengthen and improve the housing voucher 
■■ Establishing financing mechanisms for the purchase 
and redevelopment of foreclosed homes and resi-
dential properties;
■■ Purchasing and rehabilitating homes and residential 
properties that are abandoned or foreclosed;
■■ Establishing land banks for foreclosed homes;
■■ Demolishing blighted structures; and
■■ Redeveloping demolished or vacant properties .
The 2010 act provides for $1 billion in spending with 
up to 2 percent set aside for technical assistance .
Public Housing: Preservation, Enhancement and 
Transformation of Rental Assistance Act of 2010 
(PETRA)
One of the most difficult issues affecting affordable 
housing nationally is the number of low-income public 
housing units that are substandard, functionally obso-
lete, or otherwise uninhabitable or unmarketable . 
bringing all of these units up to current standards is 
not possible, given the amount of Federal funding 
that would be required, and housing practitioners 
have for years been testing out approaches to finance 
the amount of work necessary . One approach would 
harness the power of private capital markets to make 
this possible .
PETRa, a piece of legislation currently being consid-
ered in the Congress, would be a voluntary program 
through which public housing agencies, and some 
multifamily owners, could apply to HUD to convert 
their public housing operating and capital funding 
streams into a new form of rental assistance called 
“property based contract assistance .”16 For very small 
agencies, the new assistance could come in the form of 
a new project-based voucher contract . The amount of 
funding that an agency or owner would receive under 
the new rental assistance would be more than their 
current subsidies . With increased funds, housing agen-
cies would be able to borrow funds from the private 
market to upgrade and maintain their units . Upon 
conversion, the property would have a 30-year use 
restriction and 20-year property based rental assistance 
contracts, which the Secretary of HUD could choose to 
renew in the future .
among other proposed provisions of PETRa is (1) the 
offer to all project-based residents the right to move 
with a tenant-based voucher after living in a converted 
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■■ To protect tenants whose landlords face financial 
difficulties by giving agencies new tools to ensure 
that buildings are kept in habitable condition .
Other more controversial provisions of SEVRa would 
relax some of the regulatory framework of Section 8, 
as in HUD’s experimental Moving to Work program . 
This would now be named the Housing Innovation 
Program . Some housing advocates are not supportive 
of these provisions, believing that they are risky and 
unproven . Others support the new framework, believ-
ing that regulatory relief allows for innovation and 
creativity in the administration of the program .
Public Housing Budget Provisions
Massachusetts has approximately 50,000 Federal public 
housing units which need ongoing funding for opera-
tions, repairs, modernization, and resident services . 
The state’s public housing stock is generally older than 
in other parts of the country, placing it at greater risk 
of deterioration without reinvestment . This resource 
is extremely important because it provides permanent 
housing for some of the region’s lowest income fami-
lies, elders, and people with disabilities who could 
not otherwise afford to rent apartments in the private 
market . Underfunded for the last many years, the 
public housing budget is always of great importance to 
housing advocates across the country .
For FY 2011, the President has proposed a budget that 
essentially level funds federal public operating hous-
ing funds, but cuts the capital budget for public hous-
ing and eliminates the budget for supportive services 
to public housing residents . The budget includes:
■■ Operating Subsidies: The proposed FY 2011 budget 
includes $4 .83 billion for public housing operations, 
essentially the same amount as FY 2010 . Full fund-
ing of the operating subsidy formula would require 
a slightly higher appropriation .
■■ Capital Grants: The proposed FY 2011 budget 
includes $2 .02 billion for the public housing capi-
tal fund . This is a reduction of nearly half a billion 
dollars over a two-year period, probably not a wise 
choice at a time when foreclosure rates in Massa-
chusetts continue to remain high and our shelters 
are burgeoning with new clients that have lost their 
residences due to layoffs, hour cutbacks, or over-
time curtailment . Without the half-billion dollars 
in capital funds to maintain and repair the nation’s 
program, one of the most important of the housing 
subsidy programs for low and moderate income 
households . Under the Section 8 Voucher program, 
eligible households pay 30 percent of their income for 
rent, with HUD making up the difference up to an 
approved Fair Market Rent . Section 8 relies upon the 
private market to produce the units, with the rental 
subsidies administered by public housing agencies .
The highly respected Center for budget and Policy 
Priorities (CbPP) in Washington, DC, describes the 
Section 8 Voucher program as “the nation’s most 
widely used form of low-income housing assistance, 
help[ing] roughly two million low-income families 
afford modest rental units of their choice in the private 
market . Studies have shown that vouchers are highly 
effective in reducing homelessness and housing insta-
bility (both of which have been linked to a range of 
developmental problems among children) and help 
families move to lower-poverty neighborhoods with 
better schools and less exposure to crime .”19
The Section 8 program has been used extensively in 
Massachusetts since its inception in 1974, when the 
state and its housing authorities became “early adopt-
ers” of the program . There are currently approximately 
75,700 tenant-based mobile Section 8 vouchers in use in 
Massachusetts, plus another almost 67,000 project-based 
vouchers (including moderate rehabilitation projects) 
in affordable housing developments in the state, so 
that a total of nearly 143,000 households in Massachu-
setts benefit from the Section 8 program .
Some of the key SEVRa provisions are:
■■ To establish a stable, efficient voucher funding 
system that would allow agencies to help more 
needy families with the funds they receive, control 
program costs, and reduce the risk that agencies will 
be forced to cut assistance in response to funding 
shortfalls;
■■ To simplify rules for setting tenant rent payments, 
while continuing to cap rents at 30 percent of a 
tenant’s income;
■■ To help develop and preserve affordable housing 
through broader use of “project-based” vouchers 
(which, unlike more widely used “tenant-based” 
vouchers, can be tied to a particular housing devel-
opment); and
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received $643 million in federal funds and an addi-
tional one-time funding of $357 million under the 
federal american Recovery and Reinvestment act 
(aRRa) for a range of programs, including the Neigh-
borhood Stabilization Program, Low Income Housing 
Tax Credits and weatherization . altogether, DHCD 
was allocated $1 .4 billion in FY 2010 for housing, 
homelessness and community related services .
DHCD Operating Funds
In 1990, the state spent $382 million of its own funds 
on housing programs through DHCD’s operating 
budget (in FY 2010 dollars) . beginning in 1991, the 
amount declined an average of 14 percent per year, so 
that by 1994, the state was spending only about half 
the amount annually—$205 million . Over the next 
eight years, operating spending for housing continued 
to decline, but at the slower pace of 2 percent per year . 
by 2002, spending was down to $170 million . Over the 
next two years, state spending on housing was slashed 
to just $78 million (2004) . From 2004 to 2008, DHCD 
operating funds increased, but 2008 funding ($157 
million) was still less than funding in 2002 .
The current recession and the state’s fiscal crisis 
have taken a toll on the state share of DHCD oper-
ating funds . as shown in Figure 6.1, state-funded 
expenditures declined to just $115 million in FY 2010, 
from $155 million in FY 2008 . Despite pressures to 
cut spending further, the budget is level-funded for 
FY 2011 . There are changes within this budget, as 
the Massachusetts Rental Voucher Program will be 
increased $3 .2 million over FY 2010, mostly to the 
detriment of the Rental assistance for Families in 
Transition (RaFT) program (a cut of $2 .8 million) . The 
federal Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Hous-
ing Program will offset the cuts in RaFT .
as part of recommendations from the Special Commis-
sion Relative to Ending Homelessness in the Common-
wealth, state homeless programs were shifted from 
the Department of Transitional assistance to DHCD 
in FY 2010 .20 This move more than doubles DHCD’s 
budget . Emergency assistance (Ea) for Families is 
the largest of these programs . any family who meets 
eligibility guidelines may access Ea, and the recession 
pushed more families into homelessness, resulting in 
a 64-percent increase in the number of families enter-
ing the homeless service system from February 2008 
to July 2009 .21 as a result, during FY 2010, Ea received 
aging public housing stock, many units will be 
taken off line due to the lack of funding to keep 
them minimally habitable . The total capital needs of 
the country’s public housing are estimated at $20 to 
$30 billion .
■■ Choice Neighborhoods Initiative: The president’s FY 
2011 budget proposes $250 million in funding for 
the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative as a replace-
ment for the HOPE VI program .
■■ Resident Opportunity and Supportive Services (ROSS): 
ROSS links public housing residents with support-
ive services, resident empowerment activities, and 
assistance in becoming economically self-sufficient . 
The administration’s budget eliminates all funding 
for this important resource, which was funded at 
$50 million in FY 2010 .
In general, in these tight fiscal times, public housing 
is not as high a priority as many housing advocates 
believe it should be . Whether other programs such as 
Section 8 can make up for the lack of investment in 
more public housing just as tens of thousands of addi-
tional families are losing their homes to foreclosure 
will need to be studied in greater depth .
Public Spending on Housing  
in the Commonwealth
The Commonwealth has two sources of funds to assist 
homeowners, renters and developers of housing . 
One source is its own revenue and the second source 
is through a variety of federal programs . The state’s 
Department of Housing and Community Development 
(DHCD) allocates these funds from annual operating 
funds and capital or trust funds used for investment in 
public housing and used to subsidize affordable hous-
ing construction . State-funded operating funds are 
used largely for administration of the agency, rental 
assistance, and public housing subsidies . In addition, 
operating funds for homelessness programs were 
shifted from the Department of Transitional assistance 
to DHCD in FY 2010 .
Federally-financed funds extended to DHCD are used 
for such programs as the Section 8 rental voucher 
program, new housing development and rehabilita-
tion, energy assistance, and various neighborhood 
stabilization programs . During FY 2010, DHCD 
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existing programs as well as funds from the american 
Recovery and Reinvestment act (aRRa) . Figure 6.2 
shows the dramatic increase in federal spending since 
2008, adjusting all values for inflation . Federal funds 
flowing to DHCD jumped from $440 million in FY 
2008 (FY 2010 dollars) to $608 million in FY 2009 and 
$631 million in FY 2010 . an additional $357 million 
was made available to DHCD during FY 2010 as part 
$42 million in supplemental funding, for total FY 2010 
funding of $134 million . Under the FY 2011 budget, Ea 
will receive $115 million in funding .
Federal Spending through DHCD
While state spending for DHCD has declined, the 
Commonwealth is fortunate to be the recipient of 
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An Act to Stabilize Neighborhoods (The Foreclosure 
Relief Bill)
In august of this year, the Massachusetts Legislature 
passed, and Governor Patrick signed An Act to Stabi-
lize Neighborhoods to provide foreclosure relief to the 
many households affected by mortgage foreclosures 
in the state .23 Governor Patrick announced that “Even 
as Massachusetts continues its economic recovery, 
thousands of families are still dealing with the effects 
of foreclosure and they need immediate assistance . 
Combined with the 2007 comprehensive foreclosure 
law, we are redoubling our efforts to address the fore-
closure crisis .”24 This important legislation includes the 
following provisions:
■■ Delaying a foreclosure by an additional sixty days 
(to 150 days) if the financial institution neglects to 
consider a loan modification;
■■ Protecting lawful tenants of foreclosed proper-
ties from unnecessary displacement so long as the 
tenant pays rent to the lender .  The protections end 
when there is a purchase and sale contract for the 
lender to sell the property;
■■ Criminalizing willful acts of mortgage fraud;
■■ Mandating that a lender assume a Massachusetts 
Rental Voucher Program rental assistance payment 
contract;
of aRRa . Federal spending figures for FY 2011 are not 
yet available, but the large infusion of funds such as 
aRRa will not be repeated going into FY 2012 . Instead, 
smaller amounts, such as the $5 million in new federal 
funding for the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
will likely be made available to DHCD .22
Figure 6.3 shows changes in total DHCD spending 
(federal, as well as state operating and capital funds), 
excluding the new homelessness funding, from 1989 
to 2010 (in FY 2010 dollars) . From 1989 to 1997, total 
funds declined 45 percent, from $1 billion to $569 
million . While there was some recovery in total spend-
ing from 1998 to 2008, federal cash infusions in FY 2009 
and FY 2010 pushed total funding to $1 .3 billion in FY 
2010 . With the end of aRRa funding, every state will 
have to look to other sources if current funding levels 
are to be maintained . at this time, federal and capital 
spending amounts for FY 2011 are not yet available .
Recent Advances in State Housing Policy
There has been important activity at the state level in 
Massachusetts during the past year in recognition of 
market factors that have brought housing issues again 
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at least 80 percent of the units selling at market 
rate; 26
■■ authorizing a new expedited permitting program, 
Chapter 43E, to speed up state permitting decisions; 
and
■■ Extending brownfields environmental remediation 
tax credits .
Chapter 40T
In the making for more than 20 years, the affordable 
Housing Preservation bill signed into law on Novem-
ber 24, 2009, contains requirements affecting owners of 
covered subsidized properties, including the require-
ment of a notice of intent to sell any property with 
an expiring affordability restriction .27 as reported by 
the John D . and Catherine T . Macarthur Foundation, 
approximately 41,000 units of subsidized rental hous-
ing throughout Massachusetts may lose their afford-
ability restrictions by 2019 as a result of prepayments, 
opt-outs, and, increasingly, the expiration of subsi-
dized 40-year mortgages .28 In order to prevent this 
where possible Chapter 40T provides:
■■ additional notification requirements as a building 
gets closer to use restriction termination;
■■ an opportunity for the DHCD or its designee to 
purchase publicly assisted housing that is for sale 
if the proposed private sector transaction does not 
preserve affordability; and
■■ a maximum level that rents can be raised for a 
period of three years after a building’s use restric-
tions terminate if the tenants do not receive 
enhanced Section 8 vouchers .
DHCD promulgated regulations for the implementa-
tion of Chapter 40T on May 21, 2010 .
Conclusion
at this point, we have no data on which to assess 
how well new federal and state housing initiatives are 
doing, but clearly given the foreclosure crisis and the 
struggles of renters in the Greater boston region, these 
are welcome additions to the arsenal of housing laws 
and regulations aimed at expanding private housing 
production, rehabilitating public housing, increas-
ing housing affordability, reducing foreclosures, and 
securing rental subsidies for those who need them . 
■■ Creating a local option for municipalities to forgive 
property taxes on foreclosed properties acquired by 
nonprofits during the term of the rehabilitation;
■■ Requiring in-person counseling for reverse mort-
gages beginning in 2012 .
Given the recent sharp spike in foreclosures that we 
discussed in Chapter 5, this legislation is badly needed . 
However, only over the next several months will we be 
able to assess whether it has the power to limit foreclo-
sures and assist both homeowners and lenders find a 
path to loan modification .
An Act Relative to Economic Development  
Reorganization
On august 5, 2010, Governor Patrick signed the 
134-page comprehensive Act Relative to Economic  
Development Reorganization . The length and breadth of 
the bill underscores the degree to which the legislature 
and the state administration are taking seriously the 
need to focus on economic development in order to 
accelerate the state’s climb out of the financial reces-
sion . Within this extensive bill are several provisions  
of interest to housing:25
■■ Elimination of an obsolete State Low Income Hous-
ing Tax Credit (LIHTC) requirement that an investor 
in a State LIHTC also must be invested in a Federal 
LIHTC . This change is designed to attract additional 
investors to the State LIHTC market adding to funds 
for housing development .
■■ Granting of two-year extensions beyond the origi-
nal expiration date for building permits granted 
between august 15, 2008 and august 15, 2010 in 
order to provide more time for developers to begin 
construction on permitted projects . Unfortunately, 
Comprehensive Permits granted under Chapter 40b 
will not receive the benefit of the extension .
The new law also has several provisions to spur invest-
ment in older industrial or “Gateway Cities” including:
■■ Recapitalizing the Growth District Initiative with 
$50 million in additional funds;
■■ Creating a new $5 million-per-year tax credit Hous-
ing Development Incentive Program (Chapter 40V) 
for market-rate housing permitting developers and 
individuals to obtain state tax credits for rehabilitat-
ing buildings with no more than 50 units and with 
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as we have seen in the past, federal and state hous-
ing legislation does not always fulfill their missions 
given the complex web of economic and institutional 
factors that dominate housing markets . but it is grati-
fying to see the new federal and state efforts aimed at 
dealing with the housing needs of households in the 
Commonwealth .
The state’s fiscal health may pose a future problem 
for housing programs in the Commonwealth . For the 
time being, additional federal funds including those 
under the aRRa program have made up for a shortfall 
in state funding . Once these federal funds dry up, we 
may find the state unable to sustain its full commit-
ment to housing provision in the Commonwealth .
What is perhaps even more worrisome is the possible 
elimination by referendum of Chapter 40b . If this 
occurs, the state will lose its most powerful tool for 
developing affordable housing and put in jeopardy the 
success we have had with Chapter 40R . Even with 40b, 
we clearly lack sufficient affordable housing in Greater 
boston . Without it, the situation could be become 
much worse .
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7.
Conclusion
When we were wrapping up last year’s Greater Boston 
Housing Report Card in September 2009, there were 
many signs that the national economy was once again 
expanding, the housing market was stabilizing, and 
we were on the road at last to a sustained recovery . 
Indeed, the subtitle of that report was Positioning 
Boston in a Post-Crisis World . In the months follow-
ing the release, our modest forecast seemed to be on 
target . Fourth quarter 2009 Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) came in at a stunning 5 percent annual rate, the 
highest quarterly rate since early 2006, well before the 
current recession began . It was followed by another 
strong quarter at the beginning of 2010 . Productiv-
ity was driving this recovery, with output per person 
increasing at a breathtaking 6 .0 percent annual rate 
in the fourth quarter of 2009 followed by a strong 3 .9 
percent performance in the following quarter . National 
employment, which had been falling each month since 
December 2007, was now growing and housing prices 
were continuing to firm up in metro areas across the 
country, reducing the threat that millions more would 
find themselves in the position of being underwater 
with their outstanding mortgages exceeding the worth 
of their homes .
Moreover, Massachusetts was doing better than the 
nation in terms of economic activity and employment, 
something that was not true in the two previous reces-
sions . at the lowest point in the current recession, the 
U .S . Economic activity Index had fallen more than 
6 percent . In contrast, the Massachusetts Economic 
activity Index never fell by much more than 4 percent . 
Unemployment in the Commonwealth remained 
below the national rate .
There was additional good news in Massachusetts . 
The period between 2008 and 2009 saw the first net 
in-migration into the Commonwealth from other 
states since we began tracking this indicator in 2000 . 
The change in domestic migration seems to be at least 
partly related to home prices . as home prices escalated 
each year from 2000 through 2005, the rate of net out-
migration increased in lock step . Once home prices 
began to drop after 2005, each year fewer people left 
the state and more entered from other regions of the 
country .
There were also real improvements in the housing 
market through the spring of this year . Home sales 
were going up through May and foreclosure petitions 
were down 10 percent between February 2009 and 
June 2010 .
A Confusing and Troubled Time
In spite of all this good news through the spring, this 
past summer has presented us with a battery of discon-
certing data that indicate much greater weakness in 
the national economy than we would have expected 
earlier in the year .
Expansion of the nation’s GDP fell sharply in the 
second quarter and the number of unemployed nation-
wide continued to grow . New housing permits and 
housing starts nationwide, which had been improving 
in 2009 and through the spring of 2010, are now at the 
lowest level on record after the expiration of the first 
time homebuyer tax credit . Consumer confidence has 
slipped along with business confidence .
While Massachusetts continues to outperform the 
nation in economic expansion and employment 
growth, it cannot keep up this record achievement if 
the national economy continues to weaken or worse 
yet enters a double-dip recession . as such, this year we 
are not as confident that we are in a “post-crisis” envi-
ronment as we were last year .
We also have concerns on the housing front . In Massa-
chusetts, despite the thousands of additional residents 
from in-migration and sharply increased enrollment in 
post-secondary institutions, there has been a distinct 
lack of housing production . Unless supply is created to 
meet the increased demand for housing, we can expect 
that rising rents and home prices will once again make 
housing in Greater boston more unaffordable for many 
and could once again dissuade potential new residents 
from moving into the region while encouraging some 
who live here to leave for cities and towns outside of 
Massachusetts .
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also troubling is the abrupt rise in foreclosure deeds 
and auctions both nationally and in Greater boston . 
Foreclosure petitions increased only marginally in 
the summer months of 2010, but there has been an 
explosion in deeds and auctions . The number of deeds 
and auctions in the first half of 2010 suggest that the 
number of households losing their homes to foreclo-
sure throughout the year will easily exceed the total 
number in 2009 .
Rents, despite the economic crisis, are at a near all-time 
peak in Greater boston making rental units less afford-
able than ever . The big difference in the rental housing 
market between Greater boston and the nation lies 
in the large concentration of college and university 
students in the region . because of this steady demand, 
Greater boston is likely to remain the fifth most expen-
sive metropolitan region in the U .S . in average rent, 
only exceeded by New York City; Westchester County, 
New York; San Francisco; and Fairfield County, 
Connecticut . With rental vacancy rates already at 
normal rates and our forecast that an additional 
45,000 university and college students will be living in 
Greater boston by 2018, it is hard to imagine how rents 
could not become even more unaffordable unless there 
is a sizable increase in rental unit housing production .
Impact on Different Housing Markets
The recession has not had a uniform impact across 
housing types . We have found that changing 
economic conditions appear to affect multi-family 
homes more than single family homes in terms of 
production, sales, prices, and foreclosure activity . 
While permitting dropped for all housing types in 
Greater boston (the number of permits issued in 2009 
has dropped more than two-thirds from 2005), the 
permitting decline was most acute for multi-family 
homes (a 74 percent drop from 2005) . The one excep-
tion has been condominiums, which have tended to be 
the least affected type of housing .
Other affordability issues in the Greater boston region 
include the potential loss of affordable housing due to 
expiring use provisions, a lack of construction of new 
affordable housing, and reduced funding for housing 
at the state level because of the continuing fiscal crisis 
facing the Commonwealth . We are also concerned 
about the future fate of Chapter 40b and Chapter 40R 
which have been so important to the production and 
permitting of affordable housing units throughout 
the state . If Chapter 40b is repealed in November, 
thousands of units of affordable housing might not be 
produced in the near future and the loss of 40b could 
weaken the incentive for local municipalities to estab-
lish smart growth overlay zoning districts under 40R .
The Bottom Line
based on the latter half of 2009 and the first months 
of 2010, it is very difficult to predict what will happen 
in the remainder of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in 
the Massachusetts economy and the Greater boston 
housing market . Too much relies on what happens to 
the national—and international—economies, and too 
much depends on what the voters in the Common-
wealth do with regard to the referendum on 40b .  
We cannot yet tell whether the sharp reduction in 
home sales immediately after the expiration of the 
first-time homebuyer tax credit will be a temporary 
phenomenon or one that will continue for months to 
come . It is difficult at this time to gauge the impact on 
home prices as a result of the skyrocketing number of 
foreclosure deeds and auctions .
The state of housing in Greater boston is therefore in 
great flux at this moment . What we do know is that 
eventually the national economy will recover, the 
spurt in foreclosures will ultimately begin to moder-
ate, and the number of students living in the region 
will continue to grow . Under these conditions, hous-
ing prices and rents will begin to rise again, possibly 
sharply, unless we have policies in place to assure an 
increased supply of housing to meet an increase in 
demand . Finally, if housing becomes even more unaf-
fordable once demand conditions change, the gains 
we have made in the Massachusetts economy, as well 
as the gains we have made in retaining and attracting 
families and individuals to the region, will once again 
be in jeopardy . 
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Units at Risk - 
2012
abington 5,332 12 49 38 -22 .4% $250,000 $273,750 9 .5% abington 63 43 19 0 .36% 170
acton 7,645 35 75 89 18 .7% $473,000 $475,000 0 .4% acton 24 12 7 0 .09% Y 2003 0
amesbury 6,570 9 44 59 34 .1% $295,000 $290,000 -1 .7% amesbury 80 51 23 0 .35% 0
andover 11,513 19 121 147 21 .5% $495,000 $515,000 4 .0% andover 61 33 12 0 .10% 0
arlington 19,358 33 101 159 57 .4% $475,000 $491,000 3 .4% arlington 43 1 4 0 .02% 145
ashland 5,781 13 57 57 0 .0% $345,000 $325,500 -5 .7% ashland 67 44 16 0 .28% Y 2003 162
avon 1,737 2 10 16 60 .0% $232,450 $273,500 17 .7% avon 22 8 4 0 .23% 0
ayer 3,141 48 22 16 -27 .3% $267,000 $265,000 -0 .7% ayer 31 22 18 0 .57% Y 2002 20
bedford 4,692 5 32 52 62 .5% $488,750 $523,500 7 .1% bedford 10 5 1 0 .02% Y 2002 96
bellingham 5,632 13 56 68 21 .4% $228,500 $241,500 5 .7% bellingham 97 61 24 0 .43% 90
belmont 9,936 2 58 79 36 .2% $666,078 $686,000 3 .0% belmont 19 16 4 0 .04% 0
berkley 1,870 13 16 29 81 .3% $274,000 $272,850 -0 .4% berkley 22 19 6 0 .32% 0
berlin 891 4 13 8 -38 .5% $450,000 $471,465 4 .8% berlin 4 0 3 0 .34% 40
beverly 16,150 14 106 122 15 .1% $327,500 $329,250 0 .5% beverly 95 56 20 0 .12% 232
billerica 13,055 106 110 125 13 .6% $304,000 $316,000 3 .9% billerica 151 92 30 0 .23% 0
blackstone 3,321 4 34 31 -8 .8% $225,650 $225,000 -0 .3% blackstone 48 17 15 0 .45% 0
bolton 1,472 41 20 32 60 .0% $405,000 $442,500 9 .3% bolton 7 0 2 0 .14% 0
boston 250,367 332 376 532 41 .5% $368,849 $417,370 13 .2% boston 1,984 1,484 771 0 .31% 4387
boxboro 1,900 6 16 16 0 .0% $430,500 $438,500 1 .9% boxboro 10 5 4 0 .21% 0
boxford 2,602 3 28 43 53 .6% $518,725 $525,000 1 .2% boxford 26 11 7 0 .27% Y 2002 0
braintree 12,924 26 113 134 18 .6% $310,000 $325,000 4 .8% braintree 92 50 20 0 .15% Y 2003 239
bridgewater 7,639 23 53 67 26 .4% $278,600 $298,500 7 .1% bridgewater 98 24 23 0 .30% Y 2006 0
brockton 34,794 30 309 348 12 .6% $158,000 $176,564 11 .7% brockton 882 704 341 0 .98% 252
brookline 26,224 17 39 73 87 .2% $1,250,000 $1,065,000 -14 .8% brookline 35 32 12 0 .05% 99
burlington 8,395 52 55 94 70 .9% $370,000 $377,950 2 .1% burlington 43 15 8 0 .10% 0
Cambridge 44,138 11 29 59 103 .4% $846,500 $714,750 -15 .6% Cambridge 81 52 11 0 .02% Y 2002 416
Canton 8,129 37 52 83 59 .6% $408,500 $403,500 -1 .2% Canton 52 21 9 0 .11% 105
Carlisle 1,647 10 24 22 -8 .3% $677,125 $677,500 0 .1% Carlisle 9 3 0 0 .00% Y 2002 18
Carver 4,063 14 31 37 19 .4% $285,000 $250,000 -12 .3% Carver 78 45 15 0 .37% Y 2007 0
Chelmsford 12,981 15 107 140 30 .8% $320,000 $335,000 4 .7% Chelmsford 90 58 24 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Chelsea 12,317 44 11 25 127 .3% $160,000 $206,700 29 .2% Chelsea 194 2 70 0 .57% 112
Cohasset 2,752 3 36 41 13 .9% $650,000 $730,000 12 .3% Cohasset 18 11 7 0 .25% Y 2002 0
Concord 6,095 32 65 79 21 .5% $749,000 $675,000 -9 .9% Concord 16 12 8 0 .13% Y 2005 0
Danvers 9,712 11 54 108 100 .0% $319,000 $314,250 -1 .5% Danvers 69 46 20 0 .21% 0
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acton 7,645 35 75 89 18 .7% $473,000 $475,000 0 .4% acton 24 12 7 0 .09% Y 2003 0
amesbury 6,570 9 44 59 34 .1% $295,000 $290,000 -1 .7% amesbury 80 51 23 0 .35% 0
andover 11,513 19 121 147 21 .5% $495,000 $515,000 4 .0% andover 61 33 12 0 .10% 0
arlington 19,358 33 101 159 57 .4% $475,000 $491,000 3 .4% arlington 43 1 4 0 .02% 145
ashland 5,781 13 57 57 0 .0% $345,000 $325,500 -5 .7% ashland 67 44 16 0 .28% Y 2003 162
avon 1,737 2 10 16 60 .0% $232,450 $273,500 17 .7% avon 22 8 4 0 .23% 0
ayer 3,141 48 22 16 -27 .3% $267,000 $265,000 -0 .7% ayer 31 22 18 0 .57% Y 2002 20
bedford 4,692 5 32 52 62 .5% $488,750 $523,500 7 .1% bedford 10 5 1 0 .02% Y 2002 96
bellingham 5,632 13 56 68 21 .4% $228,500 $241,500 5 .7% bellingham 97 61 24 0 .43% 90
belmont 9,936 2 58 79 36 .2% $666,078 $686,000 3 .0% belmont 19 16 4 0 .04% 0
berkley 1,870 13 16 29 81 .3% $274,000 $272,850 -0 .4% berkley 22 19 6 0 .32% 0
berlin 891 4 13 8 -38 .5% $450,000 $471,465 4 .8% berlin 4 0 3 0 .34% 40
beverly 16,150 14 106 122 15 .1% $327,500 $329,250 0 .5% beverly 95 56 20 0 .12% 232
billerica 13,055 106 110 125 13 .6% $304,000 $316,000 3 .9% billerica 151 92 30 0 .23% 0
blackstone 3,321 4 34 31 -8 .8% $225,650 $225,000 -0 .3% blackstone 48 17 15 0 .45% 0
bolton 1,472 41 20 32 60 .0% $405,000 $442,500 9 .3% bolton 7 0 2 0 .14% 0
boston 250,367 332 376 532 41 .5% $368,849 $417,370 13 .2% boston 1,984 1,484 771 0 .31% 4387
boxboro 1,900 6 16 16 0 .0% $430,500 $438,500 1 .9% boxboro 10 5 4 0 .21% 0
boxford 2,602 3 28 43 53 .6% $518,725 $525,000 1 .2% boxford 26 11 7 0 .27% Y 2002 0
braintree 12,924 26 113 134 18 .6% $310,000 $325,000 4 .8% braintree 92 50 20 0 .15% Y 2003 239
bridgewater 7,639 23 53 67 26 .4% $278,600 $298,500 7 .1% bridgewater 98 24 23 0 .30% Y 2006 0
brockton 34,794 30 309 348 12 .6% $158,000 $176,564 11 .7% brockton 882 704 341 0 .98% 252
brookline 26,224 17 39 73 87 .2% $1,250,000 $1,065,000 -14 .8% brookline 35 32 12 0 .05% 99
burlington 8,395 52 55 94 70 .9% $370,000 $377,950 2 .1% burlington 43 15 8 0 .10% 0
Cambridge 44,138 11 29 59 103 .4% $846,500 $714,750 -15 .6% Cambridge 81 52 11 0 .02% Y 2002 416
Canton 8,129 37 52 83 59 .6% $408,500 $403,500 -1 .2% Canton 52 21 9 0 .11% 105
Carlisle 1,647 10 24 22 -8 .3% $677,125 $677,500 0 .1% Carlisle 9 3 0 0 .00% Y 2002 18
Carver 4,063 14 31 37 19 .4% $285,000 $250,000 -12 .3% Carver 78 45 15 0 .37% Y 2007 0
Chelmsford 12,981 15 107 140 30 .8% $320,000 $335,000 4 .7% Chelmsford 90 58 24 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Chelsea 12,317 44 11 25 127 .3% $160,000 $206,700 29 .2% Chelsea 194 2 70 0 .57% 112
Cohasset 2,752 3 36 41 13 .9% $650,000 $730,000 12 .3% Cohasset 18 11 7 0 .25% Y 2002 0
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2012
Dedham 8,893 11 80 110 37 .5% $314,500 $349,500 11 .1% Dedham 84 32 22 0 .25% 0
Dighton 2,261 7 14 23 64 .3% $279,000 $273,300 -2 .0% Dighton 39 19 4 0 .18% Y 2011 0
Dover 1,874 7 16 29 81 .3% $834,250 $779,900 -6 .5% Dover 17 6 0 0 .00% 0
Dracut 10,597 51 89 97 9 .0% $240,000 $269,900 12 .5% Dracut 145 96 37 0 .35% Y 2002 0
Dunstable 933 11 5 9 80 .0% $477,000 $385,000 -19 .3% Dunstable 9 4 3 0 .32% Y 2007 0
Duxbury 5,103 15 60 58 -3 .3% $441,000 $525,500 19 .2% Duxbury 49 1 4 0 .08% Y 2002 0
East bridgewater 4,423 28 38 49 28 .9% $251,450 $260,000 3 .4% East bridgewater 75 43 23 0 .52% 0
Easton 7,596 20 77 91 18 .2% $322,750 $394,800 22 .3% Easton 68 41 17 0 .22% Y 2002 0
Essex 1,357 7 8 20 150 .0% $404,313 $567,000 40 .2% Essex 8 1 2 0 .15% Y 2008 0
Everett 15,886 52 52 43 -17 .3% $212,500 $255,000 20 .0% Everett 231 4 92 0 .58% 160
Foxborough 6,260 24 37 57 54 .1% $355,000 $356,000 0 .3% Foxborough 50 0 8 0 .13% 0
Framingham 26,588 178 191 237 24 .1% $286,000 $300,000 4 .9% Framingham 328 303 158 0 .59% 473
Franklin 10,296 48 108 118 9 .3% $417,500 $377,000 -9 .7% Franklin 68 54 22 0 .21% 58
Georgetown 2,601 18 32 38 18 .8% $303,250 $359,200 18 .5% Georgetown 31 17 8 0 .31% Y 2002 0
Gloucester 12,997 56 60 100 66 .7% $278,750 $286,250 2 .7% Gloucester 114 49 25 0 .19% Y 2010 80
Groton 3,339 22 24 40 66 .7% $443,625 $424,500 -4 .3% Groton 19 2 5 0 .15% Y 2006 0
Groveland 2,090 35 15 34 126 .7% $300,000 $315,000 5 .0% Groveland 20 13 5 0 .24% Y 2005 0
Halifax 2,804 6 21 31 47 .6% $235,000 $256,500 9 .1% Halifax 61 39 15 0 .53% 0
Hamilton 2,717 6 23 38 65 .2% $375,000 $445,000 18 .7% Hamilton 26 8 2 0 .07% Y 2006 0
Hanover 4,440 19 32 64 100 .0% $343,290 $420,000 22 .3% Hanover 41 26 8 0 .18% Y 2006 0
Hanson 3,167 15 26 35 34 .6% $252,500 $240,000 -5 .0% Hanson 38 29 13 0 .41% Y 2009 0
Harvard 2,156 12 21 27 28 .6% $430,000 $487,000 13 .3% Harvard 8 5 2 0 .09% Y 2002 0
Haverhill 23,675 49 134 178 32 .8% $248,000 $255,000 2 .8% Haverhill 350 256 123 0 .52% 149
Hingham 7,307 50 92 120 30 .4% $587,500 $570,000 -3 .0% Hingham 40 19 5 0 .07% Y 2002 60
Holbrook 4,145 9 45 50 11 .1% $219,900 $238,750 8 .6% Holbrook 64 39 14 0 .34% 0
Holliston 4,861 20 55 61 10 .9% $350,000 $399,900 14 .3% Holliston 47 35 12 0 .25% Y 2002 0
Hopedale 2,284 2 18 27 50 .0% $206,750 $275,000 33 .0% Hopedale 22 19 13 0 .57% 0
Hopkinton 4,521 44 57 71 24 .6% $445,000 $502,000 12 .8% Hopkinton 39 30 8 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Hudson 7,144 21 53 68 28 .3% $262,500 $263,700 0 .5% Hudson 70 39 17 0 .24% Y 2008 0
Hull 4,679 9 53 48 -9 .4% $287,500 $357,350 24 .3% Hull 66 0 11 0 .24% 0
Ipswich 5,414 13 38 56 47 .4% $397,750 $395,500 -0 .6% Ipswich 41 26 12 0 .22% 0
Kingston 4,370 29 42 53 26 .2% $290,000 $317,000 9 .3% Kingston 69 41 19 0 .43% Y 2006 20
Lakeville 3,385 176 27 53 96 .3% $260,000 $250,000 -3 .8% Lakeville 65 0 15 0 .44% 22
Lancaster 2,103 16 16 23 43 .8% $309,000 $293,500 -5 .0% Lancaster 24 0 7 0 .33% 0
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Dedham 8,893 11 80 110 37 .5% $314,500 $349,500 11 .1% Dedham 84 32 22 0 .25% 0
Dighton 2,261 7 14 23 64 .3% $279,000 $273,300 -2 .0% Dighton 39 19 4 0 .18% Y 2011 0
Dover 1,874 7 16 29 81 .3% $834,250 $779,900 -6 .5% Dover 17 6 0 0 .00% 0
Dracut 10,597 51 89 97 9 .0% $240,000 $269,900 12 .5% Dracut 145 96 37 0 .35% Y 2002 0
Dunstable 933 11 5 9 80 .0% $477,000 $385,000 -19 .3% Dunstable 9 4 3 0 .32% Y 2007 0
Duxbury 5,103 15 60 58 -3 .3% $441,000 $525,500 19 .2% Duxbury 49 1 4 0 .08% Y 2002 0
East bridgewater 4,423 28 38 49 28 .9% $251,450 $260,000 3 .4% East bridgewater 75 43 23 0 .52% 0
Easton 7,596 20 77 91 18 .2% $322,750 $394,800 22 .3% Easton 68 41 17 0 .22% Y 2002 0
Essex 1,357 7 8 20 150 .0% $404,313 $567,000 40 .2% Essex 8 1 2 0 .15% Y 2008 0
Everett 15,886 52 52 43 -17 .3% $212,500 $255,000 20 .0% Everett 231 4 92 0 .58% 160
Foxborough 6,260 24 37 57 54 .1% $355,000 $356,000 0 .3% Foxborough 50 0 8 0 .13% 0
Framingham 26,588 178 191 237 24 .1% $286,000 $300,000 4 .9% Framingham 328 303 158 0 .59% 473
Franklin 10,296 48 108 118 9 .3% $417,500 $377,000 -9 .7% Franklin 68 54 22 0 .21% 58
Georgetown 2,601 18 32 38 18 .8% $303,250 $359,200 18 .5% Georgetown 31 17 8 0 .31% Y 2002 0
Gloucester 12,997 56 60 100 66 .7% $278,750 $286,250 2 .7% Gloucester 114 49 25 0 .19% Y 2010 80
Groton 3,339 22 24 40 66 .7% $443,625 $424,500 -4 .3% Groton 19 2 5 0 .15% Y 2006 0
Groveland 2,090 35 15 34 126 .7% $300,000 $315,000 5 .0% Groveland 20 13 5 0 .24% Y 2005 0
Halifax 2,804 6 21 31 47 .6% $235,000 $256,500 9 .1% Halifax 61 39 15 0 .53% 0
Hamilton 2,717 6 23 38 65 .2% $375,000 $445,000 18 .7% Hamilton 26 8 2 0 .07% Y 2006 0
Hanover 4,440 19 32 64 100 .0% $343,290 $420,000 22 .3% Hanover 41 26 8 0 .18% Y 2006 0
Hanson 3,167 15 26 35 34 .6% $252,500 $240,000 -5 .0% Hanson 38 29 13 0 .41% Y 2009 0
Harvard 2,156 12 21 27 28 .6% $430,000 $487,000 13 .3% Harvard 8 5 2 0 .09% Y 2002 0
Haverhill 23,675 49 134 178 32 .8% $248,000 $255,000 2 .8% Haverhill 350 256 123 0 .52% 149
Hingham 7,307 50 92 120 30 .4% $587,500 $570,000 -3 .0% Hingham 40 19 5 0 .07% Y 2002 60
Holbrook 4,145 9 45 50 11 .1% $219,900 $238,750 8 .6% Holbrook 64 39 14 0 .34% 0
Holliston 4,861 20 55 61 10 .9% $350,000 $399,900 14 .3% Holliston 47 35 12 0 .25% Y 2002 0
Hopedale 2,284 2 18 27 50 .0% $206,750 $275,000 33 .0% Hopedale 22 19 13 0 .57% 0
Hopkinton 4,521 44 57 71 24 .6% $445,000 $502,000 12 .8% Hopkinton 39 30 8 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Hudson 7,144 21 53 68 28 .3% $262,500 $263,700 0 .5% Hudson 70 39 17 0 .24% Y 2008 0
Hull 4,679 9 53 48 -9 .4% $287,500 $357,350 24 .3% Hull 66 0 11 0 .24% 0
Ipswich 5,414 13 38 56 47 .4% $397,750 $395,500 -0 .6% Ipswich 41 26 12 0 .22% 0
Kingston 4,370 29 42 53 26 .2% $290,000 $317,000 9 .3% Kingston 69 41 19 0 .43% Y 2006 20
Lakeville 3,385 176 27 53 96 .3% $260,000 $250,000 -3 .8% Lakeville 65 0 15 0 .44% 22
Lancaster 2,103 16 16 23 43 .8% $309,000 $293,500 -5 .0% Lancaster 24 0 7 0 .33% 0
 Appendix A Municipal Scorecard, continued Appendix A Municipal Scorecard, continued
82 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n


















































Deeds (2009) as 











Units at Risk - 
2012
Lawrence 25,540 11 74 111 50 .0% $142,450 $175,000 22 .9% Lawrence 496 413 200 0 .78% 362
Lexington 11,274 52 140 213 52 .1% $663,750 $695,000 4 .7% Lexington 32 21 4 0 .04% Y 2007 72
Lincoln 2,076 10 14 20 42 .9% $1,060,626 $917,500 -13 .5% Lincoln 5 3 0 0 .00% Y 2003 125
Littleton 3,018 11 25 36 44 .0% $337,000 $389,250 15 .5% Littleton 15 11 6 0 .20% Y 2008 0
Lowell 39,381 29 194 233 20 .1% $186,000 $189,000 1 .6% Lowell 590 445 228 0 .58% 669
Lynn 34,569 9 214 224 4 .7% $187,500 $195,500 4 .3% Lynn 704 557 297 0 .86% 541
Lynnfield 4,249 7 31 61 96 .8% $452,000 $525,000 16 .2% Lynnfield 25 1 5 0 .12% 0
Malden 23,561 5 75 92 22 .7% $249,000 $271,000 8 .8% Malden 292 2 110 0 .47% 129
Manchester 2,219 3 27 28 3 .7% $650,000 $854,500 31 .5% Manchester 7 0 2 0 .09% Y 2006 0
Mansfield 8,083 11 44 61 38 .6% $368,000 $326,000 -11 .4% Mansfield 55 33 13 0 .16% 0
Marblehead 8,746 9 66 91 37 .9% $446,750 $485,000 8 .6% Marblehead 40 31 6 0 .07% 0
Marlborough 14,846 3 104 126 21 .2% $257,500 $263,000 2 .1% Marlborough 240 216 116 0 .78% 0
Marshfield 9,117 116 97 109 12 .4% $306,000 $366,000 19 .6% Marshfield 118 96 33 0 .36% Y 2002 0
Maynard 4,398 2 47 49 4 .3% $280,000 $311,900 11 .4% Maynard 23 12 6 0 .14% Y 2007 56
Medfield 4,038 17 48 69 43 .8% $505,600 $553,400 9 .5% Medfield 18 8 2 0 .05% 0
Medford 22,631 0 90 111 23 .3% $325,000 $338,500 4 .2% Medford 162 47 44 0 .19% 93
Medway 4,243 6 52 57 9 .6% $313,000 $334,500 6 .9% Medway 42 14 7 0 .16% Y 2002 0
Melrose 11,200 6 66 118 78 .8% $389,375 $398,250 2 .3% Melrose 54 46 13 0 .12% 0
Mendon 1,870 6 12 22 83 .3% $332,000 $291,000 -12 .3% Mendon 19 12 5 0 .27% Y 2004 0
Merrimac 2,281 13 22 18 -18 .2% $280,375 $280,000 -0 .1% Merrimac 24 19 5 0 .22% 24
Methuen 16,848 46 129 167 29 .5% $235,000 $252,000 7 .2% Methuen 285 168 57 0 .34% 0
Middleborough 7,195 47 58 75 29 .3% $254,500 $225,000 -11 .6% Middleborough 116 1 36 0 .50% 16
Middleton 2,337 34 21 24 14 .3% $540,000 $409,200 -24 .2% Middleton 24 16 6 0 .26% Y 2005 48
Milford 10,682 37 70 89 27 .1% $272,750 $280,000 2 .7% Milford 132 113 63 0 .59% 61
Millis 3,060 2 20 24 20 .0% $325,000 $308,000 -5 .2% Millis 28 15 5 0 .16% Y 2008 0
Millville 956 2 8 11 37 .5% $186,000 $240,000 29 .0% Millville 23 22 14 1 .46% 0
Milton 9,142 33 99 124 25 .3% $435,000 $424,500 -2 .4% Milton 77 1 13 0 .14% 139
Nahant 1,676 3 11 8 -27 .3% $416,000 $381,750 -8 .2% Nahant 9 9 4 0 .24% Y 2005 0
Natick 13,337 24 100 155 55 .0% $432,500 $397,500 -8 .1% Natick 75 51 13 0 .10% 0
Needham 10,793 51 142 200 40 .8% $617,500 $630,000 2 .0% Needham 30 17 3 0 .03% Y 2006 20
Newbury 2,614 4 20 31 55 .0% $333,750 $380,000 13 .9% Newbury 23 11 5 0 .19% 0
Newburyport 7,717 7 46 84 82 .6% $395,000 $400,375 1 .4% Newburyport 35 25 6 0 .08% Y 2004 101
Newton 31,857 56 206 279 35 .4% $722,500 $715,000 -1 .0% Newton 74 62 19 0 .06% Y 2002 94
Norfolk 2,851 21 34 49 44 .1% $425,000 $389,500 -8 .4% Norfolk 27 1 4 0 .14% Y 2002 0
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Lawrence 25,540 11 74 111 50 .0% $142,450 $175,000 22 .9% Lawrence 496 413 200 0 .78% 362
Lexington 11,274 52 140 213 52 .1% $663,750 $695,000 4 .7% Lexington 32 21 4 0 .04% Y 2007 72
Lincoln 2,076 10 14 20 42 .9% $1,060,626 $917,500 -13 .5% Lincoln 5 3 0 0 .00% Y 2003 125
Littleton 3,018 11 25 36 44 .0% $337,000 $389,250 15 .5% Littleton 15 11 6 0 .20% Y 2008 0
Lowell 39,381 29 194 233 20 .1% $186,000 $189,000 1 .6% Lowell 590 445 228 0 .58% 669
Lynn 34,569 9 214 224 4 .7% $187,500 $195,500 4 .3% Lynn 704 557 297 0 .86% 541
Lynnfield 4,249 7 31 61 96 .8% $452,000 $525,000 16 .2% Lynnfield 25 1 5 0 .12% 0
Malden 23,561 5 75 92 22 .7% $249,000 $271,000 8 .8% Malden 292 2 110 0 .47% 129
Manchester 2,219 3 27 28 3 .7% $650,000 $854,500 31 .5% Manchester 7 0 2 0 .09% Y 2006 0
Mansfield 8,083 11 44 61 38 .6% $368,000 $326,000 -11 .4% Mansfield 55 33 13 0 .16% 0
Marblehead 8,746 9 66 91 37 .9% $446,750 $485,000 8 .6% Marblehead 40 31 6 0 .07% 0
Marlborough 14,846 3 104 126 21 .2% $257,500 $263,000 2 .1% Marlborough 240 216 116 0 .78% 0
Marshfield 9,117 116 97 109 12 .4% $306,000 $366,000 19 .6% Marshfield 118 96 33 0 .36% Y 2002 0
Maynard 4,398 2 47 49 4 .3% $280,000 $311,900 11 .4% Maynard 23 12 6 0 .14% Y 2007 56
Medfield 4,038 17 48 69 43 .8% $505,600 $553,400 9 .5% Medfield 18 8 2 0 .05% 0
Medford 22,631 0 90 111 23 .3% $325,000 $338,500 4 .2% Medford 162 47 44 0 .19% 93
Medway 4,243 6 52 57 9 .6% $313,000 $334,500 6 .9% Medway 42 14 7 0 .16% Y 2002 0
Melrose 11,200 6 66 118 78 .8% $389,375 $398,250 2 .3% Melrose 54 46 13 0 .12% 0
Mendon 1,870 6 12 22 83 .3% $332,000 $291,000 -12 .3% Mendon 19 12 5 0 .27% Y 2004 0
Merrimac 2,281 13 22 18 -18 .2% $280,375 $280,000 -0 .1% Merrimac 24 19 5 0 .22% 24
Methuen 16,848 46 129 167 29 .5% $235,000 $252,000 7 .2% Methuen 285 168 57 0 .34% 0
Middleborough 7,195 47 58 75 29 .3% $254,500 $225,000 -11 .6% Middleborough 116 1 36 0 .50% 16
Middleton 2,337 34 21 24 14 .3% $540,000 $409,200 -24 .2% Middleton 24 16 6 0 .26% Y 2005 48
Milford 10,682 37 70 89 27 .1% $272,750 $280,000 2 .7% Milford 132 113 63 0 .59% 61
Millis 3,060 2 20 24 20 .0% $325,000 $308,000 -5 .2% Millis 28 15 5 0 .16% Y 2008 0
Millville 956 2 8 11 37 .5% $186,000 $240,000 29 .0% Millville 23 22 14 1 .46% 0
Milton 9,142 33 99 124 25 .3% $435,000 $424,500 -2 .4% Milton 77 1 13 0 .14% 139
Nahant 1,676 3 11 8 -27 .3% $416,000 $381,750 -8 .2% Nahant 9 9 4 0 .24% Y 2005 0
Natick 13,337 24 100 155 55 .0% $432,500 $397,500 -8 .1% Natick 75 51 13 0 .10% 0
Needham 10,793 51 142 200 40 .8% $617,500 $630,000 2 .0% Needham 30 17 3 0 .03% Y 2006 20
Newbury 2,614 4 20 31 55 .0% $333,750 $380,000 13 .9% Newbury 23 11 5 0 .19% 0
Newburyport 7,717 7 46 84 82 .6% $395,000 $400,375 1 .4% Newburyport 35 25 6 0 .08% Y 2004 101
Newton 31,857 56 206 279 35 .4% $722,500 $715,000 -1 .0% Newton 74 62 19 0 .06% Y 2002 94
Norfolk 2,851 21 34 49 44 .1% $425,000 $389,500 -8 .4% Norfolk 27 1 4 0 .14% Y 2002 0
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North andover 9,896 41 88 106 20 .5% $420,000 $474,450 13 .0% North andover 75 51 22 0 .22% Y 2002 0
North Reading 4,839 19 44 51 15 .9% $372,549 $430,000 15 .4% North Reading 33 1 8 0 .17% 0
Norton 5,942 24 50 70 40 .0% $276,500 $259,000 -6 .3% Norton 82 59 26 0 .44% 24
Norwell 3,299 16 49 63 28 .6% $555,000 $482,500 -13 .1% Norwell 30 12 5 0 .15% Y 2003 0
Norwood 11,911 6 58 87 50 .0% $329,250 $355,000 7 .8% Norwood 69 25 18 0 .15% 35
Peabody 18,838 9 122 130 6 .6% $277,500 $298,950 7 .7% Peabody 176 114 52 0 .28% Y 2002 411
Pembroke 5,834 61 57 80 40 .4% $295,000 $284,500 -3 .6% Pembroke 84 45 11 0 .19% Y 2008 0
Pepperell 3,905 22 28 41 46 .4% $268,500 $285,000 6 .1% Pepperell 40 25 11 0 .28% 40
Plainville 3,088 21 19 31 63 .2% $304,000 $262,000 -13 .8% Plainville 22 17 8 0 .26% 0
Plymouth 19,008 32 224 251 12 .1% $271,000 $272,500 0 .6% Plymouth 364 249 112 0 .59% Y 2003 58
Plympton 865 125 8 4 -50 .0% $222,500 $272,500 22 .5% Plympton 21 11 1 0 .12% Y 2009 0
Quincy 39,912 9 176 200 13 .6% $309,950 $320,000 3 .2% Quincy 252 167 63 0 .16% Y 2007 467
Randolph 11,497 63 119 108 -9 .2% $210,000 $246,500 17 .4% Randolph 264 12 85 0 .74% Y 2006 69
Raynham 4,197 457 40 48 20 .0% $298,750 $263,950 -11 .6% Raynham 47 42 20 0 .48% 0
Reading 8,811 9 85 95 11 .8% $400,000 $421,216 5 .3% Reading 51 3 10 0 .11% 113
Revere 20,102 10 69 95 37 .7% $210,000 $235,000 11 .9% Revere 379 63 118 0 .59% 0
Rockland 6,632 1 42 56 33 .3% $265,000 $256,250 -3 .3% Rockland 100 1 25 0 .38% 0
Rockport 3,652 28 21 33 57 .1% $383,000 $425,000 11 .0% Rockport 26 16 2 0 .05% Y 2003 30
Rowley 1,985 10 11 16 45 .5% $460,000 $333,000 -27 .6% Rowley 12 12 7 0 .35% Y 2002 0
Salem 18,103 9 75 61 -18 .7% $275,000 $270,000 -1 .8% Salem 152 119 58 0 .32% 322
Salisbury 3,456 6 20 27 35 .0% $272,950 $250,000 -8 .4% Salisbury 40 26 22 0 .64% 0
Saugus 10,111 8 76 98 28 .9% $257,200 $298,950 16 .2% Saugus 128 97 38 0 .38% 266
Scituate 6,869 60 89 101 13 .5% $420,000 $407,500 -3 .0% Scituate 54 35 10 0 .15% Y 2003 0
Sharon 6,006 21 71 88 23 .9% $350,000 $384,950 10 .0% Sharon 36 20 10 0 .17% Y 2006 0
Sherborn 1,449 12 14 30 114 .3% $696,075 $720,000 3 .4% Sherborn 2 1 0 0 .00% 0
Shirley 2,140 0 14 19 35 .7% $254,000 $265,000 4 .3% Shirley 23 15 5 0 .23% 0
Somerville 32,389 16 27 42 55 .6% $386,500 $384,000 -0 .6% Somerville 135 97 35 0 .11% 23
Southborough 2,988 2 28 52 85 .7% $339,950 $544,950 60 .3% Southborough 20 11 5 0 .17% Y 2004 0
Stoneham 9,231 6 62 62 0 .0% $348,000 $416,500 19 .7% Stoneham 54 3 12 0 .13% 194
Stoughton 10,429 2 83 89 7 .2% $262,130 $300,000 14 .4% Stoughton 134 100 42 0 .40% Y 2009 130
Stow 2,108 171 19 30 57 .9% $380,000 $429,950 13 .1% Stow 11 12 8 0 .38% Y 2002 22
Sudbury 5,582 47 66 84 27 .3% $587,000 $600,500 2 .3% Sudbury 34 19 3 0 .05% Y 2003 0
Swampscott 5,804 1 27 62 129 .6% $345,000 $401,500 16 .4% Swampscott 58 39 14 0 .24% 0
Taunton 22,874 60 127 156 22 .8% $215,000 $228,000 6 .0% Taunton 307 245 126 0 .55% 319
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North andover 9,896 41 88 106 20 .5% $420,000 $474,450 13 .0% North andover 75 51 22 0 .22% Y 2002 0
North Reading 4,839 19 44 51 15 .9% $372,549 $430,000 15 .4% North Reading 33 1 8 0 .17% 0
Norton 5,942 24 50 70 40 .0% $276,500 $259,000 -6 .3% Norton 82 59 26 0 .44% 24
Norwell 3,299 16 49 63 28 .6% $555,000 $482,500 -13 .1% Norwell 30 12 5 0 .15% Y 2003 0
Norwood 11,911 6 58 87 50 .0% $329,250 $355,000 7 .8% Norwood 69 25 18 0 .15% 35
Peabody 18,838 9 122 130 6 .6% $277,500 $298,950 7 .7% Peabody 176 114 52 0 .28% Y 2002 411
Pembroke 5,834 61 57 80 40 .4% $295,000 $284,500 -3 .6% Pembroke 84 45 11 0 .19% Y 2008 0
Pepperell 3,905 22 28 41 46 .4% $268,500 $285,000 6 .1% Pepperell 40 25 11 0 .28% 40
Plainville 3,088 21 19 31 63 .2% $304,000 $262,000 -13 .8% Plainville 22 17 8 0 .26% 0
Plymouth 19,008 32 224 251 12 .1% $271,000 $272,500 0 .6% Plymouth 364 249 112 0 .59% Y 2003 58
Plympton 865 125 8 4 -50 .0% $222,500 $272,500 22 .5% Plympton 21 11 1 0 .12% Y 2009 0
Quincy 39,912 9 176 200 13 .6% $309,950 $320,000 3 .2% Quincy 252 167 63 0 .16% Y 2007 467
Randolph 11,497 63 119 108 -9 .2% $210,000 $246,500 17 .4% Randolph 264 12 85 0 .74% Y 2006 69
Raynham 4,197 457 40 48 20 .0% $298,750 $263,950 -11 .6% Raynham 47 42 20 0 .48% 0
Reading 8,811 9 85 95 11 .8% $400,000 $421,216 5 .3% Reading 51 3 10 0 .11% 113
Revere 20,102 10 69 95 37 .7% $210,000 $235,000 11 .9% Revere 379 63 118 0 .59% 0
Rockland 6,632 1 42 56 33 .3% $265,000 $256,250 -3 .3% Rockland 100 1 25 0 .38% 0
Rockport 3,652 28 21 33 57 .1% $383,000 $425,000 11 .0% Rockport 26 16 2 0 .05% Y 2003 30
Rowley 1,985 10 11 16 45 .5% $460,000 $333,000 -27 .6% Rowley 12 12 7 0 .35% Y 2002 0
Salem 18,103 9 75 61 -18 .7% $275,000 $270,000 -1 .8% Salem 152 119 58 0 .32% 322
Salisbury 3,456 6 20 27 35 .0% $272,950 $250,000 -8 .4% Salisbury 40 26 22 0 .64% 0
Saugus 10,111 8 76 98 28 .9% $257,200 $298,950 16 .2% Saugus 128 97 38 0 .38% 266
Scituate 6,869 60 89 101 13 .5% $420,000 $407,500 -3 .0% Scituate 54 35 10 0 .15% Y 2003 0
Sharon 6,006 21 71 88 23 .9% $350,000 $384,950 10 .0% Sharon 36 20 10 0 .17% Y 2006 0
Sherborn 1,449 12 14 30 114 .3% $696,075 $720,000 3 .4% Sherborn 2 1 0 0 .00% 0
Shirley 2,140 0 14 19 35 .7% $254,000 $265,000 4 .3% Shirley 23 15 5 0 .23% 0
Somerville 32,389 16 27 42 55 .6% $386,500 $384,000 -0 .6% Somerville 135 97 35 0 .11% 23
Southborough 2,988 2 28 52 85 .7% $339,950 $544,950 60 .3% Southborough 20 11 5 0 .17% Y 2004 0
Stoneham 9,231 6 62 62 0 .0% $348,000 $416,500 19 .7% Stoneham 54 3 12 0 .13% 194
Stoughton 10,429 2 83 89 7 .2% $262,130 $300,000 14 .4% Stoughton 134 100 42 0 .40% Y 2009 130
Stow 2,108 171 19 30 57 .9% $380,000 $429,950 13 .1% Stow 11 12 8 0 .38% Y 2002 22
Sudbury 5,582 47 66 84 27 .3% $587,000 $600,500 2 .3% Sudbury 34 19 3 0 .05% Y 2003 0
Swampscott 5,804 1 27 62 129 .6% $345,000 $401,500 16 .4% Swampscott 58 39 14 0 .24% 0
Taunton 22,874 60 127 156 22 .8% $215,000 $228,000 6 .0% Taunton 307 245 126 0 .55% 319
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Tewksbury 10,125 124 79 103 30 .4% $299,900 $306,600 2 .2% Tewksbury 102 50 26 0 .26% Y 2007 0
Topsfield 2,126 6 22 36 63 .6% $437,730 $433,000 -1 .1% Topsfield 13 11 4 0 .19% 0
Townsend 3,162 43 35 38 8 .6% $238,000 $228,750 -3 .9% Townsend 46 26 14 0 .44% 0
Tyngsborough 3,784 115 26 35 34 .6% $342,500 $364,900 6 .5% Tyngsborough 47 30 7 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Upton 2,083 19 13 37 184 .6% $349,000 $375,000 7 .4% Upton 24 1 8 0 .38% Y 2004 89
Wakefield 9,914 35 79 93 17 .7% $370,000 $362,000 -2 .2% Wakefield 57 0 12 0 .12% 25
Walpole 8,202 48 71 109 53 .5% $334,000 $358,500 7 .3% Walpole 61 2 13 0 .16% 0
Waltham 23,749 31 95 143 50 .5% $380,000 $392,500 3 .3% Waltham 92 76 21 0 .09% Y 2006 0
Wareham 8,650 20 105 124 18 .1% $207,450 $175,500 -15 .4% Wareham 204 123 59 0 .68% Y 2003 24
Watertown 14,959 40 43 36 -16 .3% $405,000 $441,250 9 .0% Watertown 55 32 8 0 .05% 171
Wayland 4,703 9 49 70 42 .9% $476,000 $547,500 15 .0% Wayland 18 15 7 0 .15% Y 2002 0
Wellesley 8,789 36 95 187 96 .8% $1,060,000 $857,500 -19 .1% Wellesley 25 14 6 0 .07% Y 2003 13
Wenham 1,310 0 7 19 171 .4% $470,000 $431,000 -8 .3% Wenham 10 7 2 0 .15% Y 2006 0
West bridgewater 2,507 6 18 25 38 .9% $245,000 $244,000 -0 .4% West bridgewater 28 17 7 0 .28% Y 2009 0
West Newbury 1,414 12 16 26 62 .5% $443,000 $338,750 -23 .5% West Newbury 10 13 2 0 .14% Y 2007 0
Westford 6,877 55 68 93 36 .8% $427,500 $430,000 0 .6% Westford 36 18 5 0 .07% Y 2002 0
Weston 3,796 35 42 65 54 .8% $1,025,000 $1,093,000 6 .6% Weston 19 10 6 0 .16% Y 2002 0
Westwood 5,218 11 58 71 22 .4% $536,500 $535,000 -0 .3% Westwood 19 8 3 0 .06% 32
Weymouth 22,471 32 163 206 26 .4% $285,000 $300,000 5 .3% Weymouth 200 101 39 0 .17% Y 2006 188
Whitman 5,100 23 38 48 26 .3% $286,750 $249,000 -13 .2% Whitman 61 1 15 0 .29% 0
Wilmington 7,141 20 70 98 40 .0% $345,000 $325,500 -5 .7% Wilmington 73 3 15 0 .21% 0
Winchester 7,860 15 79 108 36 .7% $658,000 $717,500 9 .0% Winchester 26 22 5 0 .06% 18
Winthrop 8,009 0 32 34 6 .3% $283,750 $326,500 15 .1% Winthrop 85 0 30 0 .37% 0
Woburn 15,312 23 91 111 22 .0% $321,500 $315,000 -2 .0% Woburn 112 65 16 0 .10% 0
Wrentham 3,477 19 35 46 31 .4% $410,000 $354,000 -13 .7% Wrentham 40 24 4 0 .12% 0
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Tewksbury 10,125 124 79 103 30 .4% $299,900 $306,600 2 .2% Tewksbury 102 50 26 0 .26% Y 2007 0
Topsfield 2,126 6 22 36 63 .6% $437,730 $433,000 -1 .1% Topsfield 13 11 4 0 .19% 0
Townsend 3,162 43 35 38 8 .6% $238,000 $228,750 -3 .9% Townsend 46 26 14 0 .44% 0
Tyngsborough 3,784 115 26 35 34 .6% $342,500 $364,900 6 .5% Tyngsborough 47 30 7 0 .18% Y 2002 0
Upton 2,083 19 13 37 184 .6% $349,000 $375,000 7 .4% Upton 24 1 8 0 .38% Y 2004 89
Wakefield 9,914 35 79 93 17 .7% $370,000 $362,000 -2 .2% Wakefield 57 0 12 0 .12% 25
Walpole 8,202 48 71 109 53 .5% $334,000 $358,500 7 .3% Walpole 61 2 13 0 .16% 0
Waltham 23,749 31 95 143 50 .5% $380,000 $392,500 3 .3% Waltham 92 76 21 0 .09% Y 2006 0
Wareham 8,650 20 105 124 18 .1% $207,450 $175,500 -15 .4% Wareham 204 123 59 0 .68% Y 2003 24
Watertown 14,959 40 43 36 -16 .3% $405,000 $441,250 9 .0% Watertown 55 32 8 0 .05% 171
Wayland 4,703 9 49 70 42 .9% $476,000 $547,500 15 .0% Wayland 18 15 7 0 .15% Y 2002 0
Wellesley 8,789 36 95 187 96 .8% $1,060,000 $857,500 -19 .1% Wellesley 25 14 6 0 .07% Y 2003 13
Wenham 1,310 0 7 19 171 .4% $470,000 $431,000 -8 .3% Wenham 10 7 2 0 .15% Y 2006 0
West bridgewater 2,507 6 18 25 38 .9% $245,000 $244,000 -0 .4% West bridgewater 28 17 7 0 .28% Y 2009 0
West Newbury 1,414 12 16 26 62 .5% $443,000 $338,750 -23 .5% West Newbury 10 13 2 0 .14% Y 2007 0
Westford 6,877 55 68 93 36 .8% $427,500 $430,000 0 .6% Westford 36 18 5 0 .07% Y 2002 0
Weston 3,796 35 42 65 54 .8% $1,025,000 $1,093,000 6 .6% Weston 19 10 6 0 .16% Y 2002 0
Westwood 5,218 11 58 71 22 .4% $536,500 $535,000 -0 .3% Westwood 19 8 3 0 .06% 32
Weymouth 22,471 32 163 206 26 .4% $285,000 $300,000 5 .3% Weymouth 200 101 39 0 .17% Y 2006 188
Whitman 5,100 23 38 48 26 .3% $286,750 $249,000 -13 .2% Whitman 61 1 15 0 .29% 0
Wilmington 7,141 20 70 98 40 .0% $345,000 $325,500 -5 .7% Wilmington 73 3 15 0 .21% 0
Winchester 7,860 15 79 108 36 .7% $658,000 $717,500 9 .0% Winchester 26 22 5 0 .06% 18
Winthrop 8,009 0 32 34 6 .3% $283,750 $326,500 15 .1% Winthrop 85 0 30 0 .37% 0
Woburn 15,312 23 91 111 22 .0% $321,500 $315,000 -2 .0% Woburn 112 65 16 0 .10% 0
Wrentham 3,477 19 35 46 31 .4% $410,000 $354,000 -13 .7% Wrentham 40 24 4 0 .12% 0
 Appendix A Municipal Scorecard, continued Appendix A Municipal Scorecard, continued
Sources:
Data on the number of sales and median sales prices, along with data on foreclosure petitions, auctions, and deeds were provided by The Warren Group .
Foreclosure numbers apply only to single-family homes, units in 2–3 unit structures, and condominiums .
Data on building permits are taken from the U .S . Census building Permits Survey .
Data on Expiring Use Units at Risk come from the Community Economic Development assistance Corporation (CEDaC), Expiring Use Database,
available from the Citizens’ Housing and Planning association (http://www .chapa .org/pdf/ExpUseJuly09 .pdf) .
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Appendix B
Proportion of Boston-based Four-Year Private University and College  
Full-Time UNDERGRADUATE Students Living Off-Campus
art Institute of boston at Lesley University 100 .0%
boston architectural College 100 .0%
Laboure College 100 .0%
MGH Institute of Health Professions 100 .0%
New England College of business and Finance 100 .0%
Urban College of boston 100 .0%
School of the Museum of Fine arts, boston 89 .9%
berklee College of Music 80 .1%
bay State College 75 .8%
Suffolk University 75 .0%
Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences 74 .6%
Fisher College 69 .7%
New England Conservatory of Music 65 .0%
The boston Conservatory 64 .6%
Northeastern University 50 .1%
Wentworth Institute of Technology 49 .5%
Emerson College 46 .3%
Simmons College 44 .9%
boston University 34 .7%
Wheelock College 33 .8%
Emmanuel College 30 .5%
Saint John's Seminary 23 .5%
boston College 20 .7%
boston baptist College 16 .5%
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (boston-only) 4 .4%
Total (Undergraduates) 47 .4%
Source:  City of boston, University accountability Reports, 2009
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Appendix C
Proportion of Boston-based Private University and College  
Full-Time GRADUATE Students Living Off Campus
art Institute of boston at Lesley University 100 .0%
boston architectural College 100 .0%
MGH Institute of Health Professions 100 .0%
New England College of business and Finance 100 .0%
New England Law | boston 100 .0%
School of the Museum of Fine arts, boston 100 .0%
Suffolk University 100 .0%
The New England College of Optometry 100 .0%
Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences 99 .6%
Emerson College 99 .4%
Northeastern University 98 .6%
boston College 98 .1%
Simmons College 96 .3%
Tufts University, School of Medicine 94 .6%
New England Conservatory of Music 93 .5%
Tufts University School of Dental Medicine 93 .3%
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (boston-only) 93 .3%
The boston Conservatory 91 .6%
boston University 88 .6%
Wheelock College 88 .2%
Wentworth Institute of Technology 77 .4%
Harvard University - boston-based Schools 50 .8%
Massachusetts School Of Professional Psychology 50 .0%
Saint John's Seminary 27 .3%
Total (Graduate) 88 .5%
Source:  City of boston, University accountability Reports, 2009
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Appendix D
Proportion of Boston-based Four-Year Private University and College  
Full-Time UNDERGRADUATE and GRADUATE Students Living Off Campus
art Institute of boston at Lesley University 100 .0%
boston architectural College 100 .0%
Laboure College 100 .0%
MGH Institute of Health Professions 100 .0%
New England College of business and Finance 100 .0%
New England Law | boston 100 .0%
The New England College of Optometry 100 .0%
Urban College of boston 100 .0%
Tufts University, School of Medicine 94 .6%
Tufts University School of Dental Medicine 93 .3%
School of the Museum of Fine arts, boston 91 .5%
Suffolk University 81 .1%
berklee College of Music 80 .1%
Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences 79 .2%
New England Conservatory of Music 78 .8%
bay State College 75 .8%
The boston Conservatory 71 .9%
Fisher College 69 .7%
Northeastern University 62 .7%
Simmons College 60 .9%
Emerson College 55 .5%
boston University 53 .4%
Harvard University - boston-based Schools 50 .8%
Wentworth Institute of Technology 50 .2%
Massachusetts School Of Professional Psychology 50 .0%
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (boston-based) 43 .6%
Wheelock College 42 .3%
boston College 38 .0%
Emmanuel College 30 .5%
Saint John's Seminary 25 .8%
boston baptist College 16 .5%
Total (Undergraduate + Graduate) 59 .9%
Source:  City of boston, University accountability Reports, 2009
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